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Abstract
This thesis addresses the politics of the yokma-pa, a Shi'ite faction in the Suru valley
in the Ladakh district of Jammu and Kashmir state, in Northern India. I use the term
factions as this is one of two Shi'ite religious groups in the area that between them
contain the majority of the population, and are normally opposed to each other.
Recently, the yokma-pa have apparently undergone a major political shift from the
1 960s, when they had a millenarian ideology and were primarily concerned with their
own local religious agenda. In the 1990s, they have taken on the role of an interest
group in the context of electoral politics and the local administration. Education is a
major contemporary issue in the area, and through opening their own English medium
private school in Suru, they are addressing the stereotype held by the administration
and in popular discourse in the area that Shi'ahs in Suru are backward and irrational.
The thesis demonstrates the continuity between these two phases. It also shows that
the yokma-pa constitutes a legitimate political organisation, at the same time as being
a religious organisation and a faction.
This thesis makes an important contribution to the anthropology of Ladakh, since there
is now a large amount of detailed ethnography on Buddhists, but very little on
Muslims, who also remain relatively neglected in the ethnography of India more
generally. It may also contribute to academic debates on political forms in India in the
context of the current political crisis, especially the rise of Hindu communalism, since
there is a dearth of contemporary studies of local politics.
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Chapter 1
Background to the Research
(I) The Research Problem
In the upper Suru valley, where I conducted the majority of my fieldwork, there are
three factions: the yokma-pa, goma-pa - both Shi'ite factions; and the Sunnis. This
thesis is primarily concerned with the politics of the yokma-pa. It had a strongly
millenarian phase in the 1 960s and 1 970s, when its members were relatively
uninterested in secular education. But, by the 1 990s, its leadership had opened a
secular English-medium school where I worked during my stay in Suru. In addition,
the yokma-pa had been involved in a political dispute with the goma-pa since the
1 960s, particularly over the issue of the millenarian preaching which the goma-pa
leader opposed. However, in the 1 990s, a new conflict emerged, this time with the
Sunnis over the issue of access to and control over government resources. In my
analysis, I shall show substantial continuity in the organisation and ethos of the yokma
faction itself over the last thirty years.
Although the yokma-pa might normally be regarded as a religious organisation, I shall
show that it is also a kinship group, like the other two factions. The relations between
these three groups are defined by marriage strategies. I shall show, therefore, that
kinship is central to both religion and politics in this area. Moreover, I shall
demonstrate that this is not simply true of rural society in Suru Block because, in
Kargil itself, the emerging administrative elite is forming a kinship group.
Kinship was also extremely important in differential responses to modernisation
processes, particularly the introduction of government schooling and employment. I
shall demonstrate that marginal differences between Shi'ah and Sunni kinship
practices and hence their relationship to the land and locality have had an important
impact on their readiness to enter into the government economy. The fact that in the
past few decades many Sunnis had gained secular educational qualifications and
white-collar government jobs, while Shi'ahs had not, was a major source of tension
between the yokma-pa and Sunnis in the 1990s.
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In addition to local practices, the politics of the wider region and the Indian nation state
have a profound effect on politics in Suru. In particular, discourses concerning
Muslims and Shi'ahs in the colonial and post-colonial state in India and more
specifically in Ladakh itself, and the 'developmental project' that is inherent to the state
in India (Kohli 1990:289, Chatterjee 1993:200-21 9), have a profound effect on the
interaction between Suru people and the government institutions and economy.
Suru is a particularly good place to look at the impact of the state on local politics in
India. The governmental economy is the main supplier of capital, jobs and
infrastructure, in Kargil tehsil,' as there are few other busness opportunities or large
capitalist enterprises. Secondly, although Suru itself is peaceful, the location of
Muslims (and largely Shi'ahs), in Jammu and Kashmir state during the current conflict
means that they are caught up at the heart of India's current political crisis. My
examination of politics in Suru, may also reveal important insights about the
relationship between government policies and communalism in India.
(ii) A Brief History of Suru and Ladakh2
The history of the Suru valley from the 18th to the 20th century is one of successive
incorporation into larger polities. In the 16th and 17th centuries, the area was
apparently made up of small chiefships, the most prominent of which was Kartse, with
1 A tehsll is an administrative division which has its own local administration. The two tehsils in
Ladakh are Leh and Kargil.
2 The main sources used for the history of Ladakh are: Petech 1977, Francke 1904, 1914 &
1926, and Rizvi 1983. The main documentary sources for these works are the chronicles of the
Ladakh kingdom and various smaller chiefships of the region, most of which were written in
Tibetan but are available in translation in Francke 1914 and 1926. These works occasionally
refer to Purig and Suru-Kartse; however, there are no extant documents from the area, prior to
the current century. In fact, the only sources are Hashmatullah Khan's Urdu history of Jammu
and Kashmir (Khan 1939), which is largely based on oral accounts that he gathered while he
was the Dogra administrator (wazir-i-wazarat) of Baltistan and Ladakh just after the turn of the
century, and Kacho Sikander Khan's Urdu history of Ladakh, which is partly based on
Hashmatullah Khan (Khan 1987). The main sources used for t!-e history of Kashmir are Bamzai
1962 & 1987, Lamb 1991 and Singh 1996.
13
Map 3- Ladakh
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forts at Karpokhar and Kartsekhar near Sankhoo. 3
 However, by the mid-i 6th century,
larger political entities were beginning to form in the Himalayan region and, in the early
18th century, the chiefship of Kartse was incorporated into that of Purig, covering most
of western Ladakh and ruled by the younger brother of the king of Ladakh. The
Ladakh kingdom was becoming more powerful at this time and consolidating its
territory in that area. It was both a centre for trade in pashmina woci from Western
Tibet, used in the manufacture of Kashmir and other fine shawls; and an entrepôt on
the long-distant trade routes between Tibet, Central Asia and India (Petech 1977:24,
Rizvi 1983, Grist 1985). Ladakh and Purig frequently fought to control the Kashmir
trade in the 17th and 18th centuries and, in these conflicts, the chiefdoms of Purig
often allied themselves with the chiefships of Baltistan, who shared their Muslim faith
(Petech 1977:1 02ff). Nevertheless, by 1758, Pung was permanently incorporated into
the Ladakh kingdom and Leh was established as the centre of power and trade in the
kingdom (Petech 1977:1 05 & 110). The rulers of Ladakh (rgyal-pos4) normally
professed Buddhism, and supported the expansion of various sects of Tibetan
Buddhism in the area (Petech 1977).
From the 15th century onwards, the people of Baltistan, Ladakh's north-western
neighbour, had converted from Buddhism to Islam, as had a large proportion of the
3Mirza Haidar Dughiat who invaded Ladakh in 1532 said that he sent a party against the cho (a
name for a local noble or chief) of the upper Suru vallley. This is mentioned by Petech
1977:26, quoting Dughlat 1895:408 & 460, and frequent mentions are made of the chiefs of
Kartse.
4 The Suru language is a dialect of related languages called Ladakhi in Leh Iehsi! and Balti in
Battistan. It is now officially called Purigi, so I will use that term; however, it is not normally
used by people in the area, who simply refer to 'our language' (ngati skaO. The language is
closely related to Tibetan but people in this area do not use Tibetan script, although they
apparently did in the past. Nowadays, when it is written, mainly in books from Baltistan, the
Urdu script is used. As a result, there is no standard spelling for words, as the Balti written
language is relatively unformalised. Therefore, I have transliterated words as they are
pronounced in Suru, rather than as they are officially spelt. I have done the same with Farsi and
Urdu words and used the simplest spelling that accords best with how the word is said in Suru,
but the conventional transliteration of these words can be found in the glossary. I will also
indicate when a term is Arabic, Farsi, Urdu or, occasionally, Ladakhi. All other words can be
assumed to be from the local dialect.
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population of western Ladakh, and a minority around Leh (Rovillé 1990:117). The
conversions in Purig were as a result both of proselytising by religious figures from
Kashmir and Baltistan, and of some chiefs converting to Islam while forming alliances
with Baltistan. A link between political and religious affiliation was common in this
area. Ladakh was often, although by no means always, in alliance with Tibetan
principalities, on the basis of their common religion. There had also been some
Muslim immigration from neighbouring areas such as Baltistan and Kashmir (Rovillé
1990, Dollfus 1995). The incorporation of Purig into the Ladakh kingdom left it
relatively disadvantaged economically and politically and without any major
involvement in trade, except as the supplier of carriers for the caravans. Hence,
Muslims in Ladakh were left relatively peripheral both economically and politically.
During this period, the Suru valley was administered by kharpons (regional
administrators), most of whom were Buddhists appointed from Leh (Khan 1939:700).
Ladakh remained an independent kingdom, prior to the 1830s, when it was conquered
by the Dogras from Jammu who, by 1857, came to rule over large parts of the
surrounding area, including Kashmir and Baltistan (Rizvi 1983:67, Lamb 1991 :8).5
The Dogras themselves came under British influence very soon after their conquest of
Ladakh and Jammu and Kashmir was a princely state in the British Raj. During the
Dogra period, trade continued but the regime was relatively harsh and its people were
subjected to heavy taxes, such as having to provide corvée labour for the major routes
(Bamzai 1987:150ff, Grist 1994, Sonam Wangyal:1997:486). Cunningham reported
that many Muslims fled to Baltistan following the Dogra conquests (Cunningham
1854:288). The Dogras appear to have been particularly harsh to Muslims, including
the nobles of Pung who rebelled several times. They apparently ceased to have any
importance after this time, unlike those of central Ladakh (Francke 1926:178). Thus,
Kargil tehsil, 6 as it was later known, became even more peripheral in the Dogra period
and its people were economically disadvantaged. By the middle of this century, many
men from Pung were migrating to labour in other parts of India, as had those of
5	 Dogras invaded Ladakh from Kishtwar, via the valley that leads to Panikhar and fought
several battles with the Ladakhis in the Suru valley (Rizvi 1983 62ff).
6 Kargil itself only became important as a bazaar town after the Dogra conquests. Moorcroft
and Trebeck reported that in 1822, the nearby village of Pashkyum was the main place on the
road between Leh and Srinagar (Moorcroft and Trebeck 1837 Vol 2:23).
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Baltistan and Kashmir since the previous century (Bamzai 1987:153). In Suru, nearly
all the men used to go and labour in the Punjab and Himachal Pradesh in the winter
until the 1980s.7
At the time of Independence in 1947 Jammu and Kashmir was effectively left out of
the Partition agreement with the consequence that India and Pakistan fought a war
over the region. In 1948, western Ladakh was occupied by Pakistani forces, who
nearly reached Leh, but were eventually driven out of most of Ladakh. It is very
unclear what happened in the weeks following the defeat of the Pakistani forces, but
the Muslim population of Ladakli seems to have reduced. For example, there are
villages in Leh tehsil where the Muslim population prior to 1947 had disappeared by
the next census as the Muslims either fled to Pakistan or other parts of India,
converted to Buddhism, or were killed. 8
 In Suru, I heard of several men who went to
Pakistan in 1948 and did not return. Baltistan and some other parts of Jammu and
Kashmir became part of Pakistan, but most remained in India.
There is now a cease-fire line dividing the two countries on the north-west side of
Ladakh, which is still a matter of dispute and heavily militarised on both sides. 9
 Trade
with China and Tibet had dropped considerably after the Chinese Revolution in 1949
and the invasion of Tibet in 1959, and ended completely with the cancellation of the
Indo-China Trade agreement in 1961. In 1962 India and China fought a war, in which
the eastern border of Ladakh was one of the main fronts (Lamb 1991:204). In the
wake of this war, a motorable road was built connecting Ladakh with the Kashmir
valley to the west, and government spending in the area greatly increased. Since the
1 960s, there has been a massive army presence in Ladakh. Subsequent wars and
skirmishes with Pakistan have meant that Ladakh has continued to be of crucial
strategic importance to the Indian government; and the people of Ladakh live with a
constant threat of hostilities, as indicated by the shelling of Kargil in 1997.10
7 Only men went from Suru, but from neighbouring Zanskar women also went.
8 The Ladakh region was 86.7% Muslim and 12.89% Buddhist in 1941 (Snnivas 1995:72).
9 Fighting took place near Kargil in the Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971 and the line of
actual control is currently about twelve kilometres from Kargil town (Rizvi 1983:70-71).
10 Kargil was shelled twice by Pakistan in 1997. The first time three people were killed and
several injured, but the second about twenty were killed and many injured in Kargil town, and
several important buildings such as the hospital were damaged.
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Government and army activity, as well as the building of the road and the opening of
Ladakh to (mainly foreign) tourists from 1975 have combined to bring enormous
economic changes to the area. One of the most significant changes has been the
growth of government and army employment, mainly around Leh, which was the
administrative headquarters of Ladakh for the first three decades of Independence. In
1979, Kargil was made into a tehsil in its own right with its headquarters at Kargil town,
and there was more government activity and employment in Kargil tehsil and Suru.
However, this increase in government services has slowed down in the last decade,
with the effect being felt first in Leh tehsil, and more recently in Kargil. The numbers
of people who have state-recognised educational qualifications, combined with a lack
of other economic opportunities and the relative lack of development in farming, has
led to serious unemployment in the district as a whole. The resulting severe
competition for government jobs was one of the catalysts for the anti-Muslim feeling
among many Buddhists over the last decade (Brix Bertelson & van Beek 1995).
Since the late 1980s, the conflict in Kashmir has caused huge disruption in the state,
and many deaths. Although the dispute is largely confined to the Kashmir valley and
its environs, Kargil tehsil has been adversely affected as an immediate neighbour. In
1990, the government in Delhi decided to suspend the Jammu and Kashmir
Legislative Assembly, and put the state under Governor's Rule, which prevailed until
1996, when elections were held. In Kargil tehsil, tourism has severely declined as
most foreigners are unwilling to travel through the Kashmir valley; hence, many of the
hotels that were built in Kargil town in the 1980s are now empty.' 1
 Similarly, business
opportunities have been severely curtailed, leaving the government as the main
source of non-agricultural employment in the area.
The population of the western parts of Kargil tehsil is almost entirely Muslim, but
Zanskar in the south is predominantly Buddhist. In the east there are many villages
where both religions are found, even within the same family (Shakspo 1995). The
majority of Muslims in Kargil tehsil are Shi'ahs, but there is a s zeable minority of
Sunnis, and a small number of adherents of the Noorbakhsh sect in a few villages
11 Tourism in Leh tehsil has not been so badly affected, as it has an airport with flights from the
plains, and can also be reached by the Manali road in summer.
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near Kargil (Zutshi 1961). Shi'ah Muslims, particularly those in remoter areas such as
Suru, suffer relative poverty as compared to the majority of other Ladakhis. Evidence
can be seen in their relatively high mortality and prevalence of diseases such as
tuberculosis and leprosy.'2
(iii) The Suru valley and the Yokma-pa
My research centres on Suru Block, one of the eight administrative sub-divisions of
Kargil tehsil. The Suru valley contains three Blocks 13 : Tambis, Sankhoo and Suru and
runs between Kargil and the Pensi La (pass) dividing it from the sub-division of
Zanskar to the South. 14
 Suru Block is found about fifty kilometres to the south of
Kargil, to which it has been connected by a motorable road since 1978. Due to heavy
winter snowfall that the valley experiences, the Block can only be reached on foot from
Sankhoo or by helicopter for several months in the winter and early spring. The area
is still predominantly agricultural, and nearly all the permanent households in Suru
have at least a small plot of irrigated land which they farm using mainly manual labour.
In Suru block, the staple crops are barley, wheat, peas and a few vegetables; and the
extensive pastures support various bovines, sheep, goats and horses.
The majority of the population of the Suru valley are Shi'ahs, and the rest are Sunnis,
who form about half the population of the neighbouring villages of Panikhar (the
headquarters) and Prantee in Suru Block. There are also two Sunni families in
Sankhoo, the headquarters of Sankhoo Block. The Sunnis do not currently have any
12 According to the records of the government medical department, the upper Suru valley has
more than half the total tuberculosis and leprosy cases for Kargil tehsi!, although it only contains
about an eighth of the population.
13 Blocks are administrative sub-divisions of tehsils. In Suru block, the headquarters are in
Panikhar, which is on the main road at the point where the non-motorable road from Kashmir
enters the valley.
14 Sankhoo and Suru Blocks between them contain about a quarter of the population of Kargil
tehsiL There are no official census results for 1991, but in 1993 the Tehsildar's Office in Kargil
recorded the population of the tehsllas being about 86,000. From the 1981 figures it can be
calculated that, in 1993, the population of Suru block was about 6,800 and that of Sankhoo
Block about 13,000. The two Blocks between them account for about a quarter of the population
of the tehsil.
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Map 4- The Suru Valley
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religious leaders in this area, but they have recently built new Sunni mosques (Arabic:
masjid) in Prantee and Panikhar. The Shi'ahs in Sankhoo and Suru Blocks nearly all
belong to the two factions, called the yokma-pa and goma-pa respectively, which
mean the "lower" and "upper" group of people. These terms have no connotation of
hierarchy. The majority of Shi'ahs in Sankhoo Block are yokma-pa, but in Suru Block
the two factions are roughly equal in numbers.' 5
 When I started my fieldwork in 1993,
they had been in dispute with each other for the last thirty years, since a strongly
millenarian phase of the yokma-pa in the early 1 960s. The yokma-pa and goma-pa
form clearly demarcated kinship and social groups (see Chapter 2).
Yokma-pa	 Coma-pa
Figure 1.1 - The Vokma and Goma-pas and their Relationship to the Blocks
Both factions have at their core a lineage of sayyids who claim descent from the family
of the Prophet Mohammed's daughter Fatima and her husband All, the Prophet's
cousin (Glassé 1991 :26) . 1 6 In Kargil tehsil, male sayyids have the title agha and
5 Estimates by yokma-pa members were that they had about 16,000 supporters in the two
Blocks in 1988, but that the numbers had slightly declined by 1993. In 1993, they had about
3,400 supporters out of a total population of 6,800 in Suru Block and about 10,000 in Sankhoo
Block out of a total of 13,000.
16 They are called shanf - meaning 'noble' - in some other parts of the Muslim world including
other parts of India In Suru this term is used for a good upstanding person, and its equivalent in
the local language is norbu.
25
women are called archo. 17 In each faction there is a leading agha who is the local
guide, called rehbar18 (Farsi) or Iamstan (literally 'one who shows the way'). The agha
is the head of the faction and the rest of the members are his followers, called mund
(Farsi) or uagha khrile yodkhan migun" (literally 'those who follow the agha'). In Suru,
all Shi'ah households are affiliated to one of the factions. They attend its major
religious ceremonies, pay certain taxes to the leading aghas, and go to them for
rulings on matters of inheritance and dispute settlement. The leading aghas have
studied for many years in the Shi'ite centres of Iraq and Iran, and are literate in Farsi
and Arabic, the languages of their religious books. As sayyids, the aghas trace
descent in the male line from different lmams and have lineage names such as Rizvi,
Husaini and Musavi. In Suru, there are a number of sayyid lineages, but only a few of
the aghas are important leaders. Nevertheless, all sayyids are respected and they
and archos are considered to be different from ordinary people (am-pa).
In addition to the core aghas' lineages, there are other religious practitioners, such as
lesser aghas, shaikhs, non-sayyid men who have undertaken religious studies usually
in the Middle East, and akhuns, village-level clerics who often act as teachers and
healers. The factions have a representative in each village, usually an akhun or hall
(someone who has visited the Shi'ite pilgrimage centres in the Middle East or Mecca),
who is responsible for collecting the members taxes, for ad hoc collections and
organising work parties.
The main centres for the yokma-pa are Taisuru village in Suru Block and Sankhoo
village in Sankhoo Block. In Taisuru the two leading aghas have houses next to the
yokma-pa masjid (mosque), which is the centre for their main religious gatherings in
Suru Block.' 9 The current leader of the faction is Agha Sayyid Mohammed, who is
17 This term was a title of honour or military distinction among the Turks (Glassé 1991:26), and
in Iran it is a title of respect both for an ordinary man and for someone of true authority (Fischer
and Abedi 1990:505). Archo seems to be a local term, as cho is a title of respect in this area.
18 Ayatollah Khomeini is called the rehbar of the Revolution (Momen 1985:316).
19 Masjid means mosque, which is a place for ordinary daily and Friday prayers. Imam-barah is
an Urdu term for matam-i-sarai, which means "place of matam". It is a spedal building for
Shi'ite mourning ceremonies - particularly at the time of Muharram. Matam are accounts from of
the hadiths - books of interpretation of the Koran and accounts of the lives of the Prophet
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commonly known by the name Agha Miggi Ort, which means "with eyes like a lamp".2°
He studied in a Shi'ite college (madrasah) in Iraq for several years and is considered
to have considerable insight on matters of religion. He is normally mild-mannered and
retains a certain air of detachment in many discussions, which is a sign of his
authority. He lives in a large household shared by his principal wife, their children and
older son's wives and children, one or two of the young aghas from his relatives in
Langkartse, who study with him and several servants (duksmi).
His neighbour in Taisuru is Agha Baqir, the son of Agha Hyder, the last leader of the
yokma-pa until his death in 1988, who started the millenarian movement in the 1960s.
Agha Baqir has not studied in the Middle East but is nevertheless highly respected for
his religious knowledge and healing powers. During my fieldwork he appeared to be
trying to build his own power-base in the faction and is generally more argumentative
than Agha Miggi Ort. He lives with two of his wives, eight of his children and a number
of servants.
Near the yokma-pa aghas' houses, on the edge of the village settlement, there is a
graveyard (Urdu: qabristan) of previous aghas and their families. It contains a number
of graves of revered people (astanas), the most impressive of which is that of Agha
Jaffar, Agha Miggi Ort's father. Agha Hyder's two other sons live in Sankhoo. Near
their house there is now an impressive astana for their father. There is also a lesser
branch of yokma-pa aghas at Langkartse, below Sankhoo.
Agha Najibul, the current leader of the goma-pa, also lives in Taisuru, where the
goma-pa have their imam-barah. He is the most retiring of all the aghas but his
brother is a well-known and much consulted healer. Agha Najibul's predecessor,
Agha Raza, who was the bitter opponent of Agha Hyder, lived at Shaksthang near
Taisuru, where his descendants remain.
Mohammed and his family (Glassé 1991:141 &2 62). The yokma-pa masfld is also used as an
imam-barah.
This epithet was also used for his father, Agha Jaffar, who was the rehbar before his death in
1957.
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Shi'ahs revere twelve Imams, who are believed to be the direct descendants from the
Prophet's daughter, Hazrat Fatima, and his cousin, Imam All, who was the first lmam.
Their descendants are known as Ahi al-Bayt (the Family of the Prophet) and there
were Twelve Imams or leaders in this line. Shi'ahs believe that the succession of the
spiritual authority of the Prophet Mohammed should have passed through the Twelve
Imams rather than the Umayyad Caliphs, who managed to gain authority in the
Muslim world. This line was defeated and almost completely annihilated in the 7th
century AD, at the Battle of Karbala in which Husain, the son of Fatima and Au and the
rightful lmam from the Shi'ite point of view, was killed along with most of his male
relatives (Fischer 1980:13-21). Those events and their commemoration are at the
heart of the major Shi'ite religious observances, the climax of which is the month of
Muharram, when Shi'ahs mourn and atone for the martyrdoms at Karbala. In Suru
Block, both factions have large processions at Taisuru on the 10th of Muharram, the
day of the battle of Karbala. In the past, this has often been the occasion for fighting
between the yokma and goma-pas when their processions met.
During Muharram and on many other occasions throughout the year, each faction
holds mourning ceremonies, called matam (Farsi) or orche (Purigi). An agha or
another cleric gives an account of one of the members of the Prophet's family, and
sometimes of their suffering, and urges the congregation to weep. The tears that
people weep are considered to be of atonement, since they were not able to fight on
Husain's behalf at Karbala. Shedding tears gains Husain's intercession for the Day of
Judgement (Hegland 1983:221).
The Twelfth Imam or Imam Mandi, was forced into hiding in the 9th century AD, due to
the persecution of Shi'ahs.21 Hence religious leaders have the role of guiding Shi'ahs
on earth for him and acting as intermediaries between man and God in his absence
(Glassé 1991:186). Every Shi'ite is enjoined to follow an Ayatollah as their main
guide, to whom they will also pay religious taxes (khums) (Richard 1995:85). These
main leaders are all in the Shi'ite centres in the Middle East, but people also normally
follow a local guide (rehbar), such as the goma and yokma-pa leaders.
21 This is often referred to as the 'occultation'.
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Shi'ahs believe that the Imam Mandi will reappear on earth and rule before the Day of
Judgement (Glassé 1991:155-6). In the 1960s, Agha Hyder, the leader of the yokma-
pa at the time, started telling his followers that the coming of the Imam Mandi (Twelfth
or Hidden Imam) and the end of the world were imminent. During this period, his
following increased, and the majority of people in Suru and Sankhoo Blocks followed
his millenarian teaching. However, he was opposed by Agha Raza, the leader of the
goma-pa, who actively campaigned against the idea that the Imam Mandi was about
to appear. Nevertheless, the yokma-pa continued to hold these beliefs and still do,
albeit in a muted form.
Until the mid 1 980s, the major focus of the yokma-pa was the millenarian movement
and merit-making both to attain salvation and social standing in the community. They
were not very interested in secular state education or the government economy which
was rapidly expanding from the late 1 970s. However, by the 1 990s, the leadership
was concerned about their relative disadvantage in respect of secular education and
government jobs, particularly as compared to the Sunnis in the Block, who had
enthusiastically entered into these areas en masse in the 1 970s and 1 980s. So in
1993, the yokma-pa opened the Noon Public School, on the pattern of similar private
English-medium schools in other parts of Ladakh. Its main aims were to provide
English-medium education in a school located in Suru, so that children could gain
educational qualifications while retaining their existing culture; and to address their
relative disadvantage as compared to Sunnis in the field of education and government
employment.
The school is situated in Taisuru, the home of Agha Miggi Ort, the yokma-pa leader
and main organiser of the school, and was opened a month before I arrived to do my
fieldwork. I became closely involved in the school, both as a volunteer teacher, and
finally as a member of the management committee. It rapidly became clear that the
school was a major source of controversy in the area, particularly for Sunnis. So the
conflicts around the school became an important focus for my research. This thesis
asks whether the school will provide a means for the yokma-pa to build power and
resources in the rural area that will allow them to have some control over the
development process, or whether it will merely hasten the existing processes of elite
formation and urbanisation that are currently taking place in Suru.
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(iv) Politics and Factions as a Topic of Anthropological Enquiry
India is undergoing a political crisis and a growing level of political violence associated
with the rise of Hindu nationalism, anti-Muslim sentiments and regional conflicts in the
Punjab and Kashmir. Largely historical accounts of the politics of the nation state in
India, and South Asia in general, are complemented by a growing literature on the
issue of more extreme incidents of communalism (religious bigotry) (Pandey 1993,
Das 1990, Hansen 1996). However, there is a dearth of information on local-level
politics in India that might examine some of the important issues that these other
works raise, particularly the effect of Hindu communalism on Muslims, the main
'target'. Moreover, Muslims, in general continue to be neglected as a topic of study in
India.
Local level politics has been rather unfashionable in anthropology since the 1 970s.
One reason for anthropologists' neglect of the topic may stem from the theoretical
sterility of past approaches. Transactionalism, the theoretical approach found in such
works as Barth's uPolitical Organisation of the Swat Pathans"and Bailey's various
ethnographies of Orissa and his theoretical work "Stratagems and Spoils" (Barth 1959,
Bailey 1963 & 1970), was rejected by later generations for its lack of historical
perspective and use of imported western economic concepts to describe people's
motivations.
Ahmed addressed both of these issues in a critique of Barth's work on the Swat
Pathans (Ahmed 1976). He claims that Barth describes the Pakhtuns (Pathans) as if
they were the colonial stereotype of the pre-literate wild men who are locked into a
constant state of anarchy and war, caught in a timeless present, and without a history
of their own (Ahmed 1976:6). In order to counter these images, Ahmed tries to
restore Pakhtun history, particularly by showing that they built a state in their recent
past, rather than being the state of anarchy that Barth had described. He also
criticises Barth for ascribing motives to Pakhtuns based on western economic
concepts of maximisation rather than their own values.
Ahmed himself has been criticised for seeing Swat society too much from the point of view of
the leader, called the Wali (Street 1990:251).
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For Bailey and Barth, political disputes represented a form of competition (or game)
between relatively equal and structurally similar groups based on motives such as
maximisation. In respect of Barth's work, Ahmed demonstrated that the ideas of
entrepreneurial maximisation that he brings to his Swat analysis, come directly from
western economic theory and have little obvious connection with the way that Pathans
see the world, and their possible motivation for what they do (Ahmed 1976:7). Hence
Ahmed tries to give an accurate depiction of Pakhtun society and motivation in terms
of what he sees as their own concepts. Furthermore, he shows that these altered in
the face of changing political and economic conditions.
In an earlier critique, Asad had argued that Barth overprivileged vertical ties in the
form of the segmentary lineage, and ignored the importance of classes in Pakhtun
society (Asad 1972). Asad claims that Barth emphasised choice and ignored the
issue of power in the political affiliation of tenants to landlords, who are also political
leaders. As he points out, in Swat, saints can also be landlords and political leaders,
and the degree to which they can exert power over their followers is crucial (Asad
1 972:85ff). He also shows in his critique, that such politics were not only developed
through dispute and conflict but also through consent (Asad 1972:94). However, Asad
associates power purely with control of economic resources, and ignores what
Bourdieu calls symbolic power (Jenkins 1992:85). This has the result that he draws a
sharp distinction between authority and power, using the examples of saints who are
followed because they are believed to be saintly and those who are landlords (Asad
1972:86). As Bourdieu has shown in his classic analysis of marriage patterns among
Béarnaise farmers, ties of kinship that are regarded as affectionate by the participants
can also be relations of exploitation (Bourdieu 1990:147-161). This is true of leading
aghas in Suru, since they have more land than most people, but are not landlords,
nevertheless, they have considerable power over their followers who are bound to
them through ties of kinship and belief in their religious powers.
In asserting that class rather than lineage/faction was central to the understanding of
Swat society and decentralising conflict in an analysis of politics, Asad raised an
important feature of western academic approaches to the Orient that was to be
elaborated by Said in his book TMOrientalism". Said said that one form of the
stereotyped views of Eastern peoples that frequently appears in western academia, is
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that they are intrinsically factional and fight among themselves in an irrational manner
(Said 1978:293-305).
This point was taken up by Hardiman, in the opening volume of Subaltern Studies
(Hardiman 1982). He analyses the use of the Great Indian Faction" as a defining
explanatory concept of Indian politics, at all levels from the village to the national
political party (Hardiman 1982). He makes a number of detailed criticisms of the work
of Bailey and several other anthropologists and historians who defined factions as
vertical organisations that comprise people from different castes or classes within a
single political bloc, and suggest that they were a major factor in Indian politics from
the village-level up to national parties. Hardiman disputes their analysis and says that
factional ties do sometimes come into play, but usually only in certain particular
contexts, such as elections. In addition, he says that factions are rarely politically
relevant at the supra-village level as they are usually not even advertised to outsiders,
to whom villages normally show a unified face (Hardiman 1982:212).
Hardiman shows convincingly that we should be cautious in using 'faction' as an
explanatory concept for Indian politics in general. However, he also suggests that
political blocs in India are much more likely to combine on common class interests
(Hardiman 1982:230). This assertion does not fit in with the evidence of instances of
factional alliances that he himself has offered, some of which apparently last for
generations (Hardiman 1982:230, Bailey 1970:92). Neither does it take into account
the importance of other vertical organisations such as regional political parties in
Indian politics.
A possible source of Hardiman's problem with the village-level data on factions, is that
he does not define the historical epoch to which he is referring. Most of the
anthropological studies to which he refers were conducted in the first few decades
after Independence and concern a particular type of faction led by dominant (land
owning) caste members. These were a common feature of Indian villages in parts of
the country in the post-Independence decades (Lewis 1958, Carter 1974). However,
low-caste and class organisations also became increasingly important during this
period. For example, in Bailey's own material on Bsipara in Orissa, he says that
factions led by landowners of the Warrior caste with followings of other castes, had
been a feature of the politics of the village in the 1 950s, but that in the 1 960s,
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increasingly Warriors faced a revolution by their Untouchables (sic) (Bailey 1 970:46ff).
Similarly, Robinson says that in the village in Andhra Pradesh that she studied in the
1 980s, processes of democratisation were transforming the position of lower castes
(M Robinson 1988:263).
Therefore certain types of faction do seem to be in decline in parts of India and
horizontal forms of organisation may have become more widespread. However,
vertical forms of organisation are still important in India (Chatterjee 1993:21 5) and co-
exist with horizontal forms such as caste organisations and classes (Jalal 1995:202).
Hardiman praises Carter's work on South India as he shows that, despite the
existence of factions, there is also a political elite that, to some extent, cross-cuts the
factions (Carter 1 974:7ff, Hardiman 1982:21 9ff). However, Hardiman seems to take
Carter's material as evidence of the lack of importance of factions, whereas I would
suggest that it shows that factions and vertical forms of organisation are not
necessarily mutually exclusive.
Moreover, Hardiman dismisses the idea that kinship could have anything to do with
political organisation. For example, he says of Lewis' work: "there is little suggestion
of the Great Indian Faction. He has merely observed, with considerable insight, the
operation of Jat kinship networks within one village and has labelled this phenomenon
'faction'." (Hardiman 1982:212); and later: "Nicholas's description of the Congress
and Communist 'factions' merely demonstrates the well-known fact that Indian villages
tend to be dominated by powerful families. As the power of these families continues
over the generations, it would be surprising if there was not some continuity of con ifict
between them."(Hardiman 1982:212). Even if Nicholas's evidence - of kinship-based
factions at the village level that support different factions - does not prove that "the
Communist Party of India was merely a faction in a red cap", it does show that there is
some connection between village-level kinship-based factions and the Communist
Party (Hardiman 1982:215). However, Hardiman seems to pass over those links, as
he seems to regard kinship organisation as intrinsically irrational and he cannot accept
that kinship groups could be associated with ideological or party poftics which he
seems to regard as rational. Such an assumption was partly based on the false belief
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that kinship no longer plays a major part in western society, a view that has been
criticised most notably by Strathern (Strathern 1 992) 23
Therefore, for Hardiman, class politics are 'rational' and factional politics are not.
Accordingly, to associate factions with India becomes an example of the orientalism
Said discusses. If, however, factions are as 'rational' as classes, then his argument
does not hold. I present factions in this thesis as a form of political organisation that is
just as rational, valid and varied as any other. I shall also show that kinship is part of
modern politics and is not incompatible with the politics of the nation-state.
I use the term faction in the limited sense that can be applied to politics anywhere, as
a form of vertical organisation, often within recognised collectivities such as co-
religionists, political parties, or a village. By vertical, I mean that a faction may contain
people of different 'status', 'class' or property holding. I hope to avoid associating
them with any derogatory connotations which, as Hardiman has shown, has applied
historically to the study of factions in India.
In Suru, 'pa might be the more appropriate term to use for faction, since, in the local
language of Suru, it is used to denote a collectivity or identification with a collectivity,
which can range from the extremely temporary to the more long-lasting. For example,
it is used in the name yokma-pa, which is the yokma faction as a whole; for a village,
such as "Taisuru-pa or for house names which are the name of the head of the
household plus pa, such as NHusainpa. It is also used for the most fleeting
collectivity, such as "I can see Nicky-pa coming down the road.", which just means me
and whoever I happen to be walking with at that moment. However, it does not imply
a collection of individuals in the western Liberal sense, but rather the collectivity as an
entity. Concepts like ownership are also almost always associated with a "pa" rather
Barth and Bailey make a similar mistake as they regard relations of kinship as being
fundamentally different from those they term transactions. For example, Bailey draws on
Barth's Swat material to make a distinction between the core of the factions, which are the
families of the khans, who are the landholders, and the only people to have full citizen rights in
the villages and the followers, who are landless tenants, who he says swap sides frequently and
base their decisions on what he calls sensible and rational calculation of which leader can best
protect them (Bailey 1970:39ff). However, he also throws in the nformation that the khan may
have affinal relations with his followers (Bailey 1970:39).
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than an individual, for example you would always say ilHusainpe balang", meaning
the cow of the Husain house, rather than Husain's cow (Husaini balang).
The yokma-pa is just one of the collectivities to which people belong in Suru, albeit an
extremely important one. It is both a religious, kinship and political group with various
external connections. Nowadays, one of its roles is that it acts as an interest group in
the electoral and administrative politics of the area, which is an important theme in my
thesis. The nature of those interactions are heavily influenced by aspects of the
Indian nation state and attitudes to Muslims and Shi'ahs in India and Ladakh, as I shall
discuss in the next three sections.
(v) The Political Economy of the Indian Nation State
There have been several recent contributions to the history of the Indian nation state
as opposed to the local state I describe in Ladakh. Chatterjee suggests that the role
of planning and development lie at the core of the ideological conception of the post-
colonial Indian state, and hence they are located in the field of administration which is
dejure, but not de facto, politically neutral. Thus, Indian electoral politics are not by
and large contests between left and right because every party has to promise to spend
money in order to develop the areas they represent (Chatterjee 1993:206).
JaIaI has taken a similar view, in a comparison of the politics of post-Partition India
with those of Pakistan and Bangladesh, where she examines the role of the
government bureaucracy in some detail (Jalal 1995). She argues that the post-
colonial state in India inherited and continued the colonial administrative system
almost intact. This had been both authoritarian and provided the only contact between
the populace and government. After Independence, the Congress party was
organisationally weak in many areas, despite being the main political party of the
nationalist movement. Therefore, it was often forced to work with bureaucrats who
had links with voters that the Congress party lacked, leading to a progressive
politicisation of the administration. JalaI suggests that the country came to be ruled by
a relatively authoritarian administration that was close to, rather than controlled by,
politicians and, amongst both politicians and bureaucrats, a tendency to bend the rules
to achieve their objectives became common. She argues that this inherent
authoritarianism was also compounded by the fact that the Indian Constitution does
not contain many civil rights for the individual. In brief, it is argued that the state
35
delivers its policies through an administration in which power is centralised and has
become increasingly so in recent decades, but is not highly democratised.
The politics of nationalism and India's eventual Partition created a post-colonial state
which appears to be secular, but implicitly is founded upon notions of Hindu
nationalism. Muslims are therefore classified as a minority, and regarded as potentially
disloyal to India (Pandey 1993:3, Jalal 1995:208). Both Jalal and Chatterjee maintain
that various tendencies in the post-colonial state have been exacerbated by the
politics of the centre and particularly the Congress Party over the last two decades.
Jalal suggests that the failure of democratisation and development in most parts of
India have led to dwindling support for the Congress Party, and that both Indira and
Rajiv Gandhi mobilised religious and regional groups to counter political challenges to
their declining authority (Jalal 1 995:94ff, Pandey 1 993:4ff). This in its turn has led to
an escalation in demands on the state and a corresponding sharpening of communal
tensions.24
One of the states where this is particularly evident is in Kashmir. Jalal shows that
Shaikh Abdullah and his predominantly Kashmiri National Conference Party were
treated as if they were dissidents during the early post-Independence decades,
despite the fact that they had actively fought for the inclusion of Kashmir as part of
India in 1947/8. In the past decade, the Congress Party used Kashmir to woo the
Hindu right by promoting the idea that Kashmiri Muslims were suspect Indians, and
then progressively undermining democracy in the state, resulting in the present crisis
(Jalal 1995:175179). 25 Similarly, in her extremely illuminating book on the generation
of the current Kashmir crisis, Singh shows that the current situation was not caused by
any pre-existing rebelliousness among Kashmiris, but largely by the politics of central
government (Singh 1996). As I shall show, these policies have had a profound eftect
on Suru in the last decade.
24ln the Punjab, for example, Indira Gandhi originally encouraged Bhindranwale (the leader of
the Sikh separatist movement who died in the storming of the Golden Temple), in order to try
and undermine the ruling Akali Dal party.
The Congress and National Conference parties made a pact before the 1987 elections in
Kashmir and then proceeded to use vote-rigging to stop a loose coalition of Muslim parties
winning the election. It was because of this event that people subsequently began to take up
arms in the state (Singh 1996:1 01ff).
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One consequence of the political economy of the state in India and the politics of the
centre has been that interest groups have become extremely important in the
contemporary politics of India and are now increasingly competing for the resources of
the state. One aspect of this is that both 'low' and 'high' caste organisations have
been transformed in the last few decades into interest groups that make political
demands couched in the rhetoric of egalitarianism (Chatterjee 1993:215-6).
Another aspect of contemporary politics in India, is the existence of an elite class that
is closely associated with the state and the administration. A number of writers on the
politics of the state in India, and other South Asian countries, have noted that there is
a major social divide between the urban, well-educated middle class and the mass of
people. This is generally regarded as being a legacy of the colonial administration that
has been largely perpetuated since Independence (Donnan and Werbner 1991:23,
Chatterjee 1993:134). From the mid-i 9th century, it was an explicit policy of the
colonial administration to produce a stratum of Indian administrators between the
British rulers and the mass of the Indian populace. The intention was that they would
be: 'Indian in blood and colour, but Engllsh in taste, opinions, in morals and in
intellect." (extract from Macaulay's famous Minute on Education, quoted by Ahmed
1986:149). Hence the British encouraged English-medium education for a small
minority of Indians, while at the same time showing little interest in education for the
mass of people, who remained largely illiterate (Drury 1993:24). This administrative
elite provided the majority of the leadership of the nationalist movement in India,
resulting in a social divide between the administrators and leading politicians and the
mass of the electorate post-Independence (Jalal 1995:156).
As I shall show in my analysis of Suru, the emergence of an elite with some of these
characteristics, is one facet of the politics of Kargil tehsil at the moment. As I shall
demonstrate, this elite partly construct themselves as 'modern' in contradistinction to
groups like the yokma-pa. One reason for this is that attitudes to Shi'ahs in the region
tend to be derogatory. These attitudes are a result of Shi'ahs' particular role in the
legitimating discourses of British rule in India and other colonial possessions that
continue to influence contemporary attitudes to them in India; combined with more
local discourses on Muslims and Shi'ahs in Ladakh, as I shall discuss in the next two
sections.
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(vi) Problems in the Interpretation of Shi'ism
In discourses both on and in India, Shi'ahs have been regarded as intrinsically riotous
and rebellious since colonial times. In his fascinating work on Shi'ahs in Hyderabad,
Pinault says that: From early on the British government in India seems to have
viewed public Shi'ite Muharram obseivances primarily as a security risk harboring a
great potential for violence." (Pinault 1992:63). In his analysis of a children's book
written by a British writer called Mason in the 1 930s, Pinault shows how an extremely
stereotypical view of Shi'ahs is contributed: "The fact that it is a children's story is
suggestive of how widely shared were certain British assumptions concerning the
nature of Islam in general and Muharram in particular, insofar as the author may be
imagined to have drawn on readily recognisable conventions requiring little
explanation in creating his tale." (Pinault 1992:74). Mason apparently drew heavily on
Durand's book 'The Making of a Frontier", which is about the Gilgit and Hunza areas
where many people are Shi'ahs (Durand 1899). Pinault identifies the frontier area as
the main location for the constitution of an image of Shi'ahs as wild and anti-
British/government: "Mason couples Muharram with anti-English treachery among the
natives and makes the holy day part of a threat to the very borders of the Empire."
(Pinault 1992:76). It is also highly significant that Mason was also the author of "The
Three Feathers", which is another adventure story that takes place during the Mandi
revolt in the Sudan, an incidence of Shi'ite millenarism that came to have an explicit
anti-colonial aspect to it (Ahmed 1976:89-93).
Pinault's discussion dwells on the British administration's "obsession" with Muslim-
Hindu (and sometimes Sunni-Shi'ah) fights during Muharram processions, which
seems to have been a common occurrence since the last century. As he shows, the
British administration went to enormous lengths to try to de-fuse and police these
occasions and they became an important locus for the pathologising of Hindu-Muslim
(or inter-religious) relations. This process enabled the corresponding creation of a role
for themselves as impartial administrators keeping the peace. For instance, he quotes
from an onlooker's description of a Muharram procession in 1907: "Immediately
behind the horse came the police squad, forming a cordon about the animal and its
attendants. ...Behind the force of constables, all of them on foot, rode the embodiment,
for the nonce, of the British Raj, a solitary Englishman with a resolute but bored
expression on his face - the Assistant Superintendent of	 '(Pinault 1992:74).
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Such representations of Shi'ism witnessed a resurgence since the Iranian Revolution
in 1979 and the Rushdie affair (Asad 1993:239-268); despite convincing challenges in
recent years through an extensive anthropological and historical literature, on Iran in
particular. There are two major themes in this stereotyping of Shi'ahs, the first is the
old chestnut that they are intrinsically rebellious; and the second is that they are anti-
modernisation. In recent decades, the rationale for the former view appears to have
come from the Karbala Paradigm (see above), which offers a potential theodicy of
protest against illegitimate governments. But, as Gilsenan has demonstrated, with
contrasting examples from Iran and Lebanon, the same core of symbols can be
interpreted in many different ways in different social contexts (Gilsenan 1982:29). In
Iran the doctrine of the Hidden Imam could be used as a reason for the Shi'ite clergy
not to oppose the government, since they argued that Shi'ites should wait for the
Imam Mandi to transform the world; but equally, at other times, the anti-government
theme could be stressed, as it was in the Iranian Revolution (Gilsenan 1982:57-61).
Similarly, Hegland shows that in Iran the figure of Husain can be used in one context
as an intercessor for people to appeal to within the existing status quo; whereas in
another he is used as an example of a political revolutionary (Hegland 1983).
Since the Iranian Revolution, Shi'ites have been considered 'traditional' or anti-
modernisation. In fact, their radicalism in Iran seems to have been a reaction to
disruptive modernisation that was undermining the institutions and power of the Shi'ite
clergy and the neo-colonialism of the Shah's regime, rather than opposed to
modernisation per se (Cole & Keddie 1986:22). Also, other writers have shown the
use of Islamic symbols, which are seen as being anti-modern by others, can just as
easily be associated with modernity by the actors themselves. For example, in an
article on the introduction of the use of the head scarf and full-length clothing by urban
lower middle-class working women in Egypt, MacLeod shows that, at least initially, this
was voluntarily adopted partly as a means of creating a symbol for their new role as
both Islamic and modern. However, it is also rapidly being transformed by men in to
the essential garb of a 'good' working wife (MacLeod 1992). By the late 1 980s, the
Egyptian authorities saw this practice as an act of defiance by Islamic fundamentalists,
and banned its use in universities (Eickelman & Piscatori 1996:4).
In the West Islam is commonly regarded as traditionalist and fundamentalist. The
issue of what "the modern" constitutes is not just a topic of academic debate, it has
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become a central issue in the politics in and around Islam globally (Ahmed 1992). As
Baykan says in an article on the politics of modernity in Turkey "At any given time, in
any society, there are various conflicts between alternative power structures. Today,
given these conflicts and resulting forces for social change, one side of the con flict
identifies itself as the one that advocates historical continuity. ñt stands to represent
the "traditional" society and opposed a 'modern' one which may be regarded as either
corrupt, alienating, imperialist, Western, or as any other symbol for the 'other'?'
(Baykani 990:1 38ff).
These discourses concerning Islam and Shi'ism and their relation to modernity in India
have a major impact on Suru, particularly with the current situation in Kashmir,
affecting the position of Muslims and Shi'ahs in Ladakh. So in the next section, I shall
outline some of the general features of their treatment in the academic and popular
literature on the area, and show the connection between these and indigenous
discourses in Ladakh itself.
(vii) Muslims and Shi'ahs in Ladakh
Appadurai suggested that there is a strong regionalising tendency in anthropology,
which assigns certain questions and epistemologies to regions of the world, and then
proceeds with the assumption that the inhabitants of those areas are subject to them
(Appadurai 1 986a, 1 986b & 1992). As he says: "The central fact here is that what
anthropologists find, in this or that place, far from being independent data for the
construction and verification of theory, is in fact a very complicated compound of local
realities and the contingencies of metropolitan theory."(Appadurai 1 986a:360).
In a series of articles, Appadurai used the example of caste/hierarchy in India/South
Asia to make his point. He said that the approach to South Asan anthropology - as
epitomised by Louis Dumont's Homo Hierarchicus (Dumont 1970) - is in the orientalist
tradition, "in that in placing hierarchy, as a concept, at the heart of a "sociology for
India", Dumont also composed an elegy and a deeply western trope for a whole way
of thinking about India, in which it represents the extremes of the human capability to
fetishize inequality." (Appadurai 1 986b:745). He says that such epistemologies are
based on the "idea of the Geist (spirit) of an age or a people" (Appadurai 1992:39),
which leads to totalising concepts such as hierarchy in respect of India.
40
A further point, which Appadurai does not make, is that such a view assumes that
Hinduism is central to Indian society, thus implicitly rendering Islam somehow alien to
India. Evidence for this assumption can be found in the debate about whether Islam in
India is syncretic or purist (Minault 1984, Bayly 1986, Robinson 1986). This debate
has raised some interesting points, nevertheless, it arose because of the widespread
assumption that Hinduism is the intrinsic religion of India.
In his contribution to a volume devoted to the identification of regional epistemologies
in anthropology, Burghart notes that the anthropological view of caste is not merely a
figment of the imagination, but in fact is often the "Brahmin's-eye view", that reflects
the ideology of powerful (usually) male informants who have a vested interest in
presenting a view that both justifies and attests to their privileged position (Burghart
1990). Therefore anthropologists are regurgitating hegemonic discourses in the
society that they are observing - which of course do not have to be true, simply
authoritative. I find his suggestions particularly helpful, firstly because they accord
with an intertwining of academic and indigenous discourses in Ladakh, that has
existed since colonial times (see below); and secondly, because it implies a
predominantly Hindu view, which in part explains the widespread silence about
Muslims in the regional epistemology of India.
In Ladakh, Buddhists are much more studied and written about by scholars of all
disciplines than Muslims. This situation seems to have arisen partly because Ladakh
is seen as a Buddhist kingdom in the popular and academic imagination, although it is
in fact an administrative subdivision of Jammu and Kashmir, with a population that is
virtually half Buddhist and half Muslim. 26 Ladakh also divides the two major academic
regions in the Himalayas, each of which has its own distinct anthropology. In the
eastern Himalayas/Tibetan plateau, Buddhism, polyandry and the household have
been major concerns; and the western Himalayas/Karakorums which has been
characterised by a concern with ethnicity, conflict, segmentary lineage systems and
There are several books on Ladakh and (predominantly Buddhist) Zanskar, with titles such
as "Hermit Kingdom Ladakh" and "Zanskar the Hidden Kingdom" (Ahluwahlia 1980, Peissel
1979).
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Muslim saints and sects.27 These two anthropologies correspond to the two
interdisciplinary groupings of Tibetan Studies and those of the Karakorum/Hindu Kush
area.28
 There has been a considerable amount of critical debate about the
anthropological literature on the latter area, such as the debates on Swat society
which I discussed earlier; however very little work has been done on synthesising the
anthropology of the two regions.
The most serious theoretical attempt to bridge the gap between the anthropologies of
these two regions, has been a paper by Samuel: "Tibet as a stateless society and
some Islamic parallels", in which, he argues that most "Tibetan" society is of the
relatively uncentralised Sherpa type, rather than being like Lhasa and its environs
(Samuel 1982:216); and that it has marked resemblances to Islamic societies in the
anthropological literature, such as the Moroccan Berbers and the Swat Pathans
(Samuel 1982:222). One of the main foci for his comparison is the nature of
religious/political leadership in these relatively politically uncentralised areas, which he
characterises as embodied in a single person who is both spiritual teacher and able to
direct spiritual power (Samuel 1982:221-222).
In a more recent article Samuel argues that Tibetan society is seen to be somehow
unique because of the Buddhist base, as with Hinduism in India, and that social
organisation in Himalayan Buddhist societies cannot be assumed to be organised
according to Buddhist precepts (Samuel 1992:698). He goes on to suggest that there
are obviously continuities between the Himalayan area and neighbouring regions. His
remarks are particularly relevant for studies of Ladakh, with its religiously mixed
population and its position spanning various ethnographic regions.
Unfortunately his article created a furore in Tibetan academic circles, ostensibly
because his argument could be taken to undermine Tibetan claims of autonomy from
27This area also falls into the broader ethnographic region of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan,
which Street characterises as being rather weak on central concerns, but having a marked
focus on the study of tribal and pastoral nomadic peoples who account for a very small
proportion of the population (Street 1990:245-6).
For the former there is the International Association of Tibetan Studies and the Tibet Journal,
and for the latter various small groupings and an umbrella often of Pakistan or Islamic studies
associations.
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China. However, parallels between Tibetan Buddhist and Islamic societies are
unthinkable for many scholars of Tibetan studies. I have argued elsewhere that this
attitude relates to the demonising of Islam and lionising of Tibetan Buddhism in
western orientalist discourses (Grist 1995).
Similar attitudes can be seen in the popular and, occasionally academic, literature on
Ladakh. One common theme contends that Islam is taking over Ladakh and is a
corrupting influence. For example, William Moorcroft, who worked for the East India
Company and was - with his companion Trebeck - the first British person to visit and
write about Ladakh, commented on the effect of conversion to Islam in Western
Ladakh:
"One good effect is its promotion of temperance by the prohibition of chang
and fermented drinks, but on the other hand it has introduced much more
dissoluteness, dishonesty, and disregard for truth, than prevails in those places
where lamaism still predominates." (Moorcroft and Trebeck 1837 Vol 1:345).
In the 1 850s, after Ladakh's conquest by the Dogras, another British writer, the
explorer Cunningham, commented that longevity is rare in Baltistan and offered this
explanation:
"The differences between this and the average of the Ladakhis can only be
accounted for by the general dissoluteness of all Mussalmans, and the
consequent spread of loathsome and fatal diseases." (Cunningham 1854:301).
In a recent book on Zanskar, the writer comments:
"Under the British, both Ladakh and Kashmir were lightly administered, the
system of Government introduced by the Dogras remaining in force and
depending on head offices in Srinagar rather than Leh. Yet, under the Pax
Britannica, the Buddhist culture was able to survive amid the now decaying
splendours of previous ages; for both Hindu and British rule meant that Muslim
influence, the only serious threat to the culture, was well contained." (Crook
1 994a:461).
Later in the same book, it is claimed that, for the majority of Ladakhis: "a prime fear
remains that of domination by Islam." (Crook 1 994c:820).
In both popular and academic works about Ladakh and other parts of the Himalayas,
extensive attention is paid to the practice of polyandry, referring to joint marriage
between two or more men (usually brothers) and one woman. Since the mid-
nineteenth century, the practice has been explained by a purported need to limit
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population increase because of a shortage of cultivable land. For instance, Drew says
of Ladakh:
"There can be no doubt that the practice of polyandry in Ladakh originated
from the smallness of the extent of land that could be tilled and the general
inelasticity of the country's resources, while the isolation from the rest of the
world - isolation of manners, language, and religion, as well as geographical
isolation - hindered emigration." (Drew:1 875:250).
An additional comparison is made between the apparently conservative behaviour of
polyandrous Buddhists and the profligacy of monogamous or polygamous Muslims.
Thus, later in the same book, Drew says of Baltistan:
"In adopting Muhamadism the Baltis dropped the custom of polyandry, and
have since to some extent followed polygamy. And this although the same
economic reasons for polyandry hold in Baltistan as in Ladakh. The area of
cultivation is closely limited; there are not means of support within the country
for an expanding population. Still with the new religion the customs prevalent
among Muhamedans in other parts of the world were adopted and the old
prudential arrangements set aside. ... The result is that Baltistan is crowded.
The population is overflowing..." (Drew 1875:357-8).
This theme of attributing the relative poverty of Muslims to their marriage practice has
probably been derived from indigenous Ladakhi discourses of religious difference.
Prince Peter of Greece and Denmark reports that he received the idea from Lobsang
Tok-Tok, an elderly Buddhist man in Leh, who said to him:
"He had noticed, he said, that those Ladakhis who were converts to
Mohammedanism did the same as we did; they ceased overnight to be
polyandrous, and divided up the property immediately they got married, the
result was that there was not enough to go round for all of them. The eldest
brother remained on the best part of the land, and the others had to move
away. They had to look for work, often as landless labourers, which was most
depressing. He had noticed, too, that some of them went further afield and
travelled all the way to Burma to work in the ruby mines there. Obviously, he
concluded, they did so just as Europeans had to do, because they were
monogamous," (Prince Peter 1963:362).
Prince Peter reports that these ideas came as a surprise to him, as he remarks that he
was "wondering who was doing the field-work, he or L" He also accepts that this
economic argument is a valid explanation of polyandry (Prince Peter 1960:362).
In recent decades, there has been a rise of Buddhist militancy that has been largely in
opposition to the Sunni-dominated administration of Jammu and Kashmir State but, at
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times, actively hostile to Ladakhi Muslims, who are deemed to be associated with
Kashmir and/or hostile to Buddhism (Brix Bertelsen and van Beek 1995:8). During this
period, Buddhist organisations have increasingly enforced a prohibition on the practice
of polyandry because it was regarded as contributing to a decline of Buddhists relative
to Muslims. 29
 Since the 1 980s, particular attention has been focused on marriages
between Buddhist women and Muslim men, which along with other types of religious
intermarriage had been common in the past (Grist 1991:137). In the 1 970s and early
1 980s this opposition took the form of active attempts to bring back Buddhist women
who were running away with Muslim men but, from the late 1 980s, the Ladakh
Buddhist Association has banned Buddhists from inter-religious marriages altogether
and tries to impose a penalty of exile from Ladakh on couples who break the rule.
Latterly the Leh-based Ladakh Muslim Association has imposed a similar ban. In Leh
tehsil Buddhist-Muslim marriages have largely ceased to take place, but in Kargil tehsil
they continue to be relatively common.
Leh, from where most scholars get much of their informed opinions, is the centre of
Ladakhi Buddhist political discourse. For instance, Crook says that:
"the low reproductive rate of Buddhists in Ladakh and the marriage of Buddhist
women into Muslim families, means that the demographic balance between
Muslims and Buddhists is changing in favour of Islam, especially in towns such
as Leh or Padum where cultural change is most pronounced. These
demographic trends may eventually produce more non-Buddhist than Buddhist
voters with an inevitable increase in political resentment among Ladakhis in
their homeland." (Crook 1 994c:820).
These discourses concerning the relationship between Buddhists and Muslims in
Ladakh have been questioned by a number of scholars since the anti-Muslim agitation
in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Wahid 1989, Grist 1995, Aggarwal 1997). One
result has been that there has been a shift to studies that acknowledge the Muslim
presence in Ladakh, such as Aggarwal and Srinivas's work on religiously mixed
villages in Leh tehsil (Aggarwal 1994, Srinivas 1994 & 1995). Van Beek and Bnx
Bertelson have also worked extensively on the communal politics in L.adakh,
particularly in Leh area since the 1 930s (van Beek 1996, Brix Bertelson 1996).
However, there is still a lack of work either on Muslims or on Kargil tehsil. The only
29 Polyandry was actually banned in the state in 1947 but it was still extremely common in the
late 1 970s (Cambridge Undergraduate Ladakh Expedition 1979, Sander 1983).
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exceptions are Rizvi, who did fieldwork in tehsi/ Kargil in the early 1 970s (Rizvi 1981,
1 987b, 1993), and Khan, who has written an Urdu history of the area (Khan 1987).
In contemporary Ladakh, Shi'ahs are regarded as the poor 'other' and sometimes
treated with a degree of contempt and fear. In Leh tehsil, the name ba/ti is used both
for Shi'ahs and for Muslim Kargilis in general. This term both has derogatory
connotations and also implies that they are outsiders, as the name refers to
neighbouring Baltistan. The term is more accurate when applied to the Shi'ahs of
Chushot, since they do apparently claim descent from Baltistan; however, in Kargil
tehsil only a small minority of families claim such descent - such as some of the
families in the Balti Bazaar in Kargil town.
In Leh, bait! men are commonly regarded as having a string of characteristics, such as
being powerful and sexually potent in respect of non-bait! women. For instance, in
1977, I was told that there was an agha in Kargil tehsil who killed and ate Buddhist
nuns. Several people told me that Kargili men have magic potions that they put in tea
and chewing gum that force people to fall in love with them. They are said to be
extremely sexually promiscuous and have a propensity for divorce. For instance
someone in Leh told me:
"Just the other day there was a woman who was married to a man from Dras.
They had three children and he threw her out. The children weren't even
wearing any shoes when they left. That is what Kargili men are like, they just
divorce women and take another one."
Kargilis/Shi'ahs are also thought to be uncouth and dirty. Several people in Leh
objected to my use of the Suru dialect. I gather that people from Kargil - as opposed
to Leh tehsll Shi'ahs - receive direct derogatory remarks when they are in Leh. More
generally Kargil is seen as inferior to Leh, an opinion that is found in some books on
Ladakh. For example:
"What the Aghas and the Sheikhs do to the religion-ridden Sh!a population of
Baltistan territory under the occupation of Pakistan, is practised on the Muslim
population of Kargil tehsil on almost the same lines. In other words, the Aghas
and Sheikhs of Kargil sector profit by the people's blissful ignorance. Some of
these "demi-gods" are materially prosperous while quite a few of them take
advantage of "mutta" without any restriction. The old Muslim practice of
"mutta" (tempora!'/ marriage) is common in the region." (Kak 1978:18).
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As I shall show in this thesis, the attitude that Shi'ahs are backward, irrational and
responsible for their own poverty, have important consequences for their continuing
poverty in the present.
(viii) Methodology
One of my main concerns in this thesis is to understand the yokma-pa as a historical
phenomenon, following the example of Ahmed and Asad in their criticisms of Barth's
account of Swat Pathans (see above). I tried to construct a history of the area from
the available sources. However, in common with other politically peripheral places,
there are very few published documents on the area, or even references in the
standard histories of Ladakh (Francke 1904, Petech 1977, Rizvi 1983).
The only 'historical' sources that deal with Suru in any detail, are Hashmatullah Khan's
Urdu history of the area, which is a fascinating rendition of oral histories collected at
the turn of the century, but is understandably short on verifiable fact; and the more
recent history by Kacho Sikander Khan (Khan 1939, Khan 1987); the land records
and settlement reports in the Tehsildar's Office in Kargil, which go back to the
beginning of the century; and the two factions' own written records (daftar), which the
respective leaders were kind enough to translate for me. In addition, there is
Moorcroft and Trebeck's account of their visit to the lower Suru valley in the 1 820s,
and Rizvi's book "The Ba/ti" and his various articles based on research in the early
1 970s (Moorcroft and Trebeck 1837, Rizvi 1981, 1 987b, 1993).
I had already stayed in Suru in the early 1980s and, therefore, had some overview of
the changes that were taking place. In 1981/2 I had briefly visited the valley as a
village surveyor for a joint Save the Children Fund/United Nations Children's Fund
project, to find out about maternal and infant mortality and its causes. Another
researcher and myself carried out individual interviews rather than conducting
systematic surveys in Suru. However, we obtained sufficient data to ascertain that the
levels of mortality were dramatically higher than those found in Leh tehsil, where we
had undertaken more rigorous surveys. During that visit, we were told of the
millenarian movement and we had the opportunity to discuss these beliefs with various
people in the area.
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The fieldwork for this thesis was conducted during three visits to Suru totalling 16
months in 1993/4, and was mainly funded by a grant from the ESRC. In 1996, further
funding from the University of London's Central Research Fund allowed me to make a
month's visit to Suru. This visit proved to be invaluable to my research since (again by
chance) the campaigns for the first local elections that had been held in Ladakh for
seven years were taking place. The political shifts at that time revealed important
aspects of the situation in Suru, of which I had not been aware in 1994 (see Chapter
5), thereby illustrating the value of having a slightly longer-term perspective on the
fieldwork site.
The majority of my research was conducted during 1993/4, and consisted primarily of
participatory observation, backed by some detailed household surveys and interviews.
I stayed for several months first in a Sunni household in Panikhar and later in a
yokma-pa one in the same village. Most days I also attended the school for several
hours and I also frequently visited the two yokma-pa aghas' houses in Taisuru. Most
of the rest of my time was spent in Panikhar or Taisuru villages, where I had a wide
acquaintance and I also visited the houses of most of the pupils from the school. As
far as possible, I also attended the yokma-pa matam ceremonies and Muharram
observances as well as the major Sunni festivals. I have several goma-pa friends and
talked extensively with Agha Sakawat the brother of their current leader but I did not
attend any of their ceremonies in the imam-barah.
The language in which most of my interviews took place is the local language of Suru,
which is a dialect of Tibetan and very similar to both Ladakhi and Balti. There is a
brief grammar of the language by Bailey and a Balti grammar, which is sufficiently
similar to the Suru language to be useful (Bailey 1915, Read 1934). I refer to the
language as Purigi, but the Suru people call it ngati skat (meaning 'our language'), and
often describe it as 'a mixture' of languages. In fact, pure Suru does not contain many
loan words, but nowadays many Urdu and some English words are in everyday use.
In the Shi'ite religious context, Farsi terms are widely used, some of which are used
with a different meaning in Suru (and India in general) than they are in Iran (Momen
1985:242).
English is spoken by a handful of men in Suru Block, particularly in Panikhar and
Prantee. Urdu is also used in interactions with non-Ladakhi teachers and other
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visitors to Suru, in many government offices in Kargil and in schools. Most people
have not attended government school so they neither understand nor speak Urdu,
nevertheless it is the main language of literacy in Suru nowadays. In addition, clerics
have studied some Farsi3° and Arabic and those who have studied in the Middle East
know them very well. Some ordinary people, particularly men, can read some Arabic
as they are taught to read the Koran.
I could converse in Purigi when I arrived in Suru in 1993, but I was far from fluent as I
was used to the Leh dialect. I had spent more than two years in and around Leh in
the earlyl98Os but I had only visited Ladakh once in the intervening decade.
Nevertheless, I was able to conduct my fieldwork in the local language and my
understanding and conversation improved, although I never achieved total fluency.
For example, although I recorded some matam speeches, I was not able to translate
them from the tapes, but I could understand my own taped interviews. In addition I
can understand a fair amount of Urdu, particularly the simplified form that is spoken as
a lingua franca in northern India. I can also read it, very slowly, but this familiarity
often came in useful. I do not know any Farsi or Arabic, and I relied on people
translating unfamiliar terms into the local language or English for me.
There is very little statistical/census data available on the population of the Suru valley
in recent years. The 1991 Census of Jammu and Kashmir was performed but has not
been published, apparently due to unrest in the state. However, I was able to obtain
information from individual government departments such as the Education Office and
Tehsildar's Office in Kargil and the Zonal Education Office in Panikhar. There were no
detailed household surveys of the area when I arrived in Suru. However, in the winter
of 1993/4, the Medical Department in Kargil decided to implement a decision to start
keeping records on all the households in the Block. I was able to assist in the conduct
of these surveys, in four villages. These were Taisuru and Prantee (see above) and
Thulus and Pursa, which are on the opposite side of the Suru River from Prantee and
Taisuru, and are relatively cut off (see Map 5, Page 21).
In the earlier Dogra period Farsi was one of the main languages of the administration in
Jammu and Kashmir but was later replaced by English and Urdu (Bamzai 1987278 & 367).
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Prantee contains households from all three factions in Suru, that is yokma-pa, goma-
pa and Sunnis. Its inhabitants are relatively prosperous as the majority of households,
both Sunnis and Shi'ahs, have at least one person with a government job. Taisuru,
also has more government jobs or income generating alternatives, such as shop-
keeping, than other villages in Suru, although there are fewer with government jobs
than in either Panikhar and Prantee. All the people in Taisuru are Shi'ahs, and the
households are roughly equally divided between the yokma and goma factions.
Thulus is the most remote of the four villages as it is on a virtually disused branch
road, and is almost cut off by snow and the risk of avalanches in the winter. All the
households in Thulus are yokma-pa; whereas in Pursa, there are equal numbers of
each Shi'ite faction. In 1993, there was only one young man in Thulus who had
studied up to 10th class (the equivalent of GCSE's in the UK), and no-one with a
government job, or another major source of non-agricultural income. In Pursa there
are more men with government jobs and a few with other income generating
occupations, such as contracting.
I personally surveyed a total of 66 households, the results are summarised in Figure
1.2.
Figure 1.2 - Basic Population Statistics for Household Surveys31
The fact that there are significantly less women than men in these households, reflects
the very high levels of maternal mortality at the time of childbirth and the relatively
early death of many women. For example, the age to gender statistics for Thulus and
Pursa show that there are half as many women over forty as men.
31 In addition to these formal household surveys, I also informally interviewed another thirty
households, particularly those involved in the Noon Public School.
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Figure 1.3 - Age/Sex Distribution of Thulus and Pursa32
Out of the 46 children under 5 in these two villages, 22 of them were underweight,
under the criteria used by UNICEF, many severely so. Although I do not have
accurate statistics for infant and child mortality, I found that women under 40 in all the
villages had already lost a third of their children on average, and those over 40 have
only just over half their children surviving. These levels of maternal and child mortality
are very high, and do not appear to have improved since 1981/2, when we found a
level of 40% child mortality among the offspring of women of child-bearing age.
Moreover, the figures are also extremely high compared to other parts of Ladakh. In
1981/2, detailed surveys of villages in Leh tehsilthat we conducted revealed only a
20% child mortality.
These surveys suggested that the people of Suru Block are relatively disadvantaged
compared to those in other parts of Ladakh, and that this disadvantage has not
significantly decreased in the last two decades, despite the processes of
modernisation that have occurred in the area, such as the introduction of schooling
and a government medical service.
I also spent some time in Kargil town, as services such as a telephone are only
available there. In Kargil I have a number of friends and acquaintances, whose homes
I visited and where I sometimes stayed. I also visited several government offices,
both as part of my own research and on school business.
A demographic survey of an equivalent village in neighbouring Zanskar in the early 1 980s,
found that there were a total of 85 women and 75 men, and there were 21 men over 40, as
opposed to 26 women of that age (Elford 1994:333).
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The final aspect of my fieldwork that I wish to stress is that I was not a neutral
observer, since I both worked in the Noon Public School, and I became a member of
the Management Committee and an enthusiastic supporter. So I was also located at
the centre of the politics of the school, and I was known not to be neutral by those who
were opposed to it - many of whom are also my friends. This meant I simply had to
participate and watch events unfold. Obviously I did also ask questions, and go and
visit people specifically to find things out, but that was a small part of what I did. One
of the main reasons why I offered to teach in the school in the first place was because
I felt that it was inappropriate just to 'be there' and that I needed to play a useful role in
order to explain why I was there. I feel that it also had the consequence of allowing
me to have a much greater insight into the yokma-pa than if I had just gone and asked
people questions.
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Chapter 2
The Yokma-pa and other Social Groups in Suru
(i) Introduction
The Upper Suru valley is reached by the rather rough road from Kargil, that passes
over an area of uninhabited high land, that separates Sankhoo and Suru Block from
the lower valley. In the south, the valley is dominated by the twin Himalayan peaks of
Nun and Kun and the road proceeds to Zanskar, via a pass called the Pensi La. Suru
and Sankhoo Blocks correspond to the much older sub-divisions of Suru and Kartse.
These are the colloquial names for the area, which is sometimes referred to as Suru-
Kartse.
All the yokma faction members are in Sankhoo and Suru Blocks and they form an
endogamous kinship group, as do the goma-pa and Sunrils. In Suru Block, the two
Shi'ite factions are roughly equal in number but, in Sankhoo Block, the majority of
Shi'ahs are yokma-pa. In this chapter, I will examine Shi'ah kinship and the
organisation of the yokma-pa.
The yokma-pa is only one of the social groups to which people in the faction belong,
but it acts as the overarching kinship group for its members. The pa is a named
patrilineal clan that appears to have declined in importance during the current century.
I shall suggest that this is partly due to the emergence of the two Shi'ite factions which
form alternative kinship groups. The p'ha -spun is a much smaller, unnamed sub-
group of the pa consisting of households that have divided a single piece of land,
usually in the generation of the grandfather of the current household heads. The fairly
strict patrilineal transmission of land and the frequent movement of women through
divorce or the death of their spouse and their consequent remarriage, creates a
situation in which women are not as firmly located as men in the official kinship
associated with landed property and the p'ha -spun.
The yokma-pa too can be understood as a kinship group that is formed around the
core of the lineages of the leading aghas. A crucial element in this structure are the
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kinship relations between the leading aghas and their female followers. Thus women
are located in the faction much more permanently than they are in the p'ha -spun. One
of the ways that kinship relations are constituted in Suru is though mourning and
weeping, especially, but not exclusively, by and between women. Within the faction
one of the main occasions for this are the matam or mourning ceremonies, which are
central to yokma-pa ritual and beliefs. These ceremonies are also a means of gaining
merit, leading to the obtaining of salvation and social prestige in the present.
Finally, in a discussion of stratification within the faction, I shall show that these same
ideas of merit and the performance of good works are important in the organisation
and internal stratification in the faction.
(ii) Muslims of Kargil and Suru
The Muslims of Kargil and Suru define themselves in contradistinction to other people
in the area, particularly Buddhists. Suru people frequently refer to the fact that they
were Buddhists in the past, with the exception of the clerics and Sunnis who trace their
descent outside the area. A sharp distinction is drawn between the distant past,
Buddhist times, and the recent past, or Muslim times. For example, at the top of the
village of Namsuru, on the opposite bank of the river from Taisuru, are the ruins of a
fort or castle. I visited the family of one of the children in the school, and we tried to
find out more about the ruins. My companion, who is in his thirties and from Namsuru,
only knew that it was said to be from "Buddhist times". An old man said that it had
been the residence of the "Black Lama", lama (Tibetan: b/a-ma) being a term for a
Buddhist priest. He also told us a story about the founding of the village, by a man
called Nag-Ide, who is mentioned in Hashmatullah Khan's history of the area (Khan
1939:685). Nag-po means 'black' in the Suru language, so that is presumably the
origin of the notion of the Black Lama. Generally in Suru, only older people remember
fragments of local histories and origin stones. These are no longer recounted and
younger people usually do not know them.
In other parts of Ladakh, similar types of local history and origin myths are widely
related (Kaplanian 1991). For example, in this whole region the most important
mythological figure is Kesar, about whom there is a cycle of stories which is found
from Tibet to Hunza (Tsering Mutup 1983, Francke 1906, Lommer 1987:56-95, Yang
En hong 1993). In Ladakh, Kesar is believed to have been the founder of the dynasty
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of Ladakhi kings (rgyal-pos), and in Zanskar he is also said to have given the area
government and laws (Kaplanian 1981:45, Crook 1994a:435). When I asked about
the Kesar story in Suru, it turned out that it had been told there until quite recently and
some old people can still recite it. 1 However, Suru people now consider it to be a
story for Buddhists, and some people even regard telling it as a sin (nyespa). One old
man said that Kesar is full of untruths, such as a bird turning into a stone. However,
people thought it very funny that in parts of Baltistan Kesar is considered to be the
daffal or Anti-Christ (Sag aster 1987).
This forgetting of histories that people associate with their Buddhist past is in marked
contrast to the importance of historical narrative in the context of Shi'ism in the area,
which I will discuss in a later section and the next chapter. One woman said to me
that, in the past, the Buddhists were the rus-pa and the Muslims were the sha. This
comparison is very evocative, since, in Ladakh, rus-pa literally means 'bone', and
implies an official line of descent; whereas sha means 'flesh' and usually refers to
descent through the line that does not carry property and power, which is often via the
mother. She seems to be saying that in the recent past, Buddhists formed the
government as they did for long periods in Suru's history. Buddhists in Ladakh make
a similar distinction as they refer to themselves as nang-pa ('insiders') and Muslims as
chi-pa ('outsiders').
A similarly sharp distinction to that which is drawn with the past and Buddhist times is
found in a prohibition called sherpa ('wet') or sithu, which is observed by the majority
of Muslims in Kargil tehsil. They believe that they will be polluted by touching anything
wet that has been touched by a non-Muslim, or consuming any wet food or drink from
the hand of a non-Muslim. Such a contact renders them unable to pray until they have
performed ritual ablutions to purify themselves.
Nowadays, this prohibition is still observed by neariy all older people and many of the
younger generation in Suru, as it is in other parts of the tehsiL Nevertheless, it does
not restrict social interaction with non-Muslims to any great degree. For example, both
my children, myself (we are Christians) and the Kashmiri Pandit (Hindu) teacher from
the school could freely visit people's houses, as long as they purified vessels that we
1 This is also the case with the sagas of Apitso, another mythological character, whose saga is
found all over this region, especially in the west.
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had used by washing them while saying a short prayer (usually "Bismillah"the all
purpose blessing); and when my family gave a children's party in Panikhar, we
arranged for the food to be prepared by someone else. The fact that a person is
polluting in this way does not mean that they will be treated with any lack of respect.
For example, one day I met Cho-cho Razi, one of Agha Baqir's wives in the fields near
Taisuru. She came up to me to shake hands which is a sign of mutual respect;
however, her hand was wet, so she bent down and rubbed it in the soil to dry it before
taking my hand, so that she would not be polluted by my touch.
The main group of non-Muslims that Suru people come into contact with are the
Zanskari Buddhists, who visit in large numbers during the summer and some Suru
families have Zanskari Buddhist relatives who visit occasionally. They are regarded
as being different from Sum people, and polluting, but not as social inferiors.2
Marriages with Buddhists, particularly between Muslim men and Buddhist women
(who are now often disowned by their natal family), are still quite common in Suru.
These spouses have to convert to Islam, but are treated with special respect. Shi'ahs
give them the title Shaikh in recognition of their special status. Some of these
Buddhist spouses are also from families that are considered to be low-caste in other
parts of Ladakh but, in Suru, no such distinctions are made. Thus there is no
implication of social inequality in the sherpa distinction.
When I first visited Suru in 1981/2, we were told by a number of people in Leh that
Suru people would not let us into their homes and that we would have difficulty even
getting a glass of water. This was untrue and typical of derogatory things that were
said about Kargili Shi'ahs in Leh (see Chapter 1). It is common for the sherpa
prohibition to be ridiculed by people from other parts of the region. In a long passage
that both caricatures and criticises several aspects of Kargili society, Kaul says:
2	 most moving example of this that I witnessed was in the winter of 1993, when a truck
overturned in Parkachik killing SIX Buddhist Zanskaris and a Sum man. Subsequently the
bodies of the Buddhists were brought to Panikhar, and some of the Zanskari's relatives decided
to cremate them in Sum. So the headman of Panikhar village arranged a collection of wood
from the villagers for the funeral pyres. I was told that this was bes-pa, meaning that they
would do the same for us.
56
"The cult of ceremonial cleanliness, an essential part of their faith, as observed
by them is unique. The touch of a non-MusIini used to defile all fluids and even
all solids with a wet surface. Oil, water, butter, milk and such other things
passing through the hands of a Buddhist or a Hindu, even through their
substances might have been contained in air tight receptacles, were an
anathema to the devout Shia and this applied even to a chunk of meat
exhibited in a butchers shop or a cut melon, inadvertently touched by an
unwary non-Muslim customer, who would witness the edibles thus polluted by
him being consigned to the gutter and, who in consequence had to make good
the loss by a cash payment equivalent to the value of the things so
contaminated." (Kaul 1992:23-4).
As in this example, the sherpa rule is usually discussed as if it is very unusual,
although it is similar to pollution and commensality rules found all over the region. For
example, Madan reports that in the 1950's a similar rule was observed by both
Muslims and Hindus in respect of each other in the neighbouring Anantnag district of
Kashmir (Madan 1972). Kashmiri teachers from that area say that Muslims do not
have such a prohibition any more, although older Pandits usually still observe such
restrictions.
Less than thirty years ago the sherpa prohibition was apparently strictly followed by
everyone in Suru and the prohibition on wet contact was also observed with Muslims
from other areas, such as Leh, who were thought to be impure because they mixed
freely with Hindus and Buddhists. Nowadays, attitudes are more relaxed and its
observance is declining, particularly among those in the younger generation who have
secular education; however it is still an important way in which most Kargili Muslims
distinguish themselves from outsiders.
As in the Anantnag example that I mentioned earlier, the existence of the sherpa rule,
does not imply a relationship of hierarchy with those excluded. Nevertheless, the
custom has the effect of creating an enclave in which Kargili Muslims can obtain merit
that will enable them to gain salvation, despite their relatively poor social standing in
the present. The avoidance of sin is crucial to maintaining merit and eventual
salvation (see below). Merit-making is also central to the organisation of the yokma-
pa and its relations with the goma-pa, where each faction defines itself as being the
true upholders of Shi'ism and therefore as having access to merit denied to the other.
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The relationship between the two Shi'ite factions has elements of a type of egalitarian
rivalry that is found between other structurally equivalent groups in Suru, such as
between villages, which are important social groups in Suru.
(iii) The Village In Suru
When I was in Kargil during my fieldwork, I was frequently referred to as Panikhar-pe
Nicky, that is Nicky who belongs to the Panikhar people (pe being the pronunciation of
pa-i meaning 'of the people'). This is the polite way of identifying ordinary people from
a neighbouring area, and illustrates the importance of the village as a social unit. In
one's home village or nearby, people are identified by both their house and muliallah
or village neighbourhood. Most houses in Suru are called after their oldest male (who
is also the household head), and have names such as Husain-pa, Master Mehdi-pa,
Ha]]! lqbal-pa. Other members of the household are referred to using the house title,
for example Husain-pe Fati. The houses of sayyids are referred to as Agha-pa.
Some, but by no means all houses in larger villages are described by using the name
of the muhallah or khor (muha!!ah is the Urdu name and khor the local one) in which
they are located. Most villages have several named khors, for instance there are four
in Panikhar. In the village of Kaws, near Namsuru, the members of each khor were
said to be descended from a common ancestor. This is often the case, as new
houses tend to be constructed close to relatives, so a khor may consist of houses from
one or two pa. For instance, in Taisuru, one of the khois is called Ralam and the
people from there are usually described by that name, such as "nga Ra/am-pa in"(I
am a person from Ralam), but all the houses are also descended from a descent
group called Jali pa, so they are also a descent group.
In Suru all households of permanent villagers have some land, with the exception of
some elderly childless widows, who are supported by relatives. Each land holding
household has full citizen rights in the village, by which I mean that they are social
equals to other households and have the right to participate in village-level decision-
making. There are no lower castes or households that are excluded from full jural
status, such as are found in other parts of Ladakh and the Himalayan region (Barth
1960:127, Levine 1989:63, Grist 1991). In Suru, as in the rest of Ladakh, the vilage is
an important co-operative unit, as cultivation mainly relies on water from irrigation
canals and villages are usually built around a water source, such as a mountain torrent
or a major river. Hence the villagers are all reliant on the same, relatively scarce
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supply of irrigation water and are forced to co-operate to maintain and share the use
of irrigation canals. For example, in Panikhar there is an irrigation canal that brings
water to the village from further up the Chelong Nala. As with other major canals, this
has been reinforced with concrete in parts by the government, which builds and
repairs some canals; but the villagers are responsible for most repairs and upkeep.
When work is needed on the canal (yurba pingcha), the moqdam (village headman)
sends a message to all the houses with land to send someone to work on this task, for
as many days as are necessary. This work is all free, as it is for the participants' own
benefit.
Another form of co-operative labour is used for taking animals to the mountains during
the day in the summer, between ploughing and harvest. A rota, called bares for the
bovines (ba means 'bovines', and res means 'turn') and rares (ra means 'ovines') is
organised. During the summer, each day, houses take it in turn to be responsible for
one rota and send two people, often school age children, to do the work. They take
out all the animals from the village in the early morning, lead them to their village's
pastures in the neighbouring mountains and return them at dusk. The moqdam is a
government appointee, but usually holds the post by heredity in Suru, and is ultimately
responsible for organising these co-operative village-level tasks. But, on the whole,
they are organised collectively by the villagers, particularly the male household heads.
There are no official meetings or gatherings for this. Interested parties may gather
informally, anywhere from the bazaar, to someone's house, to discuss any matter that
comes up. As with other Suru politics, some people participate much more than
others, but underlying there is a real sense of equa'ity between all the landholders in a
village. For example, in Taisuru the aghas' families participate in the rares and bares
and take their turn just like other households and the younger aghas go to the
mountain, when it is their turn.
The village is also celebrated as a social group in many rituals, particularly weddings
(bag-ston), and events such as inter-village archery contests (da pangs). During the
celebration of a wedding, it is customary to invite someone from every house in the
village for a dinner (see Chapter 6). In the early spring, men also combine to organise
archery contests with neighbouring villages. These competitions are apparently very
competitive and are typical of the rivalry that exists between neighbouring villages.
For instance, people in Panikhar refer to Taisuru people as Basara-pa, that is people
from Basara in Iraq, who have a bad reputation. This kind of rivalry is particularly
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marked between groups that are close to each other, including the yokma and goma-
pa.
Within the village, despite differences of wealth and power, households are regarded
as equivalent and equal units, as are the villages themselves. This is also true of the
p'ha-spun which is another important kinship group in Suru.
(iv) Kinship Groups - the Pa and the P'ha-spun
It is likely that in the early part of this century, inheritance was managed by a named,
mainly patrilineal clan, called a pa.3 in the past, the custom in the Dah area of Kargil
tehsi/ was that a named patrician held land in common and fields were allocated
among the member households according to their need and the availability of labour
(Vohra 1989:19). Shaw reports that the fields in Dah were under the names of seven
apical ancestors (Shaw 1878:9). However, Vohra says that the effect of the revenue
settlement that was undertaken just after the turn of this century, was to dhange the
inheritance system by institutionalising these temporary divisions of land so that from
henceforth land was inherited individually (Vohra 1989:22 &72).4
Rizvi gives an account of the p'has-spuns of the purely Shi'ah village of Hardas in
Kargil tehsil in the mid-i 970s (Rizvi 1993). The p'ha-spuns were named lineages that
in the past had shared the same piece of land, but by the 1 970s they followed Muslim
inheritance practice and divided the land. However, they continued to practice joint
decision-making among the male elders and co-operate for funerals and other lit e-
cycle events (Rizvi 1993:27 & 47-8). The larger ones contained as many as nine
households, although nearly a third only consisted of one household. The irrigation
water in the village was allocated according to p'ha-spun, each one being allotted a
number of hours for all its constituent households (Rizvi 1993:27). In the past they
had been endogamous and marriage was still preferably within the p'ha -spun (Rizvi
1993:47-8).
For clarity I use the term pa which is the Suru name for this, but in fact people sometimes
used terms such as zat, a Kashmiri term and is always used by Sunnis or qum-bo, the Urdu
word for 'tribe'.
4 This settlement was undertaken around the turn of the century. Its preliminary report is
available in the Tehsildar's Office in Kargil, and was published as Clarke 1901.
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In Suru, the named patrilineal clan also exists in the form of the pa, whose members
trace descent from an apical ancestor. However, nowadays it is of little significance
among Shi'ahs in Sara Block. In the winter of 1981/2, when I first visited the area,
most adults knew the name of their pa and its status as a descent group, but they did
not know how they were related to other houses of the same pa, particularly those in
other villages. For instance, one of the commonest pas in Sara is Brukshel, which
means people from Gilgit, a common house and clan name in Ladakh. 5 There are
more than thirty houses of Brukshel in villages such as Trangole, Prantee and
Choskore (near Panikhar) and it is found in other villages as well. Even in the early
1 980s relationships with the pa in other villages were not traced, unless they involved
men who had recently married uxorilocally.
In the Tehsildar's office in Kargil, there is a list of the pa that dates from 1911 when
the settlement of the area was conducted. There were eighteen pas with land
holdings ranging from 4 to 171 karials, the average being about 38 kanals. 6 Land
ownership is still listed by pa in the patwari's records. In 1993 there were twenty-two
recorded in the patwari's records, fifteen had the same name as before and three
were listed under a new name. Several of the pas had been divided into two or more
sections, but many of the land holdings remained the same size.
Despite their continued official existence in the land records, nowadays, among the
majority of Shi'ahs, the pa is no longer a corporate group with any social interaction
and many adults do not know the name of their pa. It was quite common for people to
respond to my questions about their pa by saying things like "you can find out from the
Patwari's records", or "what did my relatives' house say, because they are the same
as us". One of the commonest pa names in Suru is Helbi, which is the name of one of
the mythical founders of Ladakh who came from Gilgit, and is used as a clan name all
over Ladakh (Khan 1939:684, Vohra 1989:23, Rizvi 1994:27). But in Suru, people of
that pa did not know the story of Helbi, nor were they interested. The only Shi'ahs
Francke reports that in Kha atse (in Leh tehsil between Leh and Kargil) at the turn of the
century, one of the p'ha-spuns was called Brushalpa (Francke 1904:364-5); and Vohra records
its use in Dah (Vohra 1989:23).
6 A kanal is a measurement of land and 8 kanals are equivalent to about an acre.
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who referred to their pa spontaneously were in Panikhar. Lampa is the most
numerous pa in the village and is that of the headman Moqdam Mehdi, who is the third
generation in his family to hold the post. They still refer to themselves as being a pa,
and refer to the Lampa-pa graveyard (qabristan) and water-mill (rantak). I suspect
that the reason why the pa is more significant in Panikhar (and possibly Prantee) than
in other Suru villages, is because those villages contain both Sunnis and Shi'ahs; and
the former actively use and refer to their equivalent to pa, called zat.
The pa has clearly ceased to be of any great importance as a kinship group, during
this century, and probably most rapidly in the last few decades. There may be a
number of reasons for this, such as the changes in land registration and a move
towards Muslim inheritance practice that stipulates the division of property between
heirs. However, I think that the main reason that it has become socially irrelevant
among Shi'ahs in Suru, is that its role as a kinship group and in the construction of
histories has been superseded by the Shi'ite factions.
Nowadays, only the p'ha -spun which is a sub-group of the pa is important for Shi'ahs.
This term is used for a kinship group in Ladakh and Baltistan, and other parts of the
Himalayas, but the nature of this group varies considerably between different areas,
even in Ladakh itself. 7
 The literal meaning of the term is 'father's relatives' (p'ha is a
term for father, and spun means relative) but this name does not necessarily reflect
practice. For instance, among Buddhists in the Leh area, for whom the house is an
important kinship unit, the p'ha -spun is a group of unrelated houses that fOrm a
'fictitious' exogamous kinship group that is not based on any notion of patrilineal
descent (Brauen 1980, Kaplanian 1981:1 67ff). Brauen says that in some other
villages in the tehsil, the kin links do exist, but are purely symbolic and involve the
evocation of a mythical ancestor figure (Brauen 1980:24).
is an extensive literature on the p'ha-spun among Buddhists in Ladakh, starting from
Prince Peter's extensive and valuable data on the p'ha-spuns of Leh town, and including
detailed descriptions of the p'ha-spun of various villages in Leh tehsilby CULE, Kaplanian,
Doilfus, Phylactou and Brauen, Vohra's detailed information on the Buddhist Dards of Dah in
central Ladakh, and data on Zanskar from Crook (Prince Peter 1956 & 1963, CULE 1977 &
1979, Brauen 1980a & 1980b, Kaplanian 1989, Day 1989, Dollfus 1989, Phylactou 1989, Vohra
1989, Crook 1994b:501ff).
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In Suru, the p'ha -spun is an unnamed sub-division of the pa, that consists of a small
group of households descended from a common ancestor, each holding shares of
what was once a single land holding. It is an important mutual aid group for all life-
cycle events and its members also act as a decision-making group in respect of such
issues as land division and marriage partners. For example, a woman in Suru was
divorced by her husband because she was unwell and so was unable to do much farm
work. She said that her husband had been happy to keep her but that his p'ha -spun
had decided to get rid of her. Such decisions are usually made by all the older adults
(mate and female) rather than just the household heads. The p'ha -spun is also the
kinship group that manages the inheritance of land.
The apical ancestor for a p'ha -spun is usually the grandfather of the current household
heads. For instance, the Lampa pa in Panikhar, now has seven households in that
village, but there are two p'ha-spuns, one containing six houses who are all
descended from a common grandfather and the other only a single household.
Figure 2.1 - The p 'ha-spuns in a pa
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The p'ha -spun normally only contains households that are connected in living memory,
and ordinary (that is non-sayyid) Shi'ahs do not show any great interest in their
ancestors beyond the grandparents generation, although the local language does
contain kinship terms for both male and female ancestors up to four generations past.
Similarly, they do not distinguish the graves of anyone beyond the recently dead. The
p'ha -spun is also an active group and therefore members must be in contact with each
other. For example, the only potential p'ha -spun of one of the houses in Panikhar is
the father's brother of the household head. However, he went to Pakistan in 1947,
and remained there, so he is considered to be their zargyud, which is a term for
someone from the same descent group, but his is not their p'ha -spun, as there is no
contact between them.
There is a strong association between a p'ha-spun and their land, that can override
the importance of patrilineal descent. People often referred to the p'ha -spun as
sagyat chik-pa (that is the people from the same land, sagyat means 'land, and chik is
one). Unrelated people such as faithful servants can join a p'ha -spun by being given a
share in its land. This is the case of the p'ha -spun of Munshi Habibullah Bhat, an ex-
Minister in Kargil, which contains the descendants of a servant who was given land by
Munshi Habibullah's father. The connection between the p'ha -spun and land is also
very strong in death, since ideally members will be buried on their own land. People
also said to me that p'ha -spun members are sha-rus-pa chik-chik or mirab chik chik
c/ia, which in Suru means they are of the same descent.
Nowadays land is inherited according to Muslim inheritance law; however, as in many
other places, women do not usually receive the share to which they are entitled.
Thus, division of a household's land only takes place if there is more than one son. It
rarely takes place before all the sons are married and it is common for people to wait
until their parents, particularly their father, is dead. At the time of division, each of the
sons takes equal shares of the land and property; or, if there are several brothers,
some of them may decide to remain together longer and not divide their joint shares.
This was the case of one of the families in Taisuru who have a son in the Noon Public
School. Their grandfather was a Buddhist garba (blacksmith8) from Zanskar, who
8 Blacksmiths are considered to be low-caste in Zanskar, but not in Suru.
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married a Shi'ite heiress and settled as her mag-pa (uxonlocal husband) and became
a Muslim. Their daughter had no brothers, so she also married a mag-pa from
Prantee, hence they have land in both Taisuru and Prantee. Now there are four
brothers, one is a mag-pa in Pursa and the other three are in Taisuru. The eldest
brother has recently divided from the rest of the family but his younger brothers and
their wives and children remain with their elderly parents in the original house.9
Daughters do not normally inherit land and are not given a share at the initial division
between brothers. However, if there are no sons in the family, one of the daughters
may bring a mag-pa and her children will then inherit all the land. Heiresses may also
marry virilocally but still inherit land from her natal family, in which case children inherit
both their mother's and their father's land. Alternatively parents may choose to give
the land to an agha. For instance, in 1994, I attended a wedding in Namsuru of a
young woman who was the only daughter of her widowed father. He had donated his
land and house to Agha Baqir from the yokma-pa and she was being married to a
young man in Namsuru. This practice is quite common and is an indicator that the
yokma-pa is now the main descent group for its members (see below).
Even women who have brothers, retain some rights in their natal land. If one of their
brothers dies without any heirs after the land has been divided then his sisters have
rights in his share. Virilocally married women have no inheritance rights in their
husbands' houses and older childless widows must usually rely on the good will of
their husband's family to support them after his death. However, the system of
inheritance is flexible insofar as the p'ha -spun can make alternative decisions. While I
was in Panikhar, when the husband of a childless couple died, the p'ha -spun decided
to give his wife half of his 10 kanals of land and the other half to his sister, who is
married in Panikhar. His widow objected and asked for all the land and the matter was
still in dispute a year later.
Men who marry uxorilocally remain as part of their natal p'ha -spun and it is common
for them to say things like: "I have two p'ha -spun in this village and one in Taisuru,
that's my father's brother." When a woman has married virilocally and inherited land,
9 When partition occurs, new houses may be constructed, but often people initially just make
separate hearths and, therefore, households, within the same house.
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her children are also considered to belong to her p'ha -spun, but it is not important as a
corporate group in the same way as the father's p'ha-spun. The terms mo-p'ha -spun
and pho-p'ha -spun can be used in such a case, for mothers and father's p'ha -spun
(mo means 'female' and pho 'male'); but the mother's p'ha-spun is not normally
referred to as such if there is no connection with it through the land.
During a large part of their lives women's p'ha -spun membership is more tentative
than that of men. A woman starts life in the p'ha -spun of her natal home and in rare
cases of uxorilocal marriage, she will remain there. However, when she marries, she
joins the p'ha -spun of her husband and moves to his house. Afterwards it is unusual
for her to resettle in her natal home, instead she will remarry in the event of his death
or divorce. While she is of child-bearing age her attachment to her husband's
household only remains as long as her husband is alive. In the event of his premature
death she usually remames fairly rapidly. Her children will remain in their natal home,
with the exception of very young children who may temporarily accompany her. Still
children will eventually return and have full inheritance rights in their father's house,
but their mother does not retain any such rights.
For example, Sajjida, the mother of one of the younger children in the school, has
been widowed twice. She had several children with her first husband, who then died,
and she remarried in the same village of Achambore. She then had two more children
before her new husband died as well. It is unlikely that she will remarry now, as she is
in her forties and there are no other adults in her second household to bring up the
children. However, as a single woman with children it was considered impossible for
her to live alone and so she and the two younger children have moved back into the
house of her first husband, which they share with her older daughter and son and his
wife and children. Similarly, Api Cho-cho, the most popular and influential widow of
Agha Hyder, the last leader of the yokma-pa, was originally married to the father of
Hajji Ghulam Mohammed who is one of the main organisers of the Noon Public
School. He then died, after they had had several children. She subsequently married
Agha Hyder and left the children at their fathers home in Trangole. Both these
women retained close ties with children from their first marriage; but after divorce,
which is often acrimonious, it is quite common for the husband's p'ha -spun to refuse to
let a woman see her children. Divorced women rarely return to their natal home. For
example, Roqia, one of Agha Baqir's wives, was married to a man in Choskore, but
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she was unhappy there, so she left and became a servant (duksmi) in Agha Baqir's
house and subsequently they married. Commonly, women divorce and remarry a
number of times. For instance, the stepmother of one of the other children in the
school, is now married to her third husband, since she was divorced by the previous
two for not producing any children.
It is only when women pass child-bearing age that their position in their marital home
becomes permanent and they seem to be fully accepted as part of the p'ha -spun.
This change in status is illustrated by adoption practices. When a couple are
childless, they may adopt a tsozbu, who is a boy or man who will inherit their land.
The preference is to adopt someone from the father's descent group; however, failing
that, they will often adopt a boy from the woman's side. For example, one of the
parents in the school had inherited his father's sister's land in Pursa, and was settled
there. In another case I heard of, a woman from Choskore had been married in
Sankhoo Block, but when her husband died she married a man in Choskore, where
she also had land, leaving her two sons there.'° Subsequently, her husband's
brothers threw out her sons and they came to live with her and her husband in
Choskore. They had no children, so her husband adopted one of her sons, who
inherited his adoptive father's land; the other son inherited his mother's land. In
another instance of adoption, in Panikhar, a woman was married consecutively to two
Lampa brothers, both of whom divorced her. She had a son by the first, and
subsequently married another Lampa man, with whom she did not have any sons. So
they adopted her son as the heir, which was seen as being particularly appropriate, as
he was also from the same pa. These are the only cases of adoption that I know
about in the last forty years, and they are relatively rare. However, the high levels of
mortality, and the migration in 1947, has meant that many households have
experienced a shortage of male heirs, which is significant to the history of the aghas of
both the Shi'ite factions and Sunnis, who trace their origins to men who came and
married heiresses in Suru.
As I have demonstrated, women's location within kinship groups in Suru is often
changeable and insecure. They are also considered to be supremely susceptible to
attract mi-kha (literally 'gossip' but it means the evil eye) particularly during their child-
10 Her new husband had gone to Pakistan in 1947, but had returned to Choskore in middle age.
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bearing years, as are their children, especially babies. This is partly related to the
extremely high levels of mortality that both women and babies experience. Women
tend not to reveal the fact that they are pregnant for fear of mi-kha. For instance, a
Panikhar woman I visited alone while we were doing the household surveying told me
that she was pregnant, but asked me not to tell any other women about it. I passed
another woman teacher whose parents' house I was staying in at the time on the road
to school one day, and suddenly noticed that she was pregnant, although no-one had
told me. She gave birth a week later, and when I mentioned this after a few days to
the Medical Assistant at the Hospital he had not heard, although her house is a few
yards from the hospital and they are otherwise enthusiastic users of the medical
service.
Women often said that they had lost teeth when their children were babies, and they
suggested that this was due to mi-kha. When my own teeth were looking particularly
yellow, one of the aghas commented that it must be mi-kha and that he could do poo
ba for me to make it better. This method of healing involves the person saying some
prayers and then blowing on the affected person. It is used most by clerics such as
aghas and akhuns, but other men also do it. In addition aghas in particular, give
people tawiz (amulets with lines from the Koran in them) to ward off mi-kha and its
effects. Thus women's relative vulnerability and the aghas' ability to heal and protect
them is an important way in which women are bound to the aghas. For instance, most
of the visitors to Agha Sakawat of the goma-pa, who is a famous healer trained in the
Islamic Yunani tradition, are women.
In contrast to women's precarious position in terms of the official kinship of inheritance
and the p'ha -spun, they retain strong affective ties with their natal family and rarely
marry far from home. Affinal ties are also extremely important. As in the whole of this
region, people usually have a close relationship with the family of their mother's
brother, who is known as azhang. These relationships are relaxed and affectionate,
partially as they do not involve any potential conflicts over inheritance. Affinal ties are
publicly acknowledged in the wedding ceremony, at which the companions of the bride
and groom are their azhang and nene (father's sister). Similarly, the term snyen
(relatives), refers to both cognatic and affina! relatives. In Suru, as in other parts of
Ladakh, many kinship terms, such as apo and api for grandfather and mother, do not
distinguish between cognatic and affinal relatives. However, in Suru aunts and uncles
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have particular terms according to whether they are cognatic or affinal relatives and
their birth position or age relative to ego's parents. In the Leh area, where descent is
more likely to be bilateral, a mother's brother is called the same as the father's sister's
husband.
In Suru, Shi'ah women nearly always marry in their own or a close village (see
Chapter 6). Hence they are able to visit their natal homes regularly. On the occasion
of Id Ghadir, which commemorates the day when the Prophet Mohammed chose
Imam AU as his successor, Shi'ahs visit their relatives, particularly their affines. This is
an important occasion for women to renew their kinship ties with their natal home,
which they will try to visit. If either of their parents are dead, they visit their graves and
hand out sweets to anyone who is about. Such ritual distribution of foodstuffs occurs
on a myriad of different occasions in Suru, and often involves people's acceptance into
a group. For example, on a child's first day at school they will bring sweets to be
distributed to the other children and teachers.
Thus women's links with land and kinship groups are often created through their
connection to graves, often through rituals of mourning. Women only definitively join
their marital p'ha -spun in death, as they are buried on their husband's p'ha -spun's
land, or at least near to his other p'ha-spun members in the graveyard (qabristan).
Their graves then become a focus for their daughters' links with their natal home.
Thus women's location within the p'ha -spun is very weak compared to that of men. In
contrast they have a more central and enduring location within the yokma-pa, which is
also a kinship group. However, before I discuss the organisation of the yokma-pa I
shall outline some aspects of gender in Suru.
(v) Gender and Authority in Suru
As I have suggested in my discussion of the p/ia-spun there is a clear gender division
in Suru. One expression of this is in the division of labour, as there are tasks such as
ploughing that women never perform. Prohibitions on other types of agricultural work
vary between different parts of the Suru valley. However, the main unit of agricultural
production is the household, and in most families, both men and women work at the
majority of agricultural tasks. Older people of both sexes withdraw from heavy work if
and when there is sufficient alternative labour within the household. Children start
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helping with various tasks fairly young. Girls start fetching water and washrng up from
the age of about five, and boys will be sent to tend animals from eight or nine.
The oldest man in a household is considered to be the head, and the family unit is
named after him; however, authority structures within the household are relatively
weak. As I have described, divorce as extremely frequent partly because women
cannot be forced to stay in a marriage that they do not like, either by their natal or
marital relatives. Similarly men told me that when they were younger they had been
sent to school, but that the teachers were so horrible to them that they just left.
Others, said that they had run away to labour in the Punjab in the winter without their
parents' permission when they were teenagers.
Women, particularly the older wives, are usually involved in decision-making, both
within the individual household and the p'ha-spun. In the household where I stayed in
Panikhar, the adults were a couple in their 30's who acted as equal partners in the
management of their household and their relationships with relatives and neighbours.
Until the 1 980s, the majority of men were absent from Suru for most of the winter, so
women must have enjoyed even more authority within the household than they do
today.
I talked to a number of men about their participation in this annual winter migration to
labour in the lower hills, particularly the Punjab. 1 ' They used to depart after the end of
harvest and the marriage season in the autumn, and return in the spring before
ploughing, which starts at the end of April. They would walk to Wardwan and Kishtwar
via the Chelong Nala route and often encountered thick snow on the return journey.
Many men told me of their hardships on these journeys. However, some said that
they could return with as much as Rs. 50 when, in those days, a sheep cost Rs. 5. An
important feature of the migration was that they always travelled in a group, living and
cooking together to avoid pollution from outsiders. When they returned to Suru they
were referred to as the 'punjab-pa' (Punjabis). Similarly, prior to the opening of the
road, the men who went on trading expeditions to Kashmir via the Chelong Nala route,
were known as 'kachul-pa' (Kashmiris) on their return. Their reincorporation into Suru
society involved the preparation of a dinner of rice, which was one of the main
11 In those days Himachal Pradesh was part of Punjab state.
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commodities that they brought back for their relatives and neighbours; and the
punjab-pa distributed small gifts of tea that they had brought back.
In contrast, women rarely travelled out of Suru in the past and still do not. The
majority of peasant women only go to Kargil two or three times in their entire life.
Older women made a definite virtue of their reluctance to leave Suru, and would say
that they did not like going to Kargil as it is dirty and noisy and the water is not clean.
This restriction on women's movement is usually regarded by outsiders as being part
of the Islamic conservatism of the people in Suru and Kargili Shi'ites in general. For
instance, it is often said that the poor health of women in this area is partly because
their male relatives do not allow them to visit the hospital in Kargil. This restriction
appears to be more a feature of Shi'ism in this area rather than being Islamic, since in
neighbouring Zanskar the young Sunni Muslim women from Padum used to go
labouring in the plains until recently, as did the Buddhists. Similarly, as I shall discuss
later, Sunni women commonly marry in other parts of Ladakh and Kashmir.
Moreover, Shi'ah women's movement out of the area is not restricted because they
are seen to be weak in a physical sense. In fact quite the opposite is the case, and
they work extremely hard at farming and on all kinds of heavy work. Within Suru itself
women and girls go alone far into the mountains to collect dung. My feeling is that the
restriction on their leaving the area is connected with women's lack of location, in
terms of land and kinship group that I described in the previous section. This makes it
more dangerous for them to travel out of the area than it is for men, as they are
regarded as being much more vulnerable to being harmed by sherpa and mi-kha. It is
also likely that as the conduits of tears that fertilise the land, women must themselves
particularly avoid pollution by sherpa, lest their tears pollute the land.
Given that Shi'ah women are not encouraged to leave Suru, I was initially surprised to
be told by Archo Nargis, Agha Miggi Ort's wife, that she had been on ziarat (pilgrimage
to the Shi'ite centres in the Middle East) with her father in the late 1 960s, before she
was married.' 2 Normally, she is reluctant to leave Suru, and has told me how little she
likes Kargil. In 1994 they were trying to obtain a passport for her teenage daughter
12 In those days it was a difficult journey, partly by boat from Bombay, whereas now people fly
from Delhi to Iran.
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Mansura Begum to go to Iran with her father before she was married. In fact, ziarat is
the only major journey that women make out of the area and even then few Suru
women ever go. 13 The reason why I think it is possible for sayyid women to go with
their fathers is that aghas are considered to have the greatest power to counter mi-kha
and other forms of harm and create a ritual space around them which is less
dangerous than normal. Archos themselves are also considered to have greater
powers than ordinary people and therefore may be better protected.
When Shi'ah women travel out of Suru, it is considered desirable for them to travel
with a close male relative, who is moharam ('not forbidden') to them. This concept is
based on Muslim restrictions on interaction between men and women who are not
closely related.' 4 For women in Suru, it is taken to mean the relationship with the
husband and males with whom it is forbidden to marry but with whom they are
permitted to shake hands, and show their hair (gus-po) and legs. To do these things
with other men is considered to be a sin (nyespa). For Shi'ahs the group that are
moharam includes men from a woman's natal family, including her uncles, her
husband and sons. When a woman goes away with unrelated men, she must go
through a ritual, usually in front of an agha, which makes them moharam to each
other. For example, Agha Miggi Ort's sister Archo Tohira, is moharam to a man from
Trangole who took her on ziarat some years ago.
Women's relative lack of power within the p'ha -spun and the restrictions on their
mobility, are in contrast with the important role that they play in the yokma-pa, which
can be regarded as being the most important and enduring kinship group for women.
However, as I shall show in the next two sections, the official organisation of the
yokma-pa is largely a male affair, but its organisation as a kinship group relies heavily
on women's links with the leading aghas.
13 For instance in our survey of Thulus and Pursa there were a number of male hajjis but only
one female one.
14 Fischer and Abedi explain this term as; "spouse and close kin with whom one cannot marry
and before whom a woman need not veil: spouse, mother, father, grandmother, grandfather,
brother, sister, aunt, uncle.' (Fischer and Abedi 1990:515).
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(vi) The Organ isation of the Yokma-pa
The yokma-pa has a single leader, Agha Miggi Ort, who is the rehbaror guide for all
his followers. They are called murjd (which is the Sufi term for followers), or more
colloquially: "agha khrile yodkhan migun", which literally means 'the people who
follow the agha' in the local language. The faction is localised to Suru and Sankhoo
Blocks, in the upper Suru valley. In Sankhoo Block most people are yokma-pa, and
they have their main centres in Sankhoo and Langkartse, where the important yokma-
pa aghas live. There are also a few goma-pa in the Block, but they do not have a
centre there. A minority of people follow other lesser leaders, such as a shaikh in the
Ichu valley near Sankhoo, who apparently preaches against the influence of all aghas,
whether yokma or goma-pa. In Suru Block all the Shi'ahs are yokma or goma-pa,
which are roughly equal in number. In Panikhar and Thulus all the Shi'ahs are yokma-
pa, but all the other villages contain members of both factions. For example, Taisuru
had twenty-two yokma-pa houses and twenty-seven goma-pa in 1993. Both factions
have their centres in Taisuru, which is where their leading aghas live and they have
their main religious buildings.
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Figure 2.2 - The Yokmapa lineage
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Picture 2.4 - Agha Jaffar's astana while under construction in 1988
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Picture 2.5 - Agha Jaffar's Tomb in 1988
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Picture 2.6 - The older astanas in the qabristan in Taisuru
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Picture 2.8 - Women and girls going to the Id Ghadir celebrations in Taisuru
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At the core of the yokma-pa are two patrilineages, which are branches of a lineage
which originated in Langkartse. In Taisuru, these two sub-lineages are represented by
the two yokma-pa aghas' houses. The first lineage is that of Agha Miggi Ort, who has
been the leader of the whole faction in the Suru valley since 1988. His father, Agha
Jaffar, was the leader of the faction until his death in 1957. Both of these men had no
brothers, so there is only one house of their branch of the lineage. The other house
belongs to Agha Baqir, the son of Agha Hyder, who led the yokma-pa from 1957 until
his death in 1988. His branch of the lineage has houses in Langkartse, Sankhoo and
Taisuru. Agha Hyder had three main wives, each of whom had a son. Agha Baqir,
the eldest, lives in Taisuru. He is highly respected and reasonably powerful within the
faction, but he has not studied in Iran or Iraq. Neither has Agha Abbas, the elder of
his two brothers based in Sankhoo. But the youngest brother, Agha Ahmed, is
studying with Agha Husain, Agha Miggi Ort's eldest son, in Qum in Iran. It is likely that
they will both be important aghas in the future, but the succession of the leadership of
the faction has not yet been decided, as far as I know, as Agha Miggi Ort is still only in
his 40's. In addition there are several other aghas families in the faction, including
their relatives in Langkartse, and a number of other clerics that I shall discuss later.
Agha Baqir and Agha Miggi Ort live in neighbouring houses in Taisuru, near to the
large and imposing yokma-pa masjid, which was built in 1975 and is the focus of their
collective rituals in the Block. Not far from their houses is a qabristan (graveyard) that
contains the astanas (Urdu: saints' tombs) of some of their ancestors. The largest
astana is that of Agha Jaffar which was built in 1987. In Sankhoo, there is a masjid
and now the astana of Agha Hyder is found near his sons' house.
The yokma-pa as an organisation has a structure called a daftar15 , which is a set of
records and agreements, that are the basis of the faction. Agha Miggi Ort's daftar
dates from 1916, which was his grandparents' generation. It covers both Blocks, but
at the moment he administers the yokma-pa in Suru Block, and Agha Hyder's other
two sons do the same in Sankhoo Block. The daftar contains a list of men who
organise the faction in each village. They are responsible for collecting taxes and
other ad hoc donations from the members in their village, and for organising work
15 This is a Farsi word. In Iran it is used for the register of students kept by teachers in
madrasas (Akhavi 1980:18). In India it is normally used for office (as in the place of work). In
Swat it is used for land which has feudal rights and obligations tied to it (Barth 1960:1 27).
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parties to help with the aghas' agricultural work. In the seventeen villages of the
yokma faction in Suru Block (excluding Taisuru, where the ag/ia himself is present),
ten of these representatives are akhuns, two are aghas, one is a shaikh, two are
haffls l6 and the remaining two are ordinary men.
The yokma-pa from the whole of Suru Block perform services for Agha Miggi Ort's
family, such as working on their land at various points in the agricultural cycle, and
bringing certain goods to the aghas' households. These obligations are written in
Miggi Ort's daftar as part of the agreement that was made between their family and
the local people in 1916, when his lineage were established in Taisuru (see Chapter
3). In this agreement, each household among the followers in Suru Block promise to
bring one kilo of butter and a load of wood to the ag/ia's household every year, as well
as a sheep on New Year's Day (nauroz - the 21st of March); and to do free labour in
their fields (this kind of corvée labour is called milaks). It also says that the ag/ia's
family will not be fined for allowing their horses and cows to stray into other people's
fields in the summer.17
Milaks is a form of free non-reciprocal labour used by powerful households in the area.
Work teams are organised when the agha's family sends a message, or visits each
village to request the labour, and then the organiser for that village will send workers
on a particular day, one village per day for the larger villages and two for the smaller
ones. Milaks come to Taisuru from the villages from Trangole down to Damsna
(towards Sankhoo), as it is too far to come from places like Parkachik. The milaks do
a full day's work, and the agha's household will feed them, often with the customary
meal of paba (a dough made of parched barley dough) and melted butter - this is a
particularly luxurious and auspicious dish, which is used in ceremonial contexts. On
appointed days, women from faction members' households in each village will bring
basket-loads of dung for the ag/ia's winter heating and cooking, and other goods.
They also give the ag/ia other donations, such as the butter that comes from the first
milk of each cow or dzo-mo (cow-yak cross breed) that calves. Followers from each
16 In Suru this usually means someone who has been to the Shi'ite centres in Iraq, Iran and
Syria, rather than on ha/f to Mecca, as I shall discuss later in this chapter.
17 Qther people would be fined by the lorapa whose job it is to keep an eye on stray animals.
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village also take it in turns to provide the tobarok (ritual food) handed out at the end of
various religious ceremonies in Taisuru.
Lesser aghas, shaikhs and akhuns, including Agha Baqir's house in Taisuru, have
similar arrangements, but on a more local scale. For example an akhun family from
Sangra, who came to the area from Karmang in Baltistan several generations ago,
were given land by the local people in order to settle there, and have a document that
outlines the services that local people will perform for them.
Agha Miggi Oil is responsible for the collection of Islamic taxes in the area through his
representatives. They do not collect the general Islamic zakat tax, as they say that
no-one in the area is rich enough to pay. Instead they collect the khums tax, which is
a tax that is only found among Shi'ites, and is collected on behalf of the Hidden Imam
(Glassé 1991 :226). It is a one fifth tax on the surplus that a household has at the end
of a year, whereas zakat is a tax on totat income. This surplus can be in the form of
cash, or kind, such as grain, and is paid to the agha. Agha Miggi Oil said that the
average given by each household in his following was about Rs. 200 a year, which is
the cost of about thirty-five kilos of rice. I interviewed a number of households about
khums payments in 1994, some of whom had given nothing at all, while others had
given up to Rs. 1000.
Half of the khums is called mal-e-imam and is for the upkeep of the mujtahids (high
ranking Shi'ite clerics) at the Shi'ite centres, and half is mal-e-sadat which is meant for
the support of sayyids, charity and good works locally. However, as far as I could
ascertain, the money is kept as a single amount. Some is used for the upkeep of the
ag/ia's household and for charitable works; and the remainder is sent to the mujtahid
who is currently regarded as their main guide in Iran. 18
 In 1994 Agha Miggi Oil told
me that he sends between Rs. 10-50,000 to Iran annually; but the goma-pa aghas
said that all their khums income was spent in Suru. They do not receive any money
from Iran, but students who study in the Shi'ite madrasas in the Middle East receive a
small stipend. 19
 Followers can also be called upon to give money for religious
18 The mujtahidto whom it was being sent up to his death at the end of 1994 was Ayatollah
Araki, who was also the person to whom any legal disputes that could not be resolved locally
were referred.
19 A Shi'ite doctor from Kargil commented to me that if the Ayatollahs in Iran had any idea how
poor the Suru people are, they would send all the money back.
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building, specific causes or ceremonies. The two imam-barahs in Taisuru, and the
astana of Agha Jaffar, were both built using money of this kind. I gather that every
house in the following will give money on these occasions. For example, in 1997, Dr.
Jaffar told me that Rs. 100,000 had been collected for Agha Miggi Oil and Agha Baqir
to visit Iran.
It is also fairly common for people to donate their land to an agha's family, if they have
no male heirs (see above). In the paiwari's records Agha Miggi Oil's lineage are
recorded as having about 80 kanals (about 10 acres), and Agha Baqir's branch have
land in a number of villages. The goma-pa aghas' lineage have about 300 kanals in 9
villages in Suru Block.
People regard pious donation as being a religious service, That brings merit (Farsi:
savab) to the donor. The word sawab, which is a Farsi term, is used for this kind of
good work (Rizvi 1994:115, Fischer and Abedi 1990:521). It is used as the opposite of
nyespa, which means 'sin' in the local dialect. In fact, nyespa is used all over this area
by both Muslims and Buddhists. In Suru it is used both for disobeying general Islamic
precepts, such as women showing their hair to unrelated men, and for things that are
considered to be a sin locally, but not in Islamic rules. One day, several of the
children were eating parched barley (yos) during a lesson in school After asking them
to desist a number of times, I told one of the boys to throw the yos away, but he said
to me that he could not, as it is a nyespa to do so. This is because the yos is a
product of their land and household, which it is a sin to waste, not just in Suru, but all
over Ladakh.
Individuals are considered to have an account of both sins and good works that will
affect their chances of entering Paradise. The following is an extract from a speech
given by Agha Hyder in Taisuru, in 1974, on the death day of Hazrat Zahra (who is
also known as Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Mohammed and wife of All the first
Imam), when the money was being collected for building the yokma-pa masjicak
"By constructing the masjid here, / am going to make a place for you in the
other world. If you give one stone or one pa/se for the masjid it will remain as
long as the mosque remains or until Doomsday. if you go for ha]] or pilgrimage
you will get the rewards for good works just for that time. Or if you say your
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nimaz,2° it is just for that time of the day. But if you build the masjid, the good
work and its reward will last as long as the masjid. It is actually not the masjid
itself you are making, but something like a vehicle which can take you and all
your relatives to heaven."
The faction's main contacts in India outside the Suru valley are with an organisation
called the Ayatollah Khomeini Memorial Trust in Kargil, and with the National
Conference Party. Surprisingly, the faction seems to have little contact, official or
otherwise, with other Shi'ite centres in India, even in Kashmir. This seems to be due
the fact that Baltistan was the centre for Shi'ism in this area prior to partition. In the
1 960s and 1 970s, the main outside links were with Iraq but, in 1974, the Iraqi
Government expelled all foreign clerics and, since then, people from Kargil tehsil have
only gone to Iran and Syria to study. Nowadays, the yokma-pa!s most important links
are with Iran, particularly the Shi'ite centre of Qum, where Agha Miggi Ort's eldest son
Agha Husain and Agha Baqir's brother are both studying.
Shi'ahs usually take their spiritual leadership from a local guide (rehbar in Farsi, and
lamstan in the local language), who may be an agha or a shaikh. He in turn takes
most of his guidance from a mujtahid (Farsi: 'leading cleric') in the Middle East, to
whom he may send a share of the khums tax that he has collected from his followers.
The local guide is the primary authority for issues such as inheritance and general
correct religious practice, and he is considered to be guiding his followers to salvation.
However, there is no obligation to solely follow a single guide, and followers can
accept judgements from different guides.
As Agha Miggi Ort is the rehbar in Suru, he is the main local guide for all his followers,
but Agha Baqir and other aghas are also important in the faction. Under Indian Law,
he can also act as the main authority in respect of Muslim family law for the yokma-pa.
Hence disputes over inheritance and land are taken to him for resolution, although
people often also consult with Agha Baqir as well. Disputes nearly all occur in the
Spring at the time of ploughing, as that is when issues of land ownership and
boundaries become clear. At that time, the yokma-pa aghas are constantly busy
settling conflicts among their followers. Some days, several groups of peftioners will
Nimaz are Muslim daily prayers, which are called phyak in Suru. Shi'ahs say them three
times a day, whereas other Muslims say them five times.
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come to their houses. The agha will listen to their cases and come to a decision.
Where this involves the permanent inheritance of land, rather than the setting of a field
boundary or such like, it may be written down in the agha's daftar, which has official
legal authority. 21
 When rulings by the local guide are disputed, they can be referred to
the higher authority (nowadays usually in Iran). For instance, in 1993, Agha Miggi Ort
usually took religious guidance from Ayatollah Araki, who was one of the leading
Ayatollahs in Iran before his death in 1994. Agha Miggi Ort would write to him,
outlining the matter in dispute, and the Ayatollah then replied giving his decision.
Although inheritance disputes can also be taken to the court in Kargil, this rarely
occurs.
In the next chapter, I shall discuss these connections to the Shi'ite world and other
external links of the yokma-pa. Despite their existence and importance, internally the
faction itself is extremely locatised, and consists of a real community as it is a kinship
group that is based on personal relationships between the aghas and their followers,
as I shall show in the next section.
(vii) Kinship of the Yokma-pa
Among Shi'ahs in Suru, the main social distinction is between people of sayyid
descent and ordinary people (am-pa, am being the Urdu for 'ordinary'). The former
are thought to have special powers and are given respect, due to their descent from
the family of the Prophet Mohammed. Sayyid status is passed in the male line, so the
children of an agha are automatically sayyids, but the children of an archo, are only
sayyids if their father is a sayyid. In Suru, the kinship practice of sayyids, particularly
the families of leading aghas, differs markedly from that of ordinary people. Ordinary
Shi'ahs nearly always marry monogamously with a person from the same faction and
their own or a neighbouring village, who is usually a non-relative. Sayyids also
21 His decision is not final however, since it can be referred to a mujtahid, and also to the court
in Kargil.
Ayatollah Araki was made the leading Ayatollah after the death of Ayatollahs Khoi and
Gulpaygani (Richard 1995:84).
In the houses that I surveyed a third of the marriages were with a relative of which two thirds
were with a patrilateral relative.
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marry within their faction but they have a strong preference for marrying into their own
or a related sayyid patrilineage, and leaders usually practice polygyny.
The two yokma lineages in Taisuru, are descended from the same ancestor in
Langkartse, but they now consider themselves to form two separate lineages, which
intermarry whenever possible. In the current grandparents' generation there were two
sets of patrilateral parallel cousins. The first was Agha Jaffar and his three sisters who
lived in Taisuru, and the second consisted of four brothers and four sisters from the
yokma lineage in Langkartse. Agha Jaffar married one of the sisters from Langkartse,
and two of his sisters married two of her brothers. The latter two couples were the
parents of Agha Hyder and Agha Miggi Ort's wife, Archo Nargis, respectively. Agha
Hyder's son, Agha Baqir and one of Agha Miggi Ort's sisters were also married, but
are now divorced. In the current generation, Agha Baqir's eldest daughter, Archo
Taiba, is married to Agha Miggi Ort's eldest son (and intended successor), Agha
Husain (see Figure 2.2, p.73).
These two lineages also consider themselves to be affinally related, as Agha Jaffar
was Agha Hyder's mother's brother (azhang), and Agha Hyder was Agha Miggi Oil's
classificatory azhang. Intermarriage between these two lineages maintains the
solidarity and power in the leadership of the faction. Both parallel and cross cousin
marriage is common among prestigious families in the area, and is used to form
solidary groups of kin. For example, at the core of the goma-pa there is a single
patrilineage of the leading aghas, who have houses in Taisuru and the hamlet of
Shaksthang in Suru Block. Agha Raza, the previous leader, was mamed to his
father's sister's daughter, and his sister is married to Agha Najibul the current goma-
pa leader, who lives in Taisuru. Agha Raza had no sons, so his brother's son has
come as a mag-pa for his daughter.
In 1994 I attended a wedding that involved various members of the family of Munshi
Habibullah Bhat, who is one of the richest and most influential people in Kargil and
was previously a Minister in the Jammu and Kashmir Government. His family form the
core of the administrative elite in Kargil (see Chapter 6). His eldest son, who is the
Tehsildar (officer in charge of the land records and revenue) in Kargil, is already
married to his brothers daughter. In this wedding, his middle son married Munshi
Habibullah's sister's daughter, whose father is the Assistant Development
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Commissioner in Kargil and his youngest son married the daughter of a member of
their p'ha -spun.
Archos, like aghas, are considered to have special qualities and so to give one of them
out seems to result in a loss to the lineage. Therefore it is desirable to retain them
within it. The desire to retain a family's property or assets, is I believe an important
aspect of parallel cousin marriage in Suru. It also reflects the ideal of the large and
solidary household which is a sign of high status in the whole Ladakh region. When
archos do marry outside the lineage, they are virtually always married to another
unrelated agha, which is the preference as then her children will also be sayyids, or at
least to a shaikh or akhun.
Important aghas are the only group of men who widely practise polygyny in Kargil
tehsil, and polygyny is rare among Muslims in Ladakh. In 1994, a Kargili archo
commented that only aghas could afford to have more than one wife, as they are the
capitalists of Kargil. Ordinary men in Suru only take a second wife when their first has
not had children. The second wife is often brought in with the agreement of the first, in
the hope that she will produce children. More often than not, the first wife will be
divorced before the second is brought in. Agha Hyder had several wives and his three
sons are all from different mothers. Agha Baqir has four wives, two of whom live in his
house at Taisuru. They are both non-sayyids and are given the respectful title cho-
cho. Agha Miggi Ort has two wives, but only Archo Nargis lives with him at Taisuru.
His second wife, by whom he has two small children, was a widow and lives at her
parents' house in Maita, near Taisuru. Agha Raza, the previous leader of the goma-
pa, had three wives, one of whom was an Iraqi archo who he had married when he
was studying there. But, in the current generation, the goma-pa aghas each have only
a single wife.
Polygyny allows leading aghas to have a larger kinship following than other people.
There also various other ways by which aghas expand their households and extend
kinship links throughout their faction membership. The most controversial is through
the practice of mut'a or temporary marriage with single women of the faction. Mut'a
marriage is permitted under Shi'ite law as an insurance that children born in temporary
liaisons will be supported by their fathers (Fischer and Abedi 1990:275). II involves an
agreement that states how long the marriage will last (often just a few days) and a
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mahr (marriage payment) of a few hundred rupees that is given to the woman. In the
past in both Kargil tehsil and Baltistan, this kind of agreement was apparently used for
most marriages, which could be contracted for short periods, but were often for up to a
hundred years (Rizvi 1993:55). Sagaster says that in Baltistan it was usual for young
couples to initially have an agreement of a few years, and then if their marriage was a
success, they would make another contract for a hundred years (Sagaster 1997:414).
She says that this kind of marriage is now rare (Sagaster 1997:415). ft has also
ceased to be the normal practice among ordinary people in Suru and Kargi, who now
use the nikah form of agreement, which is 'permanent' but allows for divorce. Rizvi
says that in the 1 970s clerics came back from Iran and Iraq and started to preach
against mut'a marriage (Rizvi 1 993:57).24 In Suru, sigheh (which is the Farsi term for
this kind of contract (Fischer and Abedi 1990: 522 & 518)) is still used by Shi'ahs as
the word for the contract but I understand that a permanent marriage contract is
normally used nowadays.
The mut'a marriages that aghas seem to conduct are genuinely temporary marriages
of extremely short duration. An agha from Kargil told me that they usually are made
for a month. Aghas are able to make such marriages relatively discreetly, as they can
authorise the contract themselves. I could not ask the yokma-pa aghas about mut'a
marriage directly as it is a sensitive subject, and something for which they are often
ridiculed. However, they seem still to contract mut'a marriages, although this is done
much more secretly than in the past. In the early 1 980s, when the subject was still
openly discussed, these liaisons were normally said to take place when an agha went
for a dawat (dinner) at one of his follower's houses.
The few instances of mut'a marriage that I know of involve women who either come
from one of the more influential families among the aghas'following, or who are
without heirs and are donating some land to one of the leading aghas. For instance, in
Sangra in 19811 heard that one of Agha Hyder's Sons had come for a dawat at the
house of a widow who had no heirs, and was donating some land to the agha's family.
Someone quipped at the time: "She is no longer a widow". It was said that a woman
who slept with an agha had more chance than others of entering heaven.
24 understand that it is now generally considered to be permissible in Iran again.
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The yokma-pa aghas also often create moharam links with their female followers.
Two unrelated members of the opposite sex can become moharam in respect of each
other by the performance of a simple ceremony. Subsequently when the woman visits
the agha's house, she can go and greet him and shake hands as they are moharam to
each other and this relationship will last for the rest of their lives.
In these ways the aghas make links, particularly through women, to the more
important families among their followers. The formation of these links also provides a
means by which women can themselves create a relationship that gives them
personal access to the aghas'patronage and power. It was very noticeable for
instance, that it was nearly always women who petitioned aghas for some favour or
help. They also make most of the visits to the agha's house as milaks and to deliver
gifts, so they have a good deal of contact with the aghas and their families
The yokma-pa aghas' kinship groups are enlarged further by having a number of
houses in different villages. For instance, Agha Baqir has two wives at the house in
Taisuru and another wife, who lives at her parents' house, visits to help at times of
heavy agricultural work. He also has a small house and land at Namsuru. Important
aghas usually have several servants in their house known as duskmi (household
servants), who help with the household and agricultural work.
The duksmi in the aghas'households are all from houses of factions members. Some
of the girls are orphans or particularly poor while others are from relatively well-off
families that have close links to the aghas and enough children to spare one to work in
the agha's house. All the girls said that they would stay with the agha's family until
married. The majority of the men have disabilities, some have learning difficulties and
one is deaf. These men do not necessarily come from poor families, but they will not
marry and settle on their own land as it is impossible to find marriage partners.
Sadiak, a young man from neighbouring Kargee village, is a duksmi in Agha Miggi
Ort's house. His mother died when he and his sister were still children and his father
Fischer and Abedi say that mut'a marriage can be used in Iran as a fictitious marriage that
allows unrelated men and women to have contact with each other (Fischer and Abedi
1990:276).
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was no longer able to manage their farm single-handed. So they rented out their land
in Kargee and went to live in the agha's house. His sister has since married and his
father has died. In 1996 Sadiak was 20 and was studying in 11th class. When he has
finished studying, it is hoped that he will obtain a government job or other occupation
and be able to return to his own house and land. Three years ago he married a
woman from quite a prosperous family in Taisuru, in a joint wedding with Agha Miggi
Ort's second son, AU Agha. Like the other duksmi and the aghas from Langkartse, he
is expected to work hard but he is treated like a member of the family. His wife and
two year old son now usually stay at the agha's house as well and she also works
hard at both house and agricultural work.
Api Cho-cho, one of Agha Hyder's widows, said people could now get paid
employment and were less willing to work for the aghas. Nevertheless, aghas'
households are significantly larger than those of ordinary people, which only contain
about five or six people on average. Agha Miggi Ort's household is usually about
twenty strong and that of Agha Baqir has thirteen members.
Another notable difference between the kinship practice of sayyids and am-pa is in
respect of ancestry and descent. Sayyids take a keen interest in their patrilineal
ancestry (mIrabs), that traces their descent to the family of the Prophet and they
usual'y possess a written record of this. For example, Agha Miggi Oil has a book in
which his father wrote their line of descent through twenty-four generations from the
Eighth lmam.
Their line of descent is also preserved through the astanas of their ancestors. In
Taisuru in the graveyard near the yokma-pa aghas' houses and masfld, there are a
number of small stone astanas of their forefathers and mothers. In 1987, a much
larger concrete astana was constructed for Agha Jaffar. It also contains the tombs of
his wife Roqia Begum and Agha Baqir's mother. People remember who these graves
belong to, and visit the astanas of the previous leaders, who are still thought to have
some power to intercede for ordinary people. The anniversary of Agha Jaffar's death
is observed, as are those of the close Family of the Prophet. On his death day (gyur-
jak) there is a matam and followers visit the astana to obtain his blessing. These
astanas are now more important for ordinary yokma-pa than the graves of their own
(except immediate) ancestors, who are now forgotten. I would suggest that the yokma
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lineage and their ancestors now effectively act as the lineage and ancestors for their
followers as well.
The aghas also form a living link with the family of the Prophet and through them, all
the faction members become connected to that line of descent. Through the aghas
the stories of the family of the Prophet, which are the aghas' family history, become
the history of everyone in the faction. These stories are known to everyone, and are
by far the most popular narratives in the area. Ordinary people's involvement in this
history is made very immediate by being regularly recounted and relived in emotion-
charged religious ceremonies.
(viii) Yokma-pa Ceremonies
The main collective rituals of the yokma-pa are the orche or matam (orche is the local
name for these, and matam is Farsi26) ceremonies. These take place on important
days in the Shi'ite calendar, both those that are mournful, such as death days of the
Imams, and on Id days of celebration, of which there are more than a dozen during the
year. There are also a large number of these ceremonies during the month of
Muharram, when Shi'ites commemorate the martyrdom of the Family of the Prophet at
Karbala. In Suru Block the yokma-pa hold their main matam rituals at their masjid in
Taisuru. This building is both a masj!d, that is the building used for Friday and other
prayers, and an imam-barah or matam-!-sara!, that is a place for mourning ceremonies
during the month of Muharram.
These rituals are attended by crowds of faction members, who converge on the imam-
barah in Taisuru at mid-morning. Followers come from all villages in the Block,
although people from Parkachik and the more distant villages attend less. The agha -
usually Agha Miggi Ort - sits on the large stepped seat or minbarat one side of the
masfid, with the men on the floor in front of him and the women, girls and small
children concealed by screens in various galleries. The main rite consists of the agha
making a matam speech in the local dialect. This usually consists of part of the story
of the martyrdom of the Prophet's Family, or a story about the particular member of
the Prophet's family whose birth or death day it is, interspersed with admonitions to
The correct word for this is matn, which means the body of the Hadith (commentaries on the
Koran and stories of the life of the Prophet Mohammed) in Farsi (Glassé 1991:262).
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weep. For instance, a passage from a yokma-pa akhun's speech delivered at a halt
during the procession on the 13th Muharram 1994 reads:
"Oh great lady [rgyal-mo - literally 'queen'] Hazrat27 Zahra [this is another
name for Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Mohammed and wife of Imam Au
the first Imam], you are our sponsor for the road to Heaven, because ills only
the tears that we weep for you and your relatives which provide provisions for
the journey."
Matam ceremonies explicitly link the participants into the wider Shi'ite congregation.
This akhun also said:
"You shouldn't think that you are alone in grieving here. All the Imams,
including the Imam Mehdi and the whole Universe are mourning today."
In Suru, these speeches are very emotional and compelling and are always
accompanied by loud weeping and lamentation from the agha and his followers. A
yokma woman once remarked to me: "Kargil is good for fruit and vegetables, but Suru
is good for matam, because it really gets the tears flowing." The agha recounts a
small part of the story, or exhorts the congregation to weep, and then he usually stops
and weeps himself, while his followers weep and some cry: "Husain" and the names of
other martyrs. These are tears of repentance and remorse, and are considered to
provide merit for the Day of Judgement, as well as being instrumental in gaining
Husain's intercession for his followers to enter Paradise (Hegland 1983:221). For
instance Agha Hyder said in a speech delivered in the open air in Taisuru in 1974,
when he was collecting money for the building of the yokma-pa masjict.
"We can't help lmam Husain now, because we weren't at Karbala on that day.
Had we been there we do not know whether we would have passed the test
and helped him. But now we can help him by crying and repeating the story of
his martyrdom."
27 Hazrat is a term of respect used for members of the Prophet Muhammed's immediate family
and prophets such as Jesus, who is know as Hazrat Issa.
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A later passage in the akhun's speech was:
HOn Doomsday when God asks Imam Husain to enter Paradise, he will say,
UOh God, I will not go alone unless you allow all those people who have
mourned for me to enter too"."
In these ceremonies, Agha Miggi On usually weeps more copiously than the other
men who are gathered in the congregation. His tears are considered to provide a
special blessing and it is not unusual for him to weep in other contexts. For example,
when he visited a yokma-pa woman who was gravely itt in Kargil Hospital, he wept
over her, although the rest of the assembled relatives and friends remained dry-eyed.
These matam ceremonies sometimes provide an occasion for the Agha to give his
followers advice about good conduct, and when the agha speaks from the minbar he
is considered to have the most authority. Agha Miggi Ort told me that he tells people
not to steal and to do good works. Women said that they are sometimes told to work
hard and avoid sin like Hazrat Zahra. He also sometimes passes on an important
pronouncement (Farsi: fatwa) from an Ayatollah in Iran or Iraq. For instance, in 1994
at the end of a matam, he said that a mujta hid had ruled that women should cover
their arms right to their wrists and only allow their hands to show.
In the yokma faction, usually Agha Miggi Ort, and sometimes Agha Baqir make the
matam speeches in the masjid. This adds an additional element of immediacy, since
they are the local embodiment of the Prophet's Family. People said that they
preferred one of the aghas to give the speech in the masfld, although a number of
people give them in other locations in the month of Muharram (see Chapter 3). Agha
Miggi Ort also sometimes goes to Sankhoo to lead a ceremony there, in which case
Agha Baqir deputises for him at Taisuru. Both Agha Hyder and Agha Raza also used
to deliver these speeches in their day. Interestingly, ills not very usual within Shi'ism
in general for important spiritual guides to lead matam ceremonies or their ilk.
Apparently, they are usually conducted by lesser clergy, such as the equivalent of
akhuns (Momen 1985:203, Fischer 1980:137).
These speeches reach a particular emotional intensity during the month of Muharram,
which is the main focus of the Shi'ite calendar. As I shall show in the next chapter, it
is also the main time for conflict between the yokma and goma-pa.
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(ix) Stratification within the Yokma-pa
Suru-pa are ranked according to their spiritual power or merit. The main division is
between sayyids and ordinary people (am-pa). All sayyids are respected with the titles
agha or archo, and are thought to have greater healing power and sexual potency
than ordinary people. An agha in Kargil said that archos could have children at a
much greater age than ordinary women and, as I have shown, important aghas often
have several wives. They usually perform a number of types of healing, such as
giving tawiz (protective amulets) and poo ba, a form of healing which is performed by
reciting some lines from the Koran then blowing on the affected person.
All aghas are respected, but the leaders have also studied chos (religion) for many
years in Iran and Iraq and are given special respect. For example, when Agha Miggi
Ort enters or leaves a room, it is common for other people to stand up as a mark of
respect, and he will be given the best place to sit in any gathering. Leading clerics -
both aghas and shaikhs - wear special dress when they are doing their religious work,
which is reserved for clerics who have undergone extensive religious studies. 28 But
only sayyids may wear black turbans and other clerics wear white ones.
As the leader of the faction, Agha Miggi Ort is regarded as a source of blessing for his
followers. Anything that is given out by him is called tobarok, which comes from the
term baraka, meaning spiritual power, blessing or grace, which Shi'ites consider to be
a property of the descendants of Fatima (Algar 1980:350). The term tobarok is used
for the food and sweets that are distributed at the end of matam ceremonies and some
Friday Prayers. It is also used for anything that has been given by the agha. For
instance, a yokma-pa woman told me to take special care of the shawl that I was
given when I left the school in 1994, as she said that it had come from Agha Miggi Ort
and so it was tobarok Food that the agha has half eaten is called sangma and is also
considered to be blessed. During an ordinary meal in his kitchen at home, Agha Miggi
Otl often hands his half-eaten plate of food to a companion or a family member to eat
in a manner that is not normal practice for other people, even if they are closely
related.
Their dress consists of long robes covered by an aba which is a sleeveless gown and a
turban.
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Learned aghas are considered to have access to esoteric knowledge that is hidden
from ordinary people. This is linked to their possession of baraka as well as their
superior religious learning. This belief is in accordance with the Shi'ite concepts of
zahir and batin, that mean 'revealed' and 'hidden' knowledge respectively (Hollister
1953:29). Once while a friend who is fluent in English was translating a tape of one of
Agha Hyder's matam speeches for me, a man came in, and asked what we were
doing. When I said that I wanted a translation he laughed at me and said: "How could
you possibly understand that? Even X (who was translating, and is from an akhun
family), cannot understand it. We don't understand much of what Agha Hyder or Agha
Miggi Ott says." Agha Baqir, made similar comments when he heard what we had
been doing. When I played the same tape to the woman of the house where I was
staying, she said: "How do you expect me to understand this, when even men can't
understand it?" What they meant was that the meaning of his words are so esoteric
that their full meaning is hidden to ordinary people. Agha Miggi Ort's epithet, which
means 'with eyes like a lamp' also refers to his ability to see the unseen.
Agha Miggi Ort's presence is most desired at the funeral of one of his older followers.
If he was not available, Agha Baqir or one of his sons would be requested to attend.
People emphasised, that they needed to have a chogo (big) agha from one of the
leading lineages. My understanding is that this is for two reasons. Firstly, the leading
aghas are regarded as being the direct representatives of the Family of the Prophet,
and therefore have the greatest power to intercede on behalf of the dead person, so
that they go to Heaven rather than Hell. Secondly, the presence of members of the
leading aghas' families at a funeral is a public expression of their kinship with their
followers. I attended a memorial feast in Panikhar for a yokma-pa man who had died
and his wife made a great point of posing for photographs with photos of her husband,
Agha Jaffar and Agha Hyder, so he was located within their kinship group.
A powerful agha has an enormous amount of authority within his following. In the mid-
1 990s, religious leaders in Kargil and Suru said that it was a sin to sing non-religious
songs and dance during the main parts of weddings, according to previous custom in
the area. I was at a yokma-pa wedding in the winter of 1994, at which the two
azhangs from each side were hauls, both of whom are prominent in the faction.
During the evening of the wedding day at the groom's house, we all sat around, and
the nyo-pa sang marsiyas (religious songs) in the next room. One of the half/s
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remarked that this was boring and we should be dancing, but the agha would be
angry. It was also said that the agha would beat his followers if they did something he
had spoken against. Once, I was waiting to travel to Leh but heavy snow had blocked
the road, someone in Kargil said that, if Agha Miggi O1 told them to, his followers
would dig me a path all the way to Leh.
Shaikhs, who are non-sayyid men with a large amount of religious education, are also
treated with a great deal of respect in Kargil tehsil. But in the yokma-pa the
importance of the aghas seems to have eclipsed that of other religious practitioners,
and there are no very important shaikhs. However, in the goma-pa, Shaikh Anwar, a
young man from Namsuru, is an important leader. He is currently still studying in Iran,
but he usually leads matam at the goma-pa imam-barah when he is in Suru. In Kargil
some of the most influential religious leaders are shaikhs and there is less emphasis
on the role of aghas.
Akhuns are men with some religious training, some are hereditary, and they are also
generally treated with some respect. They are usually active just within one or two
villages whereas important aghas and shaikhs do religious work over a wider area.
They provide a variety of religious services, particularly teaching Arabic and Farsi, but
they may also officiate at life-cycle ceremonies and some of them are renowned
matam speakers. In the goma-pa matam is normally conducted by an akhun in their
imam-barah, as the aghas rarely conduct these ceremonies. Akhuns are often
healers and Rizvi says that they are similar to Buddhist amchis (practitioners of
Tibetan medicine) (Rizvi 1981: 222-3, Rizvi 1993:43).
It is the aim of all Shi'ahs to go on the pilgrimage called ziarat (it is also called ha]] in
Suru) to the tombs of the Imams in Iran and Iraq (Arjomand 1981 :29, Richard 1995:7).
Undertaking ziarat is considered to be a good work that enhances a person's piety.
Both men and women who go on ziarat are called haj/iwhen they return, as are
people who were in Iran as children. Hauls are treated with more respect than
ordinary people, and are considered qualified to speak in discussions, as they have a
greater store of spiritual power. At a training session for female village-level workers
in 1993, there was a woman who had been in Iran as a child. Everyone called her
There are also people who practise these techniques in Suru, who are called aba.
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hajji and she assumed the role of spokesperson for the group. Most of the people
who go on ziarat from Suru are men. In Thulus village, there were four men who were
hajjis in 1994 but only one woman. Hajjis prefer to go as a companion of one of the
leading aghas. Thus, the father of the man who is the main sponsor of the Noon
Public School has been twice, both times as a companion for Agha Mggi Oil.
Ziarat differs from hail to Mecca in that Islamic custom stipulates that you must not
borrow to go on ha]], whereas the performance of ziarat does not have such
restrictions. Few can afford to go on ziarat, as the cost of the journey is tens of
thousands of rupees. For those that do go, it usually involves a great deal of work and
sacrifice, but at the same time they gain both religious merit and higher standing when
they return. Rizvi reports that in the 1970s, men in Kargil tehsil would labour in order
to send their son's to study religion and so raise their status (Rizvi 1993:50). In
general, both the acquisition of religious merit and the performance of good works is
central to rituals and prestige in the faction, and played a key role in the founding of
the Noon Public School, as I shall show in Chapter 5.
(x) Conclusions
Shi'ahs in Suru are involved in multiple types of relationship, such as those of the
p'ha -spun, gender and the village. All of these contain idioms of kinship that centre on
relationships to the land, both through the official male kinship of land inheritance and
through the largely female area of the creation of ties to the land and hence kinship
relationships through graves and weeping. The relationship between mourning, land
and fertility is well attested in many agrarian societies (Bloch 1982). In Suru men hold
land and women ensure its fertility by weeping.
The village in this area is also a form of kinship group as, like the p'ha -spun and the
pa, as it is a set of households that share the same piece of land. My understanding
is that for the most part the village contained the pa since, although there are often
several pas of the same name in different villages of Suru, practically people only
recognised kinship with the pa in the same village.
Clearly the faction is just one of the groups to which people in Suru belong and uses
the same idioms for creating kinship relations. However, on analysis, the faction both
contrasts with the others and incorporates them. This is clearly the case in respect of
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gender, as within the faction women have a more permanent and enduring kinship
connection than they do within the p'ha -spun and these kinship connections are
created directly with a leading agha. The agha's own role also approaches closer to
that of women, in this respect, as he weeps many tears as women do, in contrast to
the behaviour of other men, particularly younger ones. This is most marked at the
time of Muharram (see Chapter 3), when the younger men beat themselves and chant
loudly but the agha weeps.
Agha Miggi Ort is clearly also at the centre of the faction's official structures and
stratification, which are largely male and patriarchal. Hence he also mediates
between men's official, and women's unofficial kinship. In the official structure of the
faction, merit is crucial and can be gained (or preserved) in several ways. For women
it is mainly gained by weeping and avoiding sin and, on occasion, donation. However,
the major merit making enterprises such as engaging in religious studies and
performing ziarat, remain relatively closed to women and are largely a male affair.
The faction has almost superseded the pa now and taken on all its role of being the
holder of tradition and continuity for its members, particularly through the line of aghas
and the Prophet's family and their astanas. The p'ha -spun still remains important, but
is virtually entirely subsumed to the faction. Moreover, the now common practice of
allowing descent lines to die out and donating land to the aghas is evidence of the
importance of the faction for its members in respect of notions of inheritance and
continuity.
In this chapter, I have examined the internal relations within the faction, and shown
that it is in some respects almost hyper-local in its internal kinship links and connection
to the land in Suru. Kinship is also central to the relationship between the yokma and
goma-pa as I shall describe in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
The Two Shi'ite Factions in Suru
(I) Introduction
These two Shi'ite factions have roughly equal numbers of followers in Suru Block,
and there is no perceptible socio-economic difference between the profile of their
respective memberships. Internally, the organisation of the goma-pa is similar to
that of the yokma-pa. Externally, they have formed opposing factions in Suru for at
least the last thirty years.
The people of Suru have been Muslim for several centuries, but the two Shi'ite
factions came into existence in this century, when their leaders were encouraged to
settle in Suru. They apparently formed two separate factions by the 1 950s, but their
current hostility derives from the period of the yokma-pa's millenarian movement in
the 1 960s and 1 970s, which occurred partly in response to the disruption of partition
and the increased poverty faced in those days.
The yokma-goma dispute is neither pathological nor unusual. However, like the
yokma-pa's millenarian beliefs, it has been used by others in the region to
stereotype Suru people and Shi'ahs as being irrational, unruly and factional, in a
derogatory sense. Such attitudes in the administration have contributed to the
continuation of poverty in Suru in recent decades, as Suru people have been
thought incapable of participating in modernisation processes.
(ii) The History of Islam in Suru
There are few written sources on the history of Suru, but it would appear that the
spread of Islam into Purig (Kargil tehsil) was gradual and the result both of Muslim
preachers converting the ordinary populace and of chiefs adopting Islam as part of
the process of alliance building with the Mughals and the chiefs of Baltistan, who
had become Muslim eailier. An example of the former, is that of the Cho (chief) of
Pashkyum near Kargil, which was the main stopping place on the road in those
days. When the British adventurers Moorcroft and Trebeck visited him in 1821 he
had recently converted to Islam, although his wife remained a Buddhist; but the
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ordinary people of Pashkyum were already Muslims, (Moorcroft & Trebeck 1837 Vol
11:22). However, the chiefships of Chigtan and Kartse are both said to have
converted as a result of political alliances with the chiefs of Skardu (Rizvi 1983:48).
Popular tradition in Suru, and the oral history recorded by Hashmatullah Khan, relate
that the conversion to Islam started during the rule of Thi Namgyal, who was the
father of the last independent ruler of Suru-Kartse. He is said to have married Thi
Lha Khatun, the daughter of the Muslim chief of Skardu, the main power in Baltistan.
She brought Muslim scholars and preachers to Suru, who converted the population
of the valley (Khan 1 939:698). 1
 Their son, Thi Sultan was a Muslim, taught by a
scholar called Mir Hashm. His astana (tomb), still exists near the ruins of the castle
of this dynasty at Karpo Khar, between Sangra and Sankhoo, and is an important
pilgrimage place. Thi Namgyal is said to have had no legitimate heirs, so he
bequeathed his chiefdom to the ruler of Purig (Khan 1939:698-702).
This story is partly mythological, since it is likely that the title Thi (from khrid meaning
'throne' in Ladakhi) was a dynastic rather than an individual title. However, there are
references to Thi Sultan of Kartse and the Sultan of Chigtan feuding in the mid-i 6th
century (Cunningham 1854:24, Matoo 1988:24). Another Thi Sultan of Kartse is
mentioned in the Ladakhi Chronicles as having controlled much of Purig until the
early 17th century when he was defeated and captured by the Ladakhi ruler
(Francke 1926:98, Francke 1914:181-2 & 274). It is likely that this was the real end
of the dynasty as it is not mentioned again in any documents.
By the turn of this century, Francke reported that Baltistan was largely Shi'ite and
the majority of people in the Purig area were Muslim and Islam was still spreading
rapidly eastwards in Ladakh (Francke 1929). At that time, most Muslims in Purig
were Shi'ahs or Noorbakhshi, a Sufi variant of Shi'ism, rather than a completely
difterent sect (Matoo 1988:133 &1 62). The Noorbakhshi Order was started in the
15th century by the preacher called Noorbakhsh 'gift of light'. He was a Sufi follower
of the teachings of Sayyid Mahmud Hamadani (who is accredited with bringing Islam
to Baltistan and Purig). Noorbakhsh declared himself to be the Imam Mehdi (Twelfth
or Hidden" Imam) and tried unsuccessfully to overthrow the Caliphate in Persia. His
1 She is also said to have built a masjid at Kartse Khar, the site of their other castle, which
was burnt by the Dogras during their invasion in the 1830s (Khan 1939:697),
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followers became Shi'ahs in Safawid times and his disciple Shams Ud-din Iraqi
propagated his teachings in Kashmir (Glassé 1991 :304, Rovillé 1990:11 7ff). The
Noorbakhshi Order was banned by the Dogras who deported some of its members
from Baltistan to Kishtwar after their conquest of Ladakh in the 1 830s (Rovillé
1990:118). Many people in Purig, including Suru-Kartse, were Noorbakhshi until
recently (Francke 1914 Vol 1:185). Now there are only adherents in afew villages in
Kargil tehs!I (Zutshi 1961) and some in the Nubra valley north of Leh (Srinivas 1995),
but there are still many in parts of Baltistan (Sagaster 1997:414).
During the centuries when the people of Purig apparently converted, Islam was
associated with power in the region. For example, from the 16th to the 18th century,
the Mughals were in power in India and Kashmir and at times had a loose control
over Baltistan and Ladakh. During that time the Shi'ite Safawids ruled Iran and were
closely linked with the Silk Route on which both Baltistan and Ladakh were sub-
routes (Momen 1985:309, Yurur 1 993:vii). The 18th and 19th centuries saw the
Shi'ite Qajjar dynasty in Iran, and the kingdom of Oudh in Northern India, which had
its capital at Lucknow in Uttar Pradesh (Momen 1985:309, Cole 1988). However, by
the 19th century, Muslim power was waning in India, and Suru had been politically
unimportant for two centuries.
The Suru-Kartse area had apparently come under Purig, when a Thi Sultan was
defeated by the Ladakhi king in the 17th century (see above). At that time Purig was
under the control of the King of Ladakh's younger brother. However in 1758, Purig
was permanently incorporated into the Ladakh kingdom, and henceforth, the Suru
valley was administered by kharpons (regional administrators) who were all
Buddhists from the Leh area (Khan 1939:700). In the 1820s Moorcroft and Trebeck
reported that the valley was under a Buddhist governor who had a house at Tambis
in the lower Suru valley (Moorcroft & Trebeck 1837 Vol ll:279). 2 At the time of the
Dogra conquests in the 1 830s, Suru-Kartse was still administered by a Buddhist
kharpon from the Leh area (Francke 191 4:274). 3
 When the Workmans came to
climb Nun Kun just after the beginning of this century, the chag-dzot (bursar) of
2	 report that he was the brother of the chag-dzot (bursar) of Hem is gonpa near Leh.
3 At the beginning of this century there was still one Buddhist household at Tambis (Clarke
1901).
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Rangdum Monastery (between Suru and Zanskar) was the Zeldar (Block
Administrator) of Suru (Workman & Workman 1909:29).
The last Zeldar of Suru was a Muslim man from Namsuru, whom I met in 1981.
Some Mustims seem to have had administrative jobs in Suru prior to Independence,
but most of them came from outside Ladakh (see Chapter 5). Despite the lack of
power of local Muslims during this period, Islam itself was clearly flourishing in the
area, as Moorcroft and Trebeck's account of the Suru valley from their visit in 1821
suggests:
'in each of these (villages) was an akhund, or village school-master, and one
or two individuals who could speak Persian or Hindustani. Every village had
its mosque, and not a single Lama 's house, or sculptured pile made its
appearance. Islamism is evidently making rapid strides, and there is every
reason to expect that before long Ladakh will be entirely a Mohammedan
state. "(Moorcroft & Trebeck 1837 Vol Il:27-8).4
There seems to have been a new influx of Shi'ite preachers in the Suru valley in the
earlier part of the 20th century, when both the yokma and goma aghas' lineages
were established in Taisuru. However, there is little information about this period in
Kargil tehsil in general.
In recent decades there has been an increasing emphasis on more 'orthodox'
practice among Shi'ite clerics. For example, the playing of musical instruments at
events such as weddings and other celebrations apparently ended some decades
ago among Shi'ites in Kargil tehsil, as clerics said that it was un-Islamic and
therefore a sin (nyespa). Rizvi says that musicians called Doms existed in Kargil
until recently, and they played at weddings and other ceremonies, but that they had
ceased to exist by the 1 970s (Rizvi 1981:228). Also polo, which is a traditional game
in this area, is no longer played in many villages and most Muslims in the tehsil no
longer drink alcohol. People in Kargil said that the banning of practices that were
considered not to be Islamic increased enormously after all foreign Shi'ite clerics
were thrown out of Iraq in 1974, which meant that suddenly there were more clerics
in Kargil area.5 In the last few years there has been an effort to stop people dancing
and singing (except for religious songs called khasidas) at weddings. The yokma
Akhunds that he refers to are what are now called akhuns.
5 Agha Miggi Ort, who was thrown out at ths time, says that there were about two hundred
KargTs studying there.
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aghas were trying to enforce this at weddings in Suru in the 1 990s, not entirely
successfully.
There has also apparently been an increase in contact between Shi'ahs in Kargil and
the Shi'ite centres in Iran and Iraq, particularly in the numbers of men who go and
study in Shi'ite madrasas (colleges) in the Middle East. Rizvi observed this
phenomenon in the late 1 970s, attributing it to increased money-earning
opportunities that had arisen since 1947 (Rizvi 1981:227-8, Rizvi 1993:93). Earlier
generations of clerics in Suru rarely went to study in the Middle East, although some
went to Baltistan, whereas in the current and previous generation, all the leading
aghas and a number of shaikhs, studied in Iraq or Iran.
In the last twenty-five years, there has also been a flourishing of religious
architecture in Kargil tehsil. In Suru this seems to have started with the building of
the yokma-pa masjid in Taisuru in 1975, followed by the goma-pa imam-barah.
There are now a number of large religious buildings and astanas in the Suru valley,
as well as Kargil itself and other parts of the tehsi!. They are built in a style that has
emerged in the last twenty years, and are much larger and more impressive than
those that existed in the past; they are also stylistically similar to the 'modem' style
concrete houses that are found in Panikhar. Prior to this phase of building, there
were small masjids in every village. There is now a general more self-conscious
display of the presence of Islam in Kargil tehsil, that is also evident in other areas of
daily life.
(iii) The History of the Yokma Faction
There were sayyid lineages in the Suru valley before the current century. However,
some of the ancestors of the leading aghas' lineages and other clerics seem to have
arrived in this century from Baltistan and Kashmir. Certainly the leading lineages of
both the yokma and goma-pas both settled in Taisuru in the early part of this
century.
The yokma aghas have the name Rizvi and claim descent from Imam Rizvi Hazrat
the 8th Imam whose astana is in Mashed in Iran. 6 Agha Miggi Oil's father, Agha
6 That of his sister Fatima is an important pilgrimage site in Qum in Iran.
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Agha Najthul Açha Sakawat
Jaffar, recorded that they had come to the area from Iran nine generations (khul-po)
ago. However, they initially settled in Langkartse and only came to Taisuru in 1916.
A
Husan Shah
A
Agha Jalfar
A
Agha Miggi Ort
Yokma-pa
Figure 3.1 - The relationship between the yokma and goma agha's lineages in
Taisuru
According to the records (daftaO of the goma faction, both their and Agha Miggi
Ort's lineages are descended from two sisters of a lineage of sayyids who were
reiigious leaders in Taisuru in the past. The two sisters had no brothers, so one was
married to Sayyid Mushtaba who was the great-grandfather of the present leader of
the goma-pa. Her sister married Husain Shah, the son of Sayyid Mehdi Rizvi who
was from the aghas' lineage in Langkartse, who then became the rehbar in Taisuru.
However, he had no sons, so he adopted Agha Jaffar who was apparently the son of
his youngest brother, Qasim Shah. 7 Their middle brother stayed in Langkartse, and
Both of their astanas are in the qabristan in Taisuru.
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his descendants include Agha Hyder and Archo Nargis, Agha Miggi Ort's wife. The
accounts I received about this line of descent were rather confused, as the lack of a
direct line in the yokma-pa rehbar was a matter of some embarrassment to the
current leadership; nevertheless, the same line of inheritance is recorded in the
patwari's land records in the Tehsildar's office in Kargil.
Agha Miggi Ort's daftar contains the agreement made in Taisuru in Hejira 1335,
which is 1916 AD, between his family and the local people, in which the latter agree
to perform certain duties for the former in perpetuity. They also have at least 80
kanals of land in Taisuru that dates from that time.8
Agha Baqir's branch of the lineage came to Taisuru from Langkartse more recently.
Agha Hyder's father Agha Sayyid Ali was encouraged to settle in Taisuru by Agha
Jaffar who was his brother-in-law as well as being his paternal cousin. Agha Miggi
Ort said that his father gave Agha Sayyid Au land in the village. He retained a house
in Langkartse, as well as one in Taisuru. After his father's death Agha Hyder was
invited to settle in Sankhoo, which eventually became his main residence.
In his day, Agha Jaffar was the rehbar for the yokma-pa, and Agha Hyder, who was
his sister's son, spent much of his youth studying with him. Subsequently Agha
Hyder went to a Shi'ite madrasa in Iraq for twelve years, and Agha Jaffar died in
1957 while he was still in Iraq. Agha Jaffar had chosen Agha Hyder as his
successor, as Agha Miggi Ort was still a child. So, Agha Hyder became the rehbar
of the yokma faction until his death in 1988. Agha Miggi Ort was always intended to
be the rehbar after Agha Hyder and studied with him in his youth.
Agha Hyder was his azhang (he is his mother's brother's son) and Agha Jaffar was
Agha Hyder's azhang as well. Several people mentioned this relationship therefore,
in religious succession, mother's brother/sister's son relationships appear to be
important, but do not override the primary importance of direct patrilineal descent.
Agha Miggi Oil went to study in Najaf in Iraq for seven years until he was thrown out
by the Iraqi government in 1974. From Agha Jaffar's death in 1957, Agha Hyder
had made Taisuru his main base, but after 1974 he settled permanently at Sankhoo.
On his death in 1988, Agha Miggi Oil, his designated successor, became the
8 Agha Miggi Ort's family currently have 80 kanals in Taisuru according to the land records.
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rehbar. Several people said that Agha Miggi art was the real successor of his
father, and that Agha Hyder had only inherited the leadership because Agha Miggi
Oil was so young when his father died.
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Figure 3.2 — The Yokma-pa lineage showing the rehbars and relationship
between them
Ordinary yokma-pa members in Panikhar said that both of these lines of aghas had
been unyuse kyongs"which means 'bought' by the land and privileges. Some people
said that religious practitioners had been invited to settle there because the people
had been Buddhists before and wanted to learn Islam, although in fact they may
have been Muslims for several centuries at that time.
The internal organisation of the yokma-pa seems to have remained relatively
unchanged in the last few decades. However, the faction apparently had become
much larger and more united during Agha Hyder's time. I was told that Agha Miggi
Oil inherited a following that was about sixteen thousand strong in both Blocks. One
factor in the increase in the yokma-pa in Agha Hyder's day was his leadership of the
millenarian movement.
(iv) Millenarism and the Yokma-pa
I originally heard about the m lenarian movement in 1981/2, when first visited Suru,
as it was still very active at that time. When I returned there in 1993 it was not
spontaneously discussed in Suru. However, various people in Leh and Kargil,
P.s. SIaI.
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mentioned Agha Hyder and his millenarian beliefs to me, often in order to make a
joke about him and to ridicule the Suru people and Shi'ahs more generally. I also
suspect that this is one of the reasons why people like the yokma-pa leaders do not
refer to the millenarian beliefs so openly now. Consequently I initially felt reticent
about writing about the millenarian period in any detail, since I felt that I would be
exposing people to further ridicule. However, I came to realise that the whole
episode and the reaction to it, especially among people involved in the
administration, is critical to an understanding of the current politics of the yokma-pa.
Apparently Agha Hyder started his millenarian preaching in 1962, shortly after his
return from studying in Iraq. He said that the Imam Mandi, the Twelfth or "Hidden"
Imam was going to re-appear soon, an event which presages the Day of Judgement
and the end of the world. His followers used to gather, particularly after Friday
prayers, weep and repeatedly exhort the lmam Mandi to come. I never attended
one of these ceremonies, but apparently they used a tazbi which is like a rosary of
beads made from earth from the battlefield of Karbala in Iraq. In 1981, I was told
that they counted through the beads, repeatedly chanting: "May the Imam Mandi
come."
At one point, Agha Hyder set an actual date for the Imam Mandi's coming and some
of his supporters reputedly stopped tilling their fields. The authorities then
intervened, and police were sent to quell the movement. I was told that a policeman
from Leh said to the yokma-pa that one of the signs of the coming of the Imam
Mandi, was that if you fired a gun nothing would happen. He says that he fired his
gun and people heard the sound and knew that the Imam Mandi was not coming.
This story is most interesting, firstly because it casts the people of Suru as being
completely irrational in companson to the rational man from the government
administration (and Leh); secondly, despite being told as a joke, the reference to a
gun indicates the power of the administration and the threat of force. In fact, force
was used as Agha Hyder himself was apparently arrested and some of his
supporters were beaten.
I do not know exactly when this incident occurred as most of the accounts that I
received of this period were in the form of stories that are told about it by people
from outside the area. However, I believe that it was in the 1 960s. I have also been
told that people believed that Hajj Abdullah Far, the leader of the Sunnis in the Suru
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valley, was connected with the coming of the Imam Mandi. He was from one of the
leading Sunni families in Panikhar, but he had gone as a mag-pa to a Sunni family in
Sankhoo that had large amounts of land. I have heard that in those days, people
used to touch his clothes to obtain a blessing. On one occasion a cap that fell near
him was be'ieved to have fallen from the head of the Imam Mandi. Again this last
story was told as a joke.
Agha Hyder continued his millenarian preaching through the 1 970s, and he was still
saying that the Imam Mandi would come soon. The following is an extract from his
matam speech in 1974, that I quoted in the previous chapter:
"Oh poor ones, oh people who are waiting for the Imam. The best prayer is
to wait for the Imam whether is day or night. So wait for him. Who knows
whether he will come out of hiding in the day or night, morning or evening.
Everyone who is the well-wisher and follower of the Imam is waiting for him
to come out of hiding. '
In the early 1 980s, when I visited Suru for a few weeks with another English woman,
we were invited to both Agha Hyder's house in Sankhoo and Agha Baqir's in
Taisuru. We were struck by their great interest in Christian mythology, especially in
details of what happened to Jesus Christ when he was crucified. Subsequently,
Hajji Abdullah Far's grandson, Dr. Nazir, told about the millenarian movement. He
explained to us that part of the millenarian belief in Suru was that Jesus Christ was
also about to appear.
In Shi'ite mythology Jesus Christ did not die on the cross, but was taken by the
Angel Jibril (Gabriel) to Heaven, where he sits in the fourth level, whereas the Imam
Mandi is in the seventh. In Kashmir there is a widely held belief that Jesus Christ
ended his days and is buried there (Kashmiri 1973:1, Robinson 1988:13). 10 After
the coming of the Imam Mandi and his period of rule on earth, Jesus Christ will
descend to earth and will fight and kill the dajjal (Anti-Chnst). These events will
presage the Day of Judgement and the end of the world (Glassé 1991:246-7). We
were also told that it was commonly believed that foreign climbers who had been
coming to Nun Kun - the twin peaks at the head of the Suru valley - were looking for
is from the matam speech delivered on the death day of Hazrat Zahra (Fatima the
daughter of the Prophet Mohammed and wife of All), in Taisuru in 1974.
10 Bray has reported that there is a belief that Jesus Christ visfted Hemis monastery near Leh
(John Bray - personal communication).
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Jesus Christ who was said to be at the top of one of the mountains. Those who died
on the mountains, a not uncommon occurrence, were thought to have reached him
because they were pure in heart. 11 Similarly, single foreign women like ourselves,
who were far too old to be unmarried by local standards, were thought to be saving
ourselves to be brides of Christ when he descended.
This information made sense of the fact that we had been repeatedly asked about
Nun Kun by people in Suru and there seemed to be a general belief that this was
one reason why we had visited. For example, one winter's day, we were walking
along the road to Parkachik, in a light blizzard, when an old man we met on the road
exhorted us not to go up Nun Kun. BeUefs in this area about mountain spirits and
fairies provide a fuller background. For example, Munshi Khaled, the brother of Hajji
Abdullah Far, vanished without trace one night more than thirty years ago, and some
people believe that he was taken by mountain fairies (par!). Therefore there were
pre-existing beliefs about deities in the mountains. When the Workmans came to
the Suru valley to climb Nun Kun, just after the turn of this century, their porters
prayed to the mountain spirits (sic) when they got near to one of the peaks. People
in the villages below said they had seen lights on Nun Kun when they were on the
mountains (Workman & Workman 1909:68). Even now people often told me that
you can sometimes see lights on the top of Nun Kun and I was often asked why
foreigners climbed them.
We were frequently told about two unmarried foreign women who had visited
previously and this is often mentioned to this day. As far as I can ascertain, they
came as missionaries to the area in the early 1 960s and stayed in Sankhoo, where
Agha Baqir says they knew his father well. My understanding is that Agha Hyder
himself did hint at connections between many of these different elements
rather than explicitly saying what they were. This ability to hint at hidden (batin)
truths is seen as part of the aghas'power (see Chapter 2). For example, in one of
his matam speeches Agha Hyder refers to the belief of the coming of the Imam
Mandi in the following way:
11 A few years ago a foreign climber who had been to the top of one of the mountains told me
that there is a Christian cross on the summit.
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"Remember, you should not forget what is in your hearts. i.e. do not forget
the Imam Mandi and that he will come soon] Do not forget what you have
seen and what your have in your hearts.12
By the time that I returned to the Suru valley to do the fieldwork for this thesis in
1993, the millenarism was muted. However, people still believe that the Imam Mandi
will come soon, as do most Shi'ahs in Kargil tehsil now. In one of the matam
speeches that was made on the 13th Muharram in 1994, the speaker, an elderly
akhun refers to the millenarian beliefs and quotes Agha Hyder, saying that people
should follow his example and pray for the Imam Mandi to come. However, yokma-
pa people did not mention the millenarian beliefs or the events of the past
spontaneously, probably because they have been ridiculed over them.
The mil!'enarian preaching may well be connected with Noorbakhshi beliefs which
seem to have been widespread in the area until very recently. There are a number
of reports of a previous Mandist episode in Purig in 1884 (Francke 1926:145, Shaw
1894:17). Certainly there appears to be some connection between Agha Miggi Oil's
epithet containing the word 'lamp' and the fact that Noor means the same. However,
no-one in Suru made that link to me.
However, the main elements in the millenarian preaching are found in mainstream
Shi'ite Hadiths (books of the interpretation of Islam), from which the aghas prepare
matam speeches (Glassé 1991:26). As Richard says, millenarian beliefs are part of
Shi'ite philosophy: "The millenarist anticipation of the Imam's reappearance makes
Shi'ism a doctrine turned, far more than Sunnism, towards meta-history, towards an
idealistic anticipation of the End of Time."(Richard 1995:48). Cole describes a
Shi'ite millenarian episode in Oudh (the Shi'ite kingdom in Northern India) in 1844, in
which Jesus Christ figured prominently. He says that this was in response to a
feeling that Christianity was taking over, as the British were conquering India at the
time (Cole 1988:100-101).
The millenarian movement arose in a very difficult period for Suru and the rest of the
region. Partition had been extremely traumatic in this area and left Shi'ahs in Kargil
tehsil cut off from Baltistan which had been the local centre for Shi'ism. In the last
two decades the economy of Ladakh had been badly affected by the closing of the
12 This s from the matam speech delivered on the death day of Hazrat Zahra (Fatima the
daughter of the Prophet Mohammed and wife of Ali), in Tasuw in 1972.
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borders and the end of trade. In addition, Suru and other neighbouring areas, such
as Zanskar, had experienced a serious famine in 1957, when snow fell in June and
destroyed the entire year's crops. Older people frequently referred to this and said
that no one had actually died, but they had only survived by eating all their livestock,
and even the soles of their shoes. The lack of government help was a particular
source of bitterness. Someone also said that at that time, the yokma-pa aghas used
to lead prayers to try and change the weather.
I do not know what the motivation was for the millenarian episode. However, the
people of Suru had clearly experienced quite extreme disjuncture in the last two
decades, and had been left cut off from their main outside connections. The
millenarian doctrine may have provided a means of creating an intense form of
identity and thus making sense of, and taking control over, a world which was clearly
out of their control. In the 1980s, the rise to power of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran was
seen by some people as being a possible sign that the end of the world might be
near. People in Suru also said that it was possible that the Shah had been the dajjaI
(Anti-Christ). The yokma-pa became enthusiastic followers of Ayatollah Khomeini,
as did many Shi'ahs in Kargil tehsil, and to this day most yokma-pa have a picture
of him in their houses.
At the height of the millenarian movement, a strong rivalry emerged between Agha
Hyder and Agha Raza, who was the leader of the goma-pa at that time. This may
have exacerbated a pre-existing competition between the two factions and resulted
in a major rift between them.
(v) The Goma-pa and the Dispute with the Yokma-pa
I found it very difficult to find out when the yokma-goma split had started. Agha
Miggi Ort said that the height of the fighting between them had been forty years ago,
in his father's time; but other people said that there had not been any antagonism
before Agha Hyder and Agha Raza's time. However, it would appear that some kind
of divide seems to have existed between them for decades since they have not
intermarried. The first goma-pa astanas are in what is now the yokma-pa graveyard,
but they have had a separate graveyard for at least fifty years.
Nevertheless, at least part of the current antagonism between the yokma and goma
factions dates from the 1 960s, when Agha Raza, was the leader of the goma-pa.
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Figure 3.3 - The patrilineage of the goma-pa aghas
The structure of the goma faction is similar to that of the yokrna since they have a
daftar with a list of their representatives in each village where they have followers.
They claim to have foflowers aH over the Kargil area, but this is because they are
affiliated to the lslamiya School Shi'ite faction in Kargil and so have aflies/supporters
rather than their daftar in those villages. Their effective daftar is in the villages from
Parkachik down to Sangra, from which they receive khums and milaks from their
supporters. Agha Najibul's branch of the lineage have land in Taisuru, Kargee and
Parkachik; whereas Agha Raza's branch have most of theirs in Shaksthang and
Namsuru.
The rift that occurred over the miuenarian episode was also the time when Agha
Hyder's following was growing, presumably at the expense of Agha Raza's. 14
 As a
result, the two factions established separate places of congregation in Taisuru, and
stopped all unnecessary social interaction with each other. In particular, they
stopped marrying each other and I only know of one marriage between the two
factions in the recent past. In the 1960s, they did not even enter each other's
14 They apparently made up the majority of the population of 16,000 odd in Suru and Sankhoo
Blocks comb ned, a though only half of the 6,000 in Suru Block.
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houses as a general rule. In Agha Hyder's matam speech that I haive already
quoted, he seems to suggest such an action, when he says:
uDo not put your foot wherever you like. And do not greet everybody. You
should not go to a place where there are enemies of God, yr the Imam. Do
not go to the door of an enemy of God or the Imam."
Nevertheless, this antagonism does not seem to have extended to every aspect of
people's lives, especially their farming activities. I was told that villagers still co-
operated for collective work such as the bares and rares and that between
neighbours and relatives (called laktsiks). Also, the more hostile politics between the
factions are only really present on a day to day basis in the upper part of the Suru
valley and particularly in Suru Block.
Dr. Jaffar tells me that in the early 1 970s, his father, an important yokma-pa akhun
encouraged mutual visiting again. By the early 1 990s ordinary members of the two
factions were interacting, but those from the leading lineages in Taisuru still did not
usually speak to each other. There is a good deal of antagonism tetween the
factions over the allocation of government resources. For examile, there are a
number of schemes that involve the distribution of grants to villagers, which often
lead to disputes. It was also quite common for people to make derogatory remarks
about the members of the other faction, particularly about their piety.
This hostility is linked to Shi'ite history and beliefs concerning the enemies of the
Imam. The Umayyad Caliphs, who gained the leadership of the Muslim people
shortly after the death of the Prophet Mohammed and killed lmam Husain at the
battle of Karbala, were Sunnis. So Sunnis are usually regarded by Shi'ahs as being
the enemy in this respect rather than other Shi'ahs (Pinault 1992:157). In Suru,
there does not appear to have been any hostility between Shi'ahs and Sunnis in the
past. On the contrary, the yokma faction and Sunnis were close during the
millenarian period and many Sunnis seem to have believed in Açjha Hyder's
preaching. I understand that there were also good relations between the goma-pa
and the Sunnis, as there are today.
The factions seem to have directed this hostility at each other. They sometimes
speak of each other as being enemies of the true faith. For instance, in one of Agha
Hyder's matam speeches, he obliquely suggested that the goma-pa would be
excluded from salvation on the day of judgement, because they DppoSed the
supporters of Imam Husain. God will say to them:
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"I know you were not present on the battlefield when Imam Husain was
murdered, but you have harmed his followers." [Then God orders these
people to be taken to Hell, and addresses the others.] TMOh well-wishers of
Imam Husain, do not do such works that will hurt the followers of Imam
Husain. Anybody who has done any harm to a well-wisher of Imam Husain,
has done direct harm to the Imam himself."
As well as mutually avoiding each other, there have also been incidents of fighting
between faction members, particularly during the processions Uuloos) on the 10th
and 13th days of Muharram. The 10th Muharram, known as Ashura,
commemorates the actual day of the Battle of Karbala and is the climax of the
Muharram observances for all Shi'ahs. The 13th commemorates the day when
Imam Husain was finally buried. These two days are the main focus of the ritual
year for Shi'ahs in Suru. Despite being extremely upsetting, they are also eagerly
anticipated. For example, young boys used to play games of Muharram juloos for
weeks before and after. Their games usually started with them all beating their
breasts, then one of them would fall to the ground as if overcome and the others
would come and pick them up and rush them to an imaginary medical aid post.
In 1993, I witnessed the processions in Kargil, as we had just arrived on the 9th
Muharram. I had avoided processions in Leh previously thinking that they would be
frightening with all the blood. I was immediately disabused of that view and found
the chanting beautiful and moving, despite the fairly violent beating and bloodletting
that took place that year. In 1994, Ayatollah Khamenei, the appointed successor of
Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, issued an instruction (fatwa), saying that there should no
longer be any bloodletting, because of the risk of infection. This was followed in
both Kargil and Taisuru, but apparently not in Sankhoo, where people chose to
continue as before, since they are not obliged to obey one particular guide.
In 1994 I attended the Muharram observances in Suru Block. During the earlier part
of the month, there are a number of matams in the masjidat Taisuru and majlis
(Farsi: gatherings) in individual villages, at which people recite marsiyas (Farsi:
mourning dirges), and chant nohas. These are repeated refrains, usually in Urdu,
that lament the deaths at Karbala and the sufferings of other members of the family
such as Zenab, Imam Husain's wife. On the night of 9th Ashura, the yokma-pa of
Taisuru, Panikhar and Prantee, held such a gathering at Moqdam Mehdi's house in
Panikhar in the late evening. This was attended by about a hundred people from the
three villages, particularly young women and men. Agha Miggi Ort and Archo Nargis
were not there but all the younger members of their household were. We were in
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their large guest room, with the men sitting in the middle with a microphone and
speakers, and the women crouched around the edges. The young aghas led the
recitations and chanting, at which they are extreme'y skilled.
The atmosphere was subdued and there was little display of emotion, but some men
gently beat their breasts. At the end of the ceremony, the women left the house,
and we were given bread and meat as tobarok, while the men stayed inside and had
tea. When they emerged, they unfurled banners, which have village names or
curses against Yadz - the leader of the Ummayads at Karbata, and other enemies of
Imam Husain written on them and, sometimes, drawings of lmam Husain's horse
Zuljena. 15
 Some of them have the hand called Panja (Farsi: panj tan) at the top,
which represents the five pure souls of Islam, the Prophet Mohammed, his daughter
Fatima (Zahra), and lmams Au, Husain and Hassan (Fischer and Abedi 1990:51 9).
The whole group formed a procession (Farsi: dasteh, Urdu: juIoos 16) that started to
move down the road towards Taisuru. Each village formed its own section, with a
banner and burning torches, as well as a microphone and loudspeaker, and chanted
a different noha as they walked. The men and older boys formed the centre of the
procession, and women and girls came mainly at the end. The men beat their
breasts (branga dungcha) in time to the rhythmic nohas as they walked, and some
women pat their chests, and occasionally cry out the name of Imam Husain. Every
so often the procession halts for a period of more intensive chanting and beating.
The men of each village usually form a circle and beat their chests much harder,
reaching a crescendo, before they stop and start processing again. As we got
nearer Taisuru, some of the men were overcome with emotion (behosh) and had to
be restrained and looked after by their companions. When the procession reached
Taisuru, many people had come out to watch, both yokma-pa and goma-pa, and the
men were gently beating their chests in sympathy. The goma-pa accompanied the
procession up to the yokma-pa masjid, which was already full of old men who were
sitting on the floor with their heads in their hands, in gestures of despair. The
minbar was covered in a black cloth and Agha Miggi Ort was present but not
15 In Kargil I have also seen curses against Salman Rushdie, and people chanting anti-
American slogans.
16 Momen says that the terms used for the elements in Muharram are different in India than in
Iran (Momen 1985:242-3).
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wearing his clerical garb or taking any particular part in the proceedings. Then there
was a very short speech by an akhun, who stood at the bottom of the minbar, before
everyone went home. Some people would stay up all night and women in particular
often eat nothing until after the observances on Ashura day.
The benign way in which some goma-pa had greeted us in Taisuru, was apparently
unusual and a sign of a short-lived truce which had started the previous year, when
they had fought as usual on Ashura day. However, that day there was a bomb
during a Muharram procession in Iran, which left many people dead and was
extremely shocking to all Shi'ahs. Unusually, on 13th Ashura the yokma-pa had a
procession. Agha Miggi Ort related that when the processions met, he said to
everyone, "Look, we should not be divided in the light of this terrible tragedy that
affects us all.' So the two parties processed together to Taisuru. In 1994, the two
factions had become even closer, after some events that I will describe in Chapter 5.
Ashura is the day that the battle of Karbala took place and the Imam Husain and
most of his male relatives were killed. In Suru, in both factions, every village has its
own section, banners and loudspeaker in the procession. Clerics do not seem to
take part in the fuloos itself, 17
 nor do many elderly men; but all the younger men
who are prominent in the faction played an important role in their village section.
The three younger sons of Agha Miggi Ort formed the core of the Taisuru group.
Most men go bareheaded and some of them were wearing a black headband and
women wear black or dark coloured clothes as they do for the whole month.
Women of all ages walk both behind and alongside the men.
All the workers from the Medical Department were on duty, including the doctor, who
had the Hospital jeep; and there were field hospitals at the roadside in Taisuru, as
well as in the village itself. Two bus-loads of police had come from Kargil, as well as
the five or six men from the Taisuru Police Post (chowki). The main part of the
yokma-pa procession started in Panikhar bazaar; whereas the goma-pas came
from below Taisuru. The procession halted on the way for a matam speech, which
was given by a non-clerical young man, who gives a particularly vivid account of the
battle of Karbala.
17 In Iran it is unusual for clerics to join in the processions, as they are said to disapprove of
them (Richard 1995:101).
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IPicture 3.1 - Agha Hyder IHd Agha Ahrned. his youngest son. in 1981
Picture 3.2 - Api Cho-Cho, one of Agha Hyders wives anu orner noushold
members in 1981
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Picture 3.3 - Procession in Kargil on the 10th of Muharram 1993
Picture 3.4 - The Yokma-pa dasteh in Panikhar on the 10th of Muharram 1994
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Picture 3.6 - Men chanting nohas at the Oat! Gah
118
-44;
4
I
0
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Picture 3.8 - Mourners arrive at the yokma-pa masjid
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The two processions met on the road near Taisuru at the Qati Gah (qati means
'slaughter', gah means 'place'), and represents the battlefield at Karbala where the
Shi'ite martyrs died. Emotions were running very high at this point, and there was a
good deal of tension, when the two processions surged together, but nothing
happened. At this point, a yokma-pa woman, Sakina, described how they fight. She
said that the women would gather up rocks and hide them under their dahons (head
scarves), to conceal them from the police. She made it sound exciting and
enjoyable, and my understanding was that she was half looking forward to a good
rumpus I
At the Qati Gah, both processions stopped for some time, and sat in separate
groups, that formed around the tazias, which are representations of the tomb of
Imam Husain at Karbala (Momen 1985:242). Each of the groups had a horse with
red dye on it that represented Zuijena, Imam Husain's horse at Karbala. The son of
Agha Najibul, the goma-pa leader, who was visiting from his studies in Iran, made a
speech but it was not the occasion for an outpouring of grief. When the two groups
rose to continue into Taisuru, Agha Miggi Oil, who was dressed in his ordinary,
rather than full clerical garb, managed - with the agreement of the goma-pa aghas -
to get the two processions to combine for the last part of the walk into Panikhar.
The nohas and beating became more frenzied and a number of men were
completely overcome and had to be taken to one of the field hospitals. At Taisuru,
the two processions divided again and went towards their respective places of
worship. When they reached the masjid each group paused for a final session of
intense breast beating before. At one point, a group of young women formed a
circle in front of the masjid and chanted nohas and beat their breasts very hard. In
the yokma-pa masjid, the minbar was covered with a black cloth, but Agha Miggi Ort
sat at the top of it. The horse was brought into the masjid, and tethered at the
bottom of the minbar. On the walls there were a number of hangings with pictures of
Imam Husain on them. There were a few brief prayers and then the crowd
dispersed.
The 13th of Muharram is the day when the burials of Imam Husain and the other
martyrs are commemorated. For the second year, the yokma-pa broke tradition and
had a procession; the goma-pa always organise one on this day. Again the yokma-
pa procession set off from Panikhar, but there was a halt on the way in the meadows
next to the river between the two villages. There an akhun from Kanoor village in
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Sankhoo Block gave a matam speech that was particularly touching. He described
what happened to Hazrat Zenab, Imam Husain's sister, after the battle of Karbala:
"After the martyrdom of Imam Husair,, his sister, Hazrat Zenab went to look
for his body. She picked up lots of bits of earth but she could not smell lmam
Husain on them, but on her way back she saw some earth and she smelt it
and recognised his smell, then she saw his body. [She was in the QatI Gah
between the tents where the dead bodies were.] When Hazrat Zenab saw
the body of Imam Husain she wept there and stayed for some time. Then
she said goodbye to his body and returned to the campsite where she saw
the enemies had tied up all the womenfolk in a single rope, and were ready
to take them as prisoners of war. [All the men had been killed.]
Then Umr Sadr, the leader of the Yazdi forces, ordered all the prisoners to
be taken. The womenfolk were riding camels, and he told his men to take
the prisoners through the QatI Gah just to show them what they had done
and to harass them. (After killing the martyrs they had beheaded all the dead
bodiesJ He wanted them to see with their own eyes the result of not obeying
Yazdi's orders. All the prisoners had their hands tied behind their backs so
they could not come down from the camels. Hazrat Zenab said to Imam
Husain, "I cannot come down and embrace your body, so I am saying
goodbye to you from far away."
[Then the speaker addresses Hazrat Zenab.] I am sorry you cannot
dismount, as you are tied to the camel and your hands and legs are bound.
[Then the speaker addresses the Last lmam.] When will you come to take
revenge on the enemies of Imam Husain, who have martyred your
grandfather? [ Imam Husain was the grandfather of the 12th Imam.] Hazrat
Zenab has been parted from her beloved brother and she is plucking her hair
out." [This is customary when your closest relatives have died.]
This fragment is very typical of matam speeches, insofar as it allows us to view the
tragedies of the Prophet's family through the sufferings of one of the women. Hazrat
Zahra, the Prophet's daughter and the wife of Imam Au, and Hazrat Zenab, her
daughter are both extremely important in the rituals of the yokma-pa, and other
Shi'ahs in this area.18
When we reached the Qati Gah, the goma-pa had a blood-spattered bier, which
bore the shrouded body of Imam Husain. Women in particular went up to it weeping
and touched it, and some of them put earth on their heads, a sign of mourning.
When the yokma-pa procession reached the masjid, Agha Miggi Oil was sitting on
the minbar which was no longer covered by the black cloth. The men from the
18 People said that the other two important women for them are Hazrat Maryam (Mary mother
of Jesus), and Hazrat Hawwa (Eve).
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procession entered the floor of the masjid, village by village, and for some time they
continued to loudly chant nohas and beat their breasts very intensely. Agha Miggi
Oil started to recite some prayers, but for quite a while the crowd of men stayed on
their feet and refused to stop chanting nohas; eventually they quietened down and
he gave a brief matam before everyone dispersed.
The observances on the 10th and 13th of Muharram often involves some kind of re-
enactment of the events at Karbala. Among many Shi'ites, this takes the form of an
actual drama, which in Iran is called a tazia (Thaiss 1972, Momen 1985:242). There
is no explicit drama in Suru, but I think that there is a dramatic element to the whole
occasion. For example, an important part of the observances is that people in the
procession are meant to experience thirst, in order to recreate the conditions that
Imam Husain and his followers suffered. The attendants who provide cold drinks
which they press on the processors, are also able to gain religious merit by being
able to help. In 1994, Muharram fell in June, but when it falls in the winter it is
apparently the custom in Ladakh to commemorate the events at Karbala a second
time in the summer when it is suitably hot (David Pinault - personal communication).
The fighting was like a ritual battle, albeit one that was started spontaneously. As
far as I could gather, it was not very violent and never caused any serious injury or
death. It seems that it was an opportunity for the members of both factions to act as
if they were the true supporters of Imam Husain and his family at Karbala. As their
enemies, the other faction were the enemies of Imam Husain. So, both factions felt
that they had performed a righteous act by fighting with his enemies.
The processions were watched closely by the police, both the four or five men from
the Police Post (chowki) at Taisuru, and the reinforcements from Kargil. As far as I
know, the fighting in Taisuru is unusual in Kargil tehsil and the level of Police
presence is correspondingly high. Their presence adds to the drama of the
processions, as does that of the Medical Department. However, Suru people's
religious expression is being pathologised, in a way that has been common practice
in India since colonial times (see Chapter 1). In Kargil, the Shi'ahs of Suru are
regarded as being both riotous and a bit of a joke, both because of the millenarism
and the yokma-goma dispute. These attitudes are particularly prevalent among
people in the administration, both in Kargil and in the state as a whole. For example,
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one story is told about Agha Hyder visiting the Governor and not being able to drink
tea because of the sherpa prohibition
The yokma-goma split is regarded as if it was unique and used as the stereotype for
negative images of Shi'ahs. On one level, the fact that there are factions in Sum is
just normal politics both in Ladakh and anywhere else. For example, underlying the
overtly communal politics of the Ladakh Buddhist Association in Leh tehsil in recent
years, there is a major divide between two factions in Buddhism (van Beek and Brix
Bertelson 1995). Similarly in Kargil there are two major Shi'ite political factions and
this is a feature of Shi'ism in the Middle East at the moment as well (see below).
The yokma-goma split aiso has resonances of the type of rivalry that is found all
over the region between structurally equivalent groups. For example, relations
between brothers who have divided their land, are often quite fraught because they
form part of the same p'ha -spun, whose members must co-operate and support
each other, but at the same time they are to some extent in competition. A large
proportion of serious disputes are between closely related people over land and
inheritance, and nearly all come to a head at the time of ploughing when land
ownership becomes de facto. A Suru man once remarked to me that he could not
understand why another was jealous of him, since he had neither stolen his beloved,
nor was he his relative who had become richer than him. People also particularly
feared the evil eye (m!-kha) from the houses of their immediate p'ha -spun, especially
those from whom they have recently divided the house and land.
Therefore, the rivalry between the factions is typical of that found between groups of
equal status in the area, a slightly more playful form of which is the inter-village
rivalry enacted at weddings (see Chapter 6) and in archery contests. External
connections of the two factions reveal a similar form of competition between equals
and reflect ideological splits that are found in Shi'ism in Kargil and the Middle East,
and in party political divisions in Ladakh.
(vi) Outside Connections of the two Shi'ite factions Suru
The Shi'ite congregation has its most important spiritual centres in Iran and Iraq (and
to a lesser extent Syria), but there is no single central organisation or leader for all
Shi'ites. This is partly a result of the doctrine of the line of Imams and the
occultation of the Twelfth Imam, which means that most Shi'ahs believe that in the
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absence of the Hidden Imam there is no absolute religious authority present on
earth. 19
 Hence, at any given time, there are several religious authorities in Shi'ism
who are considered to be mujtahids, that is, people who are sufficiently learned to
pronounce on matters of jurisprudence. A handful of the most respected of whom
are known by the title Ayatollah (Glassé 1991:259). They are spiritual guides, who
ordinary believers are enjoined to follow (Zubaida 1987:43).
Currently, all the leading mujtahids are normally resident in the Middle East, mainly
in Iraq, Iran and Syria. Each mujtahid may pronounce judgements (Farsi: ijtihad) on
matters of religious practice, and Shi'ahs are free to follow the guidance of whoever
they want. When this was discussed in Suru, people said: "If we don't like one
Ayatollah's advice, then we can just choose another one." This was what had
happened in 1994 in respect of the blood-letting at Muharram. Ayatollah Khamenei,
who is the successor of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, had issued a ruling (fatwa) that
there was to be no bloodshed during the memorial processions in Muharram.
Nevertheless, the people of Sankhoo were under no obligation to follow this advice,
and chose not to; whereas those of Suru Block and Kargil did.
Some mujtahids also run religious colleges, called madrasas, in the important Shi'ite
towns, such as Qum in Iran, Najaf (near Karbala) in Iraq and Damascus in Syria.
These madrasas are funded mainly from the khums tax, and, to a lesser extent,
through income from land ownership (Fischer 1980:42). 20 The students are from all
over the Shi'ite world, and may receive a small stipend from the madrasa towards
the cost of their upkeep.21 The main religious leaders in Suru have all spent some
years studying in Iraq before the expulsion of foreign clerics in 1974 (Richard
1995:114), and more recently in Iran. At the moment, a number of men from Suru
are studying in Iran, including three of the scions of the yokma faction's lineage, and
19 Ayatollah Khomeini challenged this in his political philosophy, and did claim temporal
authority (Zubaida 1993:16).
20Fischer says that since the land reforms under the Pahlavis, the ulama in Iran no longer
own much land (Fischer 1980:95)
21 For example in the madrasa where Agha Husain was studying in Qum, most students
received a stipend of about 1,000 Rials a month, about Rs.300, which is very little in Iran; but,
in 1994, Agha Husain had come first in the examinations so he would receive 7,000 Rials a
month for the following year, but even that was not enough to live on. The rest of the cost of
his upkeep was covered by the khums money and other ad hoc donations from the yokma-pa.
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an important shaikh from the goma faction.22
 Until 1947, some of the local religious
leaders used to study at madrasas in Skardu in Baltistan; but I have not heard of
anyone studying at Shi'ite madrasas in other parts of India, not even in Kashmir.
Local leaders may have a certain doctrinal loyalty to the preaching of the guides
associated with their madrasa; however, they can choose subsequently to take the
guidance of one or more other mujtahids. Hence, as Zubaida points out, despite
Shi'ism having a large institutional base, it does not have a centralised organisation
or single authority (Zubaida 1987:42).
The absence of a single indivisible sovereignty or territory was a feature of the
politics of religion and the state in the Himalayan region for centuries, as Burghart
has shown in respect of Nepal (Burghart 1984). Miller describes the overall
structure of Tibetan Buddhist monasticism as a webu, since it consisted of different
sects, which overlap geographically, and are not completely exclusive, or often
antagonistic to each other. Similarly, within each sect, the sub-monasteries and
rinpoches (lines of religious leaders) are often relatively autonomous, and not
subject to any centralised spiritual authority (Miller 1961, Cassinelli & Ekvall 1969).
A similar factional split to that found between the yokma and goma-pa exists in
Kargil, where the two important Shi'ite factions in the last few years have centred
around the lstamiya School and the Ayatollah Khomeini Memorial Trust (AKMT).
The former, has been in existence since the 1 950s as a school of religious
instruction for younger men, most of whom subsequently study at one of the Shi'ite
centres in the Middle East. Nowadays it has an imposing building in Kargil's main
bazaar. The latter was started after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini as a social
welfare organisation, and runs a chain of schools in and around Kargil town. The
yokma and goma-pa are linked to the AKMT and lslamiya School factions
respectively. The AKMT does not seem to have any presence in Suru itself; but a
few years ago, the goma-pa aghas opened a branch of the lslamiya School in
Taisuru. However, it is relatively inactive and Agha Sakawat said that it only had two
pupils in 1994.
This division among the Shi'ites of Kargil tehsil reflects one in the Middle East
between Ayatollah Khomeini and the Ayatollah Khoi, who were two of the leading
221n 1994, there were said to be about 100 students from Kargil tehsil in Iran, and a few had
their families with them.
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mujtahids in Shi'ism, until their deaths in 1989 and 1992 respectively (Richard
1995:84). Broadly speaking, the yokma-pa faction has taken its leadership for the
last few decades from a politically more radical section in the Shi'ite leadership,
whose main exponent was the Ayatollah Khomeini, and hence it is seen in Kargil as
the Iranian faction. The goma-pa favoured the Ayatollah Khoi who lived and taught
in Najaf in Iraq and died at a great age in 1992, not long after he was briefly
imprisoned by Saddam Husain during the Gulf War. He was considered by many
Shi'ites to be the most important mujtahid prior to the rise to popularity of Ayatollah
Khomeini. He remained extremely popular, and was followed by the majority of
Shi'ites in India, Pakistan and East Africa as well as many in the Middle East
(Momen 1985:31 5). He preached a quietist doctrine and he: considered politics a
pitfall to be avoided by men of goodwill. '(Taheri 1985:136). His view was in keeping
with the widespread interpretation of the doctrine of the Hidden Imam, which can be
used as a justification for accepting existing regimes (Hegland 1983). Hence, the
fierce opposition between the two factions on matters of doctrine is congruent with
wider Shi'ite divisions.
The factions are also split along party lines in the democratic politics of the area. It
has been customary for the yokma-pa to support the National Conference and for
the goma-pa to follow the Congress Party, as do the AKMT and the lslamiya School
factions respectively. The National Conference party is only found in Jammu and
Kashmir state, and has been the party of several recent administrations. The
Congress Party is national and has been in power at the centre most of the time
since Independence. From the 1950s to the 1 980s, these two parties were politically
opposed to each other, except for a brief period in the late 1 980s when they had a
disastrous accord (Singh 1 996:90ff). In broad ideological terms, there is a definite
homology between the yokma-goma split, that between the more radical doctrine of
Ayatollah Khomeini and the more quiescent of Ayatollah Khoi in Shi'ism and the
National Conference and Congress parties. The former being more politically
proactive and the latter more connected with the status quo. Thus, there is an
ideological coherence within each of the factions and in their relationships to politics
beyond the local level.
Richard says that, by 1988, he had become the most popular Ayatollah in Iran, presumably
as people became disenchanted with Ayatollah Khomeini, who the majority had to lowed since
the Revolution (Richard 1995:85).
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Nevertheless, the politics of the yokma-pa, particularly the millenarian doctrine,
cannot be regarded either as simply oppositional to the Indian state or its rule in the
area, or as a response to a threat to Islam, as Ahmed suggests (Ahmed 1976:106).
In fact, the opposite seems to have been the case, since in the early 1 960s Agha
Hyder personally encouraged his followers to go and work on the building of the
Leh-Srinagar road, which was strategically crucial to India. 24 Equally, although the
faction's main focus was undoubtedly on the Shi'ite world which to a large extent
provided a meta-state, at the same time the yokma-.pa has been actively involved in
state and national democratic politics for several decades.
Initially, the yokma-pa's involvement in electoral politics seems to have arisen largely
because Agha Hyder's following was the largest block of votes in Kargil, constituting
about a quarter of the population of the tehsil and this vote was more or less
determined by the agha's directions. He and other yokma-pa leaders were
accordingly wooed by the main political parties and apparently always supported the
National Conference candidate. However, their enthusiastic support of the
democratic process did not result in them receiving reasonable treatment from the
administration. For example, in 1981, a non-Ladakhi DC ridiculed Agha Hyder's
request for a female doctor in the area, claiming that the agha wanted her: "like an
elephant to tie in his yard". These kinds of attitudes to Suru people, persist in the
administration and affect Shi'ahs in general in Ladakh. In the early 1 990s, the
budget for Kargil tehsi/ was about half that of Leh (Kristoffer Brix Bertelson, personal
communication). Moreover, Kargilis' demands for resources that are available in
other areas, are often turned down with ridicule, both locally and by government
officials.
By the time I started to do my fieldwork, the yokma-pa were more proactivally
engaged in electoral politics and for some years had had their own political
candidate, Qamer AU, who is from the Sangra akhun family that I have mentioned
previously. He had briefly been the Member for Kargil of the Jammu and Kashmir
Legislative Assembly before the suspension of democratic politics in the state in
24 On the wall of Agha Hyder's family's guest room in Sankhoo, there is a letter of thanks from
Sonam Norbu who was the Ladakhi engineer supervising the building of the Leh-Snnagar
road in the early 1 960s. This letter commends him for insisting that his followers went and
worked as labourers on the most difficult and dangerous part of the road near Lamayuru. It
says that Agha Hyder told his followers not to return until the road was finished.
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1989 and stood as a candidate for MP in 1996 (see Chapter 5). Thus their
relationship to democratic politics had changed significantly in the past decade.
Moreover, in Suru itself, by 1992, a split had emerged in Suru between the yokma-
pa and the Sunnis, who had previously had a cordial relationship and at the same
time relations between the yokma and goma factions became less strained, as I
shall describe in the next chapter.
(vii) Conclusions
As I have shown in this chapter, the yokma faction is not a 'traditional' organisation
that is now adapting to 'modern' conditions. Rather ills an organisation that has
emerged in the relatively recent past out of forms that have a long tradition in this
area and it has been changing throughout the last forty years. Therefore, following
Zubaida (1993) I would suggest that drawing a distinction between traditional and
modern forms of organisation is not helpful. Moreover, such categories are
themselves socially constructed in any particular context. In this respect, in the next
chapter I will show that in recent years they Sunnis have constructed a history for
themselves in which they are more 'modern' than Shi'ahs.
Nevertheless, until the late 1 970s, Suru was relatively cut off both from government
and the effects of modernisation. During this period, the most significant politics for
the yokma-pa were the millenarian movement and their split with the goma-pa, both
of which are viewed from outside as a sign of their intrinsic irrationality and
disorderly nature. The transformation of the local political economy over the last few
decades, particularly since the opening of the road in the late 1 970s, has caused a
period of unusually rapid change, which is having an impact on the yokma faction.
Whereas in the past they had largely avoided secular education and too close an
involvement with the institutions of the state, at the moment they are increasingly
forming an interest group in competition for the resources of the state. However, the
structure and organisation of the faction remains relatively unchanged and has
adapted to these new aims.
This new kind of politics is evident in the relationship between the yokma and goma
factions. By 1994, these were fairly cordial at Muharram, when they had traditionally
fought, but their antagonism flared up over competition for government resources.
Nevertheless, the hostility between the two Shi'ite factions over such issues was
minor during my fieldwork, as compared to that which had emerged between the
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Sunnis in Panikhar and Prantee and the yokma faction. Relations had been very
cordial previously and Sunnis had often taken part in ma tam and Muharram
observances. However, by 1993, they were starting to openly compete, particularly
in the field of secular state education, in which Sunnis had been remarkably
successful in the last few decades. One reason for this was that they had been less
locally focused and marginally more oriented towards the government historically
than Shi'ahs, as I shall demonstrate in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Sunnis, Education and the Government
Economy
(I) Introduction
As I demonstrated in the last chapter, for the last few decades, the factional conflict
between the yokma-pa and goma-pa has been the main political issue in Suru
However, during my fieldwork there was an emerging conflict between the yokma-
pa and the Sunnis. The Sunnis are a minority in the Block, having about 50
households in Panikhar and Prantee. I start by describing some aspects of Sunnis'
social organisation and collective history and rituals. I then show that the Sunnis in
Sum Block were the first to take advantage of the opportunities offered by
government education and employment and hence have been much more
successful in obtaining government jobs than Shi'ahs. I will demonstrate that
differences between Sunnis and Shi'ahs, in terms of their history and kinship, have
been significant in this process.
I shall also make a distinction between the peasant farming economy of Suru,
which remains the main source of livelihood in the area and the government
economy, which is largely a feature of the last three decades in Suru. As I shall
show, such a distinction does exist and is relevant to the current politics of Suru but
I am not suggesting that they are totally separate economic spheres. Initially,
Shi'ahs were not very interested either in secular education or government
employment, but the undermining of the peasant economy in the last two decades
has meant that they are now forced to look for alternative sources of income,
particularly government employment, for which they now need secular educational
qualifications.
The changing conditions in the tehsil and state as a whole, had also caused great
increase in competition for government resources, particularly jobs, in the last few
years. At the same time, Sunnis had been attempting to establish themselves as
an administrative elite in the Block by refusing to marry with Shi'ahs among other
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things. They justified this move by claims to being more educated and modern than
Shi'ahs, who came to feel increasingly bitter about their deteriorating position in
respect to Sunnis, particularly in the field of education. As I shall show, this is the
context in which the yokma-pa leadership opened the Noon Public School, in order
both to address their disadvantageous position in respect of secular education and
government employment and, to some extent, as a challenge to Sunnis' dominance
of secular education in the Block.
(ii) Sunnis in Suru
Just like the two Shi'ite factions, the Sunnis now form a kinship group in Suru that is
apparently of relatively recent origin and is rapidly transforming itself in the
changing economic and political context in the area. All the Sunnis in Suru Block
are now in the villages of Panikhar, the administrative centre, and its contiguous
neighbour Prantee. They make up about half the population of each of these
villages and in 1993/4 there were about forty Sunni households altogether in the
two villages. 1 The only other Sunnis in the Suru valley are in Sankhoo, where there
are two families, both of whom are wealthy. There is also a small settlement of
Sunnis from Panikhar in Wardwan, in Kashmir, which is a two day walk on foot from
Suru via the Chelong Nala route from Panikhar. 2 The Wardwan families moved
there during the famine of 1957 and their settlement is called 'chota Kargil' (lithe
Kargil) in Wardwan.
In Suru, as elsewhere in Ladakh, the word for Sunnis is kache, which seems to
refer to their Kashmiri origins, but is not the same as the word for Kashmiri, which is
kachul-pa. The Sunnis in Panikhar and Prantee consider themselves to form a
community, which is also a single kinship group. They say that they are all related
to each other and, due to their tendency to marry within this small group, many of
them are closely related. However, this idea of relatedness exists even between
people who do not remember any actual kinship connection. Sunni men and
women in Suru treat each other as close relatives in respect of the Islamic rule of
moharam; whereas, for Shi'ahs, it only applies to relatives in the immediate family.
Nevertheless, like Shi'ahs, they also share a common spiritual ancestry in the form
I I do not have exact figures for this as I did not survey the whole of these two villages.
2 Before the opening of the road, this was the quickest way to get to Kashrnir from Suru.
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of a preacher called Hazrat Zanchas or Hazrat Pir. He is a semi-mythological
religious leader, who is said to have come from Kashmir and settled in Suru. The
story of his settlement follows a common paradigm for foundation myths in this
area, containing similar elements to the story of the founding of Namsuru (see
Chapter 2), and the origin myth of the leadership in Chigtan as being founded by a
wandering fakir (Francke 1926:1 734).3 Part of this myth, recounts that when
Hazrat Zanchas came to Panikhar, he planted his stick in the ground and it grew
into a willow tree.
His astana is in the fields above Panikhar where this is said to have occurred, and
people said that until recently the tree had been growing there. Hazrat Zanchas is
regarded as being the founding ancestor of the Sunnis, although nobody literally
traces descent from him. His astana is a major focus for Sunni rituals, such as
Mentok Tangba (literally 'the giving of flowers'). This takes place in the late spring,
when wild tulips called kapi mentok are flowering on the mountainsides. The day
before the festival, many of the girls and young women from Panikhar and Prantee
go up the mountains to gather the delicate yellow flowers. On the morning of
Mentok Tangba, the men and boys pray and put flowers on the astana of Hazrat
Zanchas. Then most of the Sunnis visit all the Sunni graves in the two villages,
sprinkling them with flowers and water. The men say prayers for the dead (fatiha)
over some of the graves (qab, particularly those of the more influential men. In
the middle of the day everyone gathers in Prantee near the grave of a man who
had been considered as a saint.4 Men and women sit separately and a collective
(vegetarian) meal is served, to which every house has made a contribution. On the
morning of Mentok Tangba in 1994, I was told by my Sunni companions that they
could go and eat in anyone's house, as it seems to be a day which particularly
emphasises that all Sunnis are related, so the normal discomfort about going
uninvited to eat food in non-relatives' houses does not apply.
3 Chigtan is a village between Kargil and Leh, which for several centuries was the base of
the chiefs of Purig (Francke 26:173-4).
He was called Sadur Shah and is said to have had great spiritual power. In 1981, his
grandson, who is now dead, was an important Sunni leader.
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It is also customary for a Sunni groom's wedding party (nyo-pa) to take him to pray
at the astana of Hazrat Zanchas in Panikhar, before they leave to go and fetch his
bride. Both men and women also pray at their deceased parents' graves before
they leave their house on their wedding day.
Although the Sunni emphasis on a common spiritual ancestor has some resonance
with the structure of the Shi'ite factions, as a religious group they are far more
egalitarian internally, as they do not have any leaders who collect taxes or take
mflaks from the others. Their collective ceremonies also emphasise equality
between all men - of whatever age - although gender differentiation is marked in
their enactment and organisation. In Suru, as in Kashmir itself, Sunnis revere
preachers called pirs, and spiritual guides called qutubs. There was a man from
Prantee three generations ago, who was considered to be a saint. Pirs
occasionally visit from Kashmir, and in 1993 there were two serving as government
teachers in Suru.
The Sunnis' collective religious ceremonies are organised by a man chosen by all
the households in Panikhar and Prantee, but there is a strong sense of equality
between all the Sunni families both in the organisation and the enactment of the
rituals. This was clear in the celebration of Id Qurban, which is one of the most
important festivals for Sunnis. This Id commemorates Hazrat Ibrahim's (Abraham)
sacrifice of a goat, which God had substituted for his son Isaac. 5
 In 1993 the day
started with all the Sunni men going to pray in the Id Gah, which is a field near the
Tourist Bungalow. Then a man in each Sunni household slaughtered a goat. This
was then cut into pieces, one for each Sunni house in the two villages and some
special bits for close relatives and for the household itself. Then children from
every house went round all the others to give them a piece of meat - which is called
tobarok - and to say 'Id Mubarak' (Id greetings), the traditional greeting for Id days.
Later in the morning people dressed in new clothes and then went for a maflis
(congregation) at the Sunni masjid in Prantee. That had been built the previous
year with a contribution equivalent to two and a half months' Government salary
(about Rs.5,000) from every Sunni house in the two villages. A platform with loud
speakers and seating had been erected in front of the masfld. The men and boys
5 Qurban means 'Sacrifte', and it is also called Bakri (goat) Id.
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participated in the ceremony and sat in front of the masjid, while the women and
older girls sat by a line of trees about fifty yards away. The ceremony lasted about
an hour, and consisted of some prayers in Arabic and a number of speeches on
religious subjects by various men and some recitals by teenage boys. One of the
men gave his speech in a very emotional style, but most of the deliveries were very
low key. At the end, a large cauldron of halva (a delicious and auspicious sweet)
was brought round, and we were each given a piece to take away. I was told that I
must take it as it was the tobarok from the ceremony.
Id Qurban, and the days following are a particularly important time for visiting
relatives, on both sides of the family. Each house prepares meat curry and rice,
and gives snacks like cakes and biscuits to their guests, who must always eat and
drink something when they visit. All the Sunnis who are living or staying in Kargil
try to return to Suru, as do the women who have married outside the area. There
are a number of such women, as it is common for Sunnis to contract marriages with
families in other parts of the region. In this and other respects Sunni marriage
practice differs quite markedly from that of Shi'ahs.
The expressed preference among Sunnis, particularly older people, is for marriage
with relatives, particularly affinal ones. Two thirds of the marriages of the Sunni
families that I surveyed in Prantee had been with a relative and nearly half of them
were with a close affinal relative. The majority were between people in Panikhar
and Prantee, but nearly a third were between people in different parts of Ladakh
and Kashmir. When these marriages occur they are frequently with an affinal
relative, and the marriage ties seem to be continued over several generations.
For example, Jamila who is a trained midwife working in the Primary Health Centre
in Panikhar, is married to her mother's sister's son from Chushot village near Leh.
In 1994 I attended the wedding of Latifa and Bashir, a brother and sister from
Panikhar. They married a brother and sister from Zanskar who are their maternal
cousins. 6
 Kazim Sahib, the Sunni leader from Sankhoo, was married to a woman
from Dras; and now one of his daughters is married to a man from that family.
6 These joint weddings, are very common among both Sunnis and Shi'ahs, as I shall discuss
in Chapter 6.
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Although I do not have statistics for the whole Sunni population of Sum Block, I
know of many people who have made similar marriages, most of them being with
people from the small Sunni community in the neighbouring region of Zanskar. The
effect of this is that most families have relatives in another part of the region, as
well as in Suru itself. Hence their kinship practice differs markedly from that of
Shi'ahs, whose kinship connections are almost entirely local.
The Sunni kinship pattern seems to have similarities with that of the Muslim
(predominantly Sunni) traders, of the Himalayan/Central Asian region. These
trading families, usually had (and some still have) branches of the family in different
trade centres, such as Lhasa, Shigatse, Leh and Kashmir (Petech 1977:1 05,
Gaborieau 1972 & 1973, Radhu 1981, Shaikh 1991, Siddiqi 1991). Such an inter-
regional kinship structure, was advantageous to their long-distance trading
activities. In fact Suru was important for local trade in the past as, prior to the
building of the road, the Chelong Nala route from Panikhar to Kashmir was
apparently the main route for bringing rice and other such commodities into Kargil
tehsll. People from the area also traded with Baltistan and Zanskar. Some of the
Zanskari Sunnis were successful traders at the turn of the century (Khan
1939:791). As I shall discuss in a later section, a considerable amount of small-
scale trade still occurs in the area. '
In Kargil itself most of the traders and people who were involved in the
administration in the past also trace their descent from outside the area, and
several were Hindus in the past, but are now Shi'ahs. Most notable among these is
the family of Munshi Habibullah Bhat, one of the most influential men in Kargil
tehsil. His family came to Kargil from Kishtwar (on the Anantnag side) a couple of
generations ago, at which time they were Hindus, called Kashmiri Pandits (Pandits
are Brahmins). They first became Sunnis, then, in Munshi Habibullah's father's
time, they adopted Shi'ism. There are several other families in Kargil with similar
origins, who have now become Shi'ahs and there is only one zat of Sunnis
remaining who are from Kargil itself. The one Sunni family in Taisuru, who were
Dogra administrators prior to Independence, became Shi'ahs in the 1 960s.
7	 1911 settlement report in the Tehsildar's office in Kargil says that there were a number
of traders at Pariikhar and Taisuru.
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The Sunnis in Suru do not claim to have been traders in the past. However, they
do claim outside descent in the male line, since most of them say that they are the
descendants of men who came to the area and married local women in Suru. Only
two families in Suru Block say that they are descended from Dogra administrators,
but some of the Sunnis of Padum say that they are (Crook 1 994a:461). The
majority of the Panikhar and Prantee Sunnis claim to have been Muslims from the
Anantnag district of Kashmir and have Kashmiri names such as Wani (Wain) and
Kakpuri (Bamzai 1987:313). They also call their equivalent of the pa, called zat,
which is a Kashmiri term for this kind of kinship group. The members of several
Sunni zats say that their male ancestors were Hindus. For instance a family in
Prantee that have the zat name Shaikh - which is a title that is sometimes given out
of respect to people who convert to Islam - claim descent from a Hindu grandfather,
who married a Shi'ah woman and converted to Islam. 8
 As far as I can ascertain,
the majority of the Sunnis who came were poor and this remained true until the
1980s.
It is likely that a major reason why people came to Suru from Kashmir, was that it
was relatively undisturbed by rapacious government administrators compared to
Kashmir proper. Bamzai says that until the later Dogra period, land tenure in
Kashmir had been extremely precarious, as the majority of farmers were only given
land for a year at a time, in what seems to have been a corruption of a pre-existing
system of periodic re-allocation similar to that of the pa in Suru. Taxes both in kind
and in cor.,ée labour (begat) were also very harsh, so people frequently 'eft their
tenancies and went and settled elsewhere, leaving much land uncultivated (Bamzai
1987:119-120 & 128). As! suggested in the previous chapter, in the past many
households in Suru apparently experienced a shortage of labour rather than land,
and outsiders seem to have been encouraged to settle there.
This lack of a strong link to the land and custom of moving from area to area does
seem to be connected both to the engagement of Kashmiris in trade and the inter-
regional marriage patterns of Sunnis in Suru. It is also significant that Chota Kargil,
8 Shaikh is used generally in India and Kashmir for Muslims who are said to have converted
from Hinduism (Imperial Gazetteer 1909:36).
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the settlement of Suru Sunnis in Wardwan dates from 1957, when a number of
Sunni families moved there in the face of the famine in Suru. However, I was told
that no Shi'ahs moved out of the area at that time.
As I shall show later, these Sunni origin stories are constantly being reformulated,
and cannot be taken simply as fact. Nevertheless, most of the Sunnis do seem to
be of outside origin on the paternal side and most of the Sunni zats have less land
than Shi'ahs in Panikhar and Prantee. For instance, in the 1911 settlement records
in the Tehsildar's office in Kargil, 5 Sunni zats have land in Panikhar and they are
still the only Sunni zats in the village. They each had between 10 and 56 kanals of
land, whereas the Shi'ah Lampa pa had 116. Nowadays, most Suru people say
that Sunnis tend to have less land and the majority of them were poor until recently,
as I shall discuss in a later section. In the whole of Ladakh, until recently, a
minority of Sunnis were prosperous traders or administrators, but the majority were
socially and economically marginal. 9 For example, Korkhurru is a Sunni zat name
in Panikhar and Prantee and this apparently refers to the khor khuru-pa (literally
'load carriers'), who used to act as poney men on the Leh Srinagar and other
routes. They were wage labourers, with no political or economic power in the
region (Ramsay 1890:18 & 47, Imperial Gazetteer 1909:66, Joldan 1985:65, Grist
1994:268).
Hence, as in other parts of Ladakh, the origins of the Sunnis are quite diverse, but
they have made themselves into a cohesive social group. In Suru, like the Shi'ite
factions, they now form a localised kinship group, that is linked to the landscape of
Suru through monuments to ancestors. As recently as the early 1 980s, my
observation was that in most respects Sunnis were neither very different, nor did
they greatly differentiate themselves from Shi'ahs. For instance, all the Sunni
households had land and were primarily farmers. They were also virtually
indistinguishable from Shi'ahs in terms of dress, language, and day to day activities.
Until a few years ago, they were not politically divided from Shi'ahs and they
intermarried freely with them. They also used to attend Shi'ah religious
9 According to Joldan, by the 1940's, there were only two aristocratic families of Ladakhi
Muslims in Leh; as well as a few - apparently Shi'ah - Muslim families from Central Asia who
were engaged in the long-distance trade (Joldan 1985:61).
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observances such as the Muharram procession and matam and, as I showed, Hajji
Abdullah Far, a leading Sunni was very close to Agha Hyder and the millenarian
movement.
Similarly, Sum people often said to me that in the past they were all equally poor, in
order to emphasise the fact that there are now noticeable economic differences
between Sunnis and Shi'ahs. As I have mentioned, that is not strictly true as there
were some Sunnis and Shi'ahs who were better off than the mass of people.
Nevertheless, the majority of Sunnis were poor in the recent past, as most Sunni
men who are now of middle-age and older used to go labouring in the plains in the
winter, until thel 970s. However, this situation has changed dramatically in the last
few years, so that by 1981, there was only one Sunni man in the whole of Panikhar
and Prantee who still went labouring in the winter. This has been largely to do with
the introduction of government infrastructure and jobs into the area in the last
twenty years. During this time, Sunnis have taken up educational and employment
opportunities much faster than Shi'ahs. As I shall show in a later section, their
relative success in and enthusiasm for the government economy has partly been a
result of minor differences between them and Shi'ahs, that I outlined in this chapter,
particularly their more regional focus. However, first I shall outline some of the
major economic changes that have taken place in the last few decades.
(iii) The Changing Economy of Suru
With the exception of landless widows, all Suru families have some land and
practice both agriculture and animal husbandry. They practice a mixed agriculture,
which involves growing one crop of barley and, to a lesser extent, wheat and peas,
per year, in irrigated fields; and keeping various bovines, sheep, goats and horses,
from which they get milk, meat and wool. In the past landholdings were much
larger than they are now, as the amount of cultivable land has not increased very
much in the current century, but the population clearly has. The 1911 settlement
report in the Tehsildar's Office in Kargil says that average size of landholdings in
this area was 2 to 3 acres, which is 16 to 24 kanals10; whereas the Tehsildar said
that now it is about 7 kanals, a figure that I confirmed from my own surveys.
People in Sum, told me that an average size household needs about 20 kanals, so
10 A kanal is an eighth of an acre.
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many households have less than they need. This pressure on land is common
throughout the State. The 1981 census reports that the increase in population in
Kargil tehsll was the lowest in Jammu and Kashmir state. However, since 1971 the
population of the whole of Ladakh had apparently increased more rapidly than in
the past (Census 1981a:101 & 103). 11 The slower rate of population increase in
Kargil tehsil is also certainly attributable to the extremely poor state of health found
in the area, as I shall discuss later.
The village of Thulus, which is on the opposite bank of the Suru river from Prantee,
provides a good example of the peasant economy. In 1993, there was only one
young man from this village who had studied and passed his 10th class
examinations and no-one with a government job. Thulus and Pursa villages, which
are recorded jointly in the census reports, had 15 houses and 14 landholdings in
1911, but in 1993 there were 36 households. 12 Clearly, we do not know what the
household size was in those days, but it still indicates a significant population
increase. Thutus-Pursa is recorded as having 296 kanals of land in the 1981
census, which is an average of 8 kanals per household, a figure that I confirmed
from my own household surveys. I also found that the smallest landholding was 4
kanals and the largest was 20. The number of animals that each household has
varies from village to village depending on the availability of pasture; and between
households, largely depending on their wealth. Most households have at least one
cow or dzo-mo (cow-yak cross-breed) that gives milk, although not necessarily all
the year, and several sheep and goats, as well as either a horse or dzo (male cow-
yak cross-breed) for ploughing and other such tasks. In Thutus, each house had on
average 2.5 bovines, 5 sheep and goats and 0.5 horses, but one had only two
goats.
In Thulus, most men still do labouring for part of the year, but this is now done in
the non-winter months of the year in Ladakh itself, as there are now many such
11 This increase seems to be for a range of reasons, from a general move towards universal
marriage to the availability of subsidised food from the government.
12 Similarly the number of households in Panikhar has gone from 17 to 31 in the same
period, but the cultivable land has slightly decreased, because some of it was used for
government buildings.
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jobs in government projects. This kind of work is only undertaken by people from
poorer households, and is now considered to be rather demeaning. For example, a
man from Namsuru village told me that there are only 10 households out of more
than 100 from which the men now take labouring jobs and he took this as an
indication that these are the poorest households. Labouring is both extremely
arduous, as people work for many hours each day, and poorly paid, as in 1994 the
wages were about Rs. 60 a day, giving about As. 1,500 a month. This compares
with government salaries that start at about Rs. 1000 a month, are paid all year and
often do not involve much actual work. Usually men only go labouring for about two
months of the year, as the rest of the time they need to be doing their own
agricultural work.
Until the 1 980s however, most men from Suru went labouring in the winter in the
plains. It is impossible to know when this practice started, but the 1911 settlement
report says that some men from Kargil tehsil went labouring to the Punjab.
However, it also reports that many villagers got their cash income from res or
begar. This was a practice under the Dogra administration, that required villagers
to be available to carry loads, on their backs or on animals, for traders and
government administrators. It was levied in all areas that were on or near one of
the major routes and was extremely onerous since it required large numbers of
people and ponies to regularly attend at stages on the routes during the busy
agricultural and trading seasons (Joldan 1985:65, Sonam Wangyal 1977:486, Grist
1994).
According to the 1911 settlement report, the people in the upper Suru valley were
not required to supply people for a fixed period to be present at a stage (parao) on
the road; but the people from the lower part of the valley had to attend at Dras.
Nevertheless, even the Suru-pa were apparently constantly made to supply workers
for ad hoc demands. For instance, the Workmans say that just after the turn of the
century their mountaineering expedition to Nun Kun took 243 coolies from Wardwan
on the way to Suru and 60 in Kargil. They said that in the Suru valley itself all
available coolies were absent on government service (Workman & Workman
1909:6-13). The moqdam of Achambore, who is an old man, told me that he had to
organise frequent levies for this purpose. Older people in Suru and elsewhere in
Ladakh told me that they had often been beaten by government officials while
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working as carriers. Generally, all over Ladakh, the Dogra period is remembered
as a time of hardship and harassment by their officials (Imperial Gazetteer
1909:103, Kaul 1992:183-4, Sonam Wangyal 1997:485-487).
Prior to Independence there was also work as commercial carriers on the major
trade routes (see above). However, this does not seem to have been a practice in
Suru Block. As I have mentioned, some Suru people were involved in trading, and
the 1911 settlement report says that the people from this area took butter, horses,
and sheep to Kashmir and returned with rice and maize. They also apparently
traded in Ladakhi salt, and also sometimes went to Baltistan to get apricots and
stone vessels that were used for cooking. This trade was all undertaken by
exchange in kind. The 1911 settlement report said that many of the people in the
upper Suru valley did not have enough cash to pay the land revenue, half of which
was in cash and the rest in kind.
The need for cash to pay the land revenue, must have been one of the reasons
why during the Dogra/British period, large numbers of men and boys also started to
migrate to the hills and plains each winter to work as wage labourers. 13 This
practice apparently increased enormously after Partition, as the amount of carrying
work in Ladakh reduced as a result of the closure of the borders and trade routes,
dramatically affecting the economy of Ladakh. Rizvi says that many people
permanently left the area and settled in places such as Nainital and Dehra Dun in
Himachal Pradesh, where there are now said to be sizeable Kargili populations
(Rizvi 1993:102). However, no one in Suru refers to having relatives in that area.
In Suru Block men and boys were already going to labour in the plains and the
majority of them still did until the early 1 980s. As this work was undertaken in the
winter, it had the advantage that the men were available for agricultural work for the
rest of the year. Although the wages they received were poor, they would
apparently return with money to the value of about 10 sheep or goats, which was a
useful addition to their household's income.
13Sometimes men were also forcibly taken to work on projects, such as for the building of the
Gilgit road in the latter part of the 19th century (Imperial Gazetteer 1909:101).
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This practice was in existence from the 1 920s, which is the earliest living memory in
Suru. In those days, the only salaried government employees in Suru were the
patwarl and a policeman. There was also a zeldar who was in charge of res and
the collection of taxes for the whole Block. The last zeldar was a man from
Namsuru, who was alive in 1981 and had a large landholding that had been partly
granted by the government. The village headmen, were given a small share of
revenue collections, and both they and the zeldar could obtain tips (baksheesh)
from travellers for whom they arranged coolies.
Prior to the 1 930s, there were only a few literate people in the Block, most of them
clerics. Important aghas and shaikhs would study Arabic and Farsi in one of the
Shi'ite centres in the Middle East and some akhuns and other aghas also studied in
Baltistan. Some ordinary people also studied Koran reading with a cleric, but they
were not fully literate in that language. There were also a small number of non-
clerical men, who were literate in Farsi, Arabic and Urdu, such as Hajji Abdullah
Far, from the Kakpuri zat in Panikhar.
He was one of the first teachers in the Panikhar Primary School, when it was
opened in the 1930s. It was the first primary school in the Block and at that time
there were only a handful of primary schools in Kargil tehsil and middle schools at
Kargil and Skardu (Chohan 1994:110-111 ).14 Hajji Nabi, one of Hajji Abdullah Far's
cousins, who is a retired Sunni teacher from the Kakpuri zat in Panikhar, was one of
the first students of the Panikhar primary school. He is now considered to have the
greatest knowledge of Urdu in the Block. Hajji Nabi was the only student from Suru
to complete middle schooling in Kargil at that time.' 5
 A Shi'ah from Choskore and a
Surini from Panikhar went to study with him but they dropped out. After completing
his studies, he went to the Punjab to labour in the winter for a couple of years, as
14 Chohan says that the government first opened a primary school in Kargil at the turn of the
century, and it was upgraded to a middle school in the 1 930s.
15 In Jam'mu and Kashmir, primary school is 1St to 5th class, middle school is 6th to 8th,
secondary is 9th and 10th, and Higher secondary is up to 12th class, after which people go
to co lege or university. As the Indian education system is closely modelled on the British,
the 10th class exams correspond to GCSE's and 12th to A" levels.
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there were no government jobs. 16 Then, in 1942, he became a teacher and was
posted to Karsha in Zanskar. Further studies were only available in Srinagar at that
time, as the schools in Leh and Kargil were only extended up to 10th class after
independence (Kaul 1992:1 89). 17 It was not until 1957 that three other Sunni men
from Panikhar also qualified as teachers, which in those days required a Middle (8th
class) pass.
Since that time there has been a great increase in education in the Block and the
tehsi! as a whole. In 1973, a Boys' High School was opened in Panikhar and by
then all the villages had primary schools. By 1994, there were twenty-eight primary
schools in Suru Block, three middle schools, one lower high school (up till 9th class)
and girls' and boys' high schools in Panikhar and Prantee respectively. The girls'
high school in Panikhar is the only one of its kind in the tehsil. In other areas older
girls have to attend boys' schools, except in Kargil where there are both boys' and
girls' higher secondary schools, but only a hostel for boys. In 1996, the Sankhoo
high school was extended to be a higher secondary school. For university studies
students usually go to Srinagar, although a degree college was recently opened in
Leh. When the Governor visited in 1994, he promised to open one in Kargil, but
this has not been started yet.
Despite the increasing availability of government education since the 1 930s, other
changes in the economy came much later. Firstly, the road from Kargil to Suru was
opened in 1978, and eventually extended as far as Padum in Zanskar, which
caused a great increase in small-scale commerce in the area. For instance,
Moqdam Mehdi, the headman of Panikhar, opened the first shop in Panikhar in
1978, and by the time I visited Suru in 1981/2 there were several shops in the small
bazaar that was growing up along the road. By 1993 there were about thirty shops
in Panikhar itself, and about twenty in Taisuru, and one or two in other villages. In
Panikhar, there is also a small hotel and cafe and there had been several more that
16 Chohan reports that in 1932 there were only a total of 76 Ladakhis in government service
in the whole area, of whom more than halt (44) were teachers (Chohan 1994:150).
17 Chohan says that there were grants for a few Ladakhi students to study in Srinagar, and
they could then be employed as Naib (deputy) Tehs'Idars or sub-Inspectors of Police, and
were paid much less than non-local employees (Chohan 1994:113).
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catered mainly for foreigners, before the trouble in Kashmir caused a decline in
tourism to the area.
There has also been a great increase in government employment and activities
funded by government money during this period, due to the establishment of Kargil
as a separate tehsil with its own headquarters in 1978, after a campaign by Kargili
politicians. Prior to that Ladakh District had been administered as a single unit with
its headquarters at Leh, which had resulted in the majority of government offices
and jobs being in Leh tehsil. Politicians in Kargil had campaigned to have it made a
tehsil in order for it to attract more government jobs and money.
The tehsifs administration, consists of a District (Development) Commissioner, who
is both in charge of the administration, and responsible for development. He has
two deputies, the Assistant Commissioner (AC), who is his deputy for the basic
administration, and an Assistant Development Commissioner (ADC), whose
responsibility is solely for development. Under them they have a number of
departments, such as education, and the public works department. Each of these
has a head of department, such as the Chief Education Officer (CEO). Each
department has most of its white-collar staff in Kargil, although there are offices in
the Blocks, such as the Zonal Education office. However, the senior administrators,
who are called Officers, have their offices in Kargil, and most of the administrative
officers are in Kargil. The posts of DC and Superintendent of Police (SP) are
frequently filled by people from outside the state, as the incumbents are from the
higher echelons of the national civil service. However, all other government jobs in
Jammu and Kashmir, must be filled by state subjects, due to Jammu and Kashmir's
special status in the Indian union.
There are no government statistics on the origins of their workers, but my
observation is that the majority of those working in offices in Kargil are local,
although there are a significant number of people from other parts of Kashmir, and
a few from Leh tehsil. For example, in 1993/4, the DC was a Sunni from Leh, and
both his deputies were Shi'ahs from Kargil tehsil. In the medical department, the
head was a Kashmiri Pandit, and his wife worked as a doctor in the hospital; but all
the rest of the doctors were Ladakhi, one being from Leh and one from Zanskar
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tehsil. 18 There is still a shortage of sufficiently qualified local people to fill the more
senior government posts. For example, in Suru Block, several of the senior
teachers in the boys' and girls' high schools are from other parts of Kashmir, as
there are no local teachers who are sufficiently qualified to teach some of the more
advanced levels. However, where possible jobs are filled by locals and below a
certain level all employees are from the tehsi!. For white collar jobs candidates are
required to have minimum educational qualifications, such as a 10th class pass
(called the Matric) in order to be a teacher. There are also many unskilled
government jobs, such as chaprassies (janitors) in schools and offices, and manual
labourers in the animal husbandry and other such departments.
In addition to permanent government jobs, many other opportunities have been
created in areas like construction. For example there are a number of Suru men,
who now call themselves contractor (tikadaO. This can mean anything from
supplying furniture for a school to building a major construction such as a hydro-
electric project. Anyone can become a contractor, as it requires no educational
qualifications. In addition, many of these projects require casual labourers, so now
there is a great deal of that kind of work available in Ladakh.
These new opportunities have enabled some Suru people to substantially increase
their prosperity in the last two decades, particularly those living in and around
Panikhar and Prantee. For example, Hajji Razak is an elderly Sunni man from
Prantee, who used to go regularly to the Punjab to labour, and is considered to
have been poor in the past. Now, one of his sons is the Headmaster of the boys'
h Ugh school in Prantee and one of the most respected people in the Sunni
community. Another son is a Medical Assistant and has a shop in Panikhar bazaar
and two of his daughters and another son are teachers. The family of Ghulam
Hyder, who is one of the chief sponsors of the Noon Public school, have also
become much more prosperous. Their father also used to go for labouring, but
eventually he got a job as a chaprassie in Panikhar. Ghulam Hyder his eldest son,
is now a successful contractor and his younger son is a bus driver.
18 Zanskar was recently made into a separate tehsllas well.
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Other families, such as that of Moqdam Mehdi, have managed to build on their
existing advantages. As I have mentioned, he is the hereditary moqdam and so his
father and grandfather held this post as well. They were not poor in the past, and
so never went labouring, but seem to have always been involved in small-scale
trading. He is now one of the biggest traders in the area. Among other things, he
buys wool from the nomadic Bakarwal, who come to this area from Jammu in the
summer. He then sends it by lorry to a weaving plant in another part of the state.
Both he and his brother also have shops in Panikhar bazaar, above which they
used to have a hotel and he is one of the wealthier people in the area.
These histories also illustrate an important difference between Sunnis and Shi'ahs.
Namely that Sunnis have mainly obtained secular education, and taken government
jobs; whereas Shi'ahs have tended to eschew government education and are not
well represented in most areas of government employment. Similarly, all Sunnis
have adopted such an approach, so, as a community, they are now well established
in government employment, but only a minority of Shi'ahs have benefited from the
economic changes of the last two decades and many of them are extremely poor.
The division of landholdings has left many households without sufficient land for
their household's needs, and there has been very little effective development of
agriculture. The value of local barley and wheat have also fallen relative to other
prices and the increasing monetization of the economy has made cash a necessity
for everything from bus fares to (government subsidised) 'ration' rice. In addition
there are very few non-government or government associated jobs in this area.
This is partly because of Ladakh's remote geographical location, especially the cost
of transport in and out of the area, which has made many types of business
unfeasible. Since the late 1980s, Kargil has also been badly affected by the
Kashmir conflict which has severely curtailed business activities in the State, and
unlike Leh tehsil it does not have a large tourist industry, It is also very difficult for
people from this area to obtain jobs in other parts of the State or India, as there is
an unemployment problem in most parts of the country, including many
unemployed graduates.
The consequence of this is that most households in Suru are poor, evidence of
which can be seen in their relatively high rates of mortality and disease as
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compared even to other parts of Ladakh. When I first visited Suru, we were
conducting a survey for SCF/UNICEF, and hence asking people about issues such
as child mortality. We were shocked to find that it was dramatically higher than in
areas of Leh tehsil where we had been working. While we were in Suru, a severe
virus was killing so many children that outside some villages there were half a
dozen or more freshly dug graves. I was equally surprised to find that the situation
had not significantly changed by the time that I returned in 1993. I do not have
accurate figures for such indices as child mortality, since this is not yet recorded at
the Block level (see Chapter 1). However, among the families that we surveyed for
the medical department, I calculated that women in the under-40 age group had
already on average lost a third of their children. Maternal mortality is also
extremely high, as is the prevalence of diseases such as tuberculosis. The degree
of premature mortality is particularly bad in villages such as Thulus, which are
further from the hospital and other mecfcal services, but it is still very bad in villages
such as Taisuru which are not.
Part of the reason for this is absolute poverty, causing many people to not have
enough to eat. No-one in Suru is destitute, as the social system accommodates
people who cannot fend for themselves, but many ordinary families are struggling to
survive. For example, several children in the Noon Public School have been given
free places because they are orphans (this means without a father), or their families
are extremely poor. One day, I talked to one of the latter girls about washing her
uniform, but she told me that she could not, as they do not have any money to buy
soap. When we were interviewing women about their own health, most of them
said that they usually only eat bread and drink tea and our observation was neither
they nor their children ate enough to be healthy. It was noticeable (although not
statistically significant) that mortality was slightly lower than average in the leading
aghas'families, and the wealthier Sunnis, who nowadays eat much better food than
most other people on a daily basis.
Nevertheless, the whole Block is deprived in terms of their access to resources,
such as medical services and transport and hence there is not such a great
difference in mortality between rich and poor families in Suru. For instance, Sunnis'
mortality rates are not much better than those of Shi'ahs, despite the fact that they
are nearly all fairly comfortable economically, live close to the Primary Health
148
Centre, and compared to Shi'ahs, are much more likely to use contraception to
space their pregnancies, vaccinate their children and visit a doctor when they are ill.
Nevertheless, there are important differences between Sunnis and Shi'ahs in
respect of their history of involvement with the government economy and how they
both view that history. So in the next section 1 shall look at why the Sunnis have
been so ready to take up government education and employment. I will also show
that during the same period they have reformulated both their sense of what it is to
be a Sunni, and their relationship to Shi'ahs, by constructing a history in which they
are the more educated and modern people in the Block.
(iv) Sunnis, Secular Education and Government Employment
There are several reasons why Sunnis have entered enthusiastically into the
government economy. The first, and one of the most important, is that they were
less ideo'ogically tied to the land than Shi'ahs. As I have shown in my analyses of
Shi'ah and Sunni kinship practices, despite the aghas' own outside origins, the
whole reference of Shi'ahs' practical kinship is local. Women are discouraged from
travelling far from their own land, and hence the preferred partner is someone
physically close. For ordinary people, however, there is no particular preference for
relatives and in fact marriage with them is thought to risk future rifts in the event of
divorce. For Sunnis the opposite is the case, as one of the preferred partners is a
person in another region, but they prefer that person to be a relative. As I showed,
this kinship pattern is partially a result of laws in Kashmir preventing people from
being permanently tied to land, until the end of the 19th century. Its consequence
is that for Sunnis the kinship group is more enduring and important than the
location, and therefore being a Sunni is not ultimately tied to being connected to a
particular piece of land.
Both they and Shi'ahs say that Sunnis entered government employment because
they had less land than Shi'ahs. There is some truth in this, since there are a
number of Sunni zats that do not have very much land. However, until recently
there was usually a large amount of land in Sum that was available for leasing,
which is commonplace when a household does not have sufficient labour to farm its
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own land.' 9
 Moreover, Shi'ahs, who also did not have much land, have not done
the same, and the two families in Suru Block that were leaders in government
education both had larger than average landholdings. One of these families is the
yokma-pa akhun family in Sangra (see Chapter 3). The other are the Kakpuris of
Panikhar, who have been the leaders and role models for the other Sunnis in the
Suru Valley.
The Kakpuris are one of the few exceptions among Sunnis in Suru, as they do not
have a history of being relatively poor. They have considerably more land than
other Sunnis in Panikhar which is their original base in Suru. In the previous
generation, Hajji Abdullah Far, who I have mentioned several times, went as a mag-
pa (uxorilocal husband), to a Sunni heiress in Sankhoo. Her family, who were
descended from Dogra administrators, had large amounts of land in both Sankhoo
and two villages near Leh. 2° Before he married in Sankhoo, he taught in the newly
opened primary school in Panikhar in the 1 930s. 2' He was able to do that as the
men in his family were apparently all highly literate in Farsi, Urdu and Arabic,
although he was apparently the first to have a government job. After he went to
Sankhoo he became the leader of the Sunnis in the Suru Valley.
In the present century, the Kakpuris have played an important part in providing both
the leadership and bridgehead for other Sunnis to enter into state education and
government employment. Older people told me that in the past Hajji Abdullah Far,
and his elder brother's son, Munshi Khaled, had been the people in the area who
were most literate in Urdu, and who used to help everyone else by writing letters
and dealing with the administration.
	 Nowadays, the Kakpuri zat in Panikhar has
the most senior government officer from Kargil tehsil, a Doctor, several engineers
and many teachers in its number. Hajji Abdullah Far has been dead for about ten
19 For example in 1911, there were several tenants in both Taisuru and Panikhar, and in
Choskore, half the households were said to be tenants. The tenancy arrangement is called
shazma, and the tenants are expected to give half the crop to the owners.
20 They gave much of this up in the 1950s when the government of Jammu and Kashmir
made a land ceiling of just under 200 kanals.
21 Chohan reports that the first primary school had been opened in Kargil in 1899, and that it
was converted to a middle school in 1930 (Chohan 1994:11 0-1 11).
Munshi Khaled disappeared mysteriously about forty years ago (see Chapter 3).
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years and now his son Kazim Sahib has the unofficial role as leader of all the
Sunnis in Kargil tehsil. Until his retirement, he was a senior administrator in the
Education Department in Kargil, one of his sons was one of the first two people
from the Suru valley to qualify as a doctor - the other being from the other Sunni
family in Sankhoo, his other son is an engineer, and his two daughters are both
teachers.
The Kakpuris were apparently in a good position to take advantage of the
opportunities offered by the government as they already had a sound base, having
a knowledge of Urdu, the administrative language, and good contacts with the
government and an understanding of the government system. Most Sunnis
certainly did not have these advantages, but they still started to engage in the
Government economy from the 1 960s and 1 970s. For instance a man in his fifties
from the Sunni Shaikh family in Prantee, told me that he only studied up to 3rd
class and then went to the Punjab and Himachal Pradesh for labouring with his
brothers when he was about twelve. Much later he got a job as a chaprassie
(unskilled janitor). Now all his older children are educated and have jobs and the
younger ones are studying. His family's success in education and employment is
typical of most of the Sunni families in Panikhar and Prantee, whatever their
previous economic profile.
In this respect they are also markedly different from most Shi'ahs in the Block, as
the statistics in Figure 4.1 illustrate. Sunnis particularly predominate in the
education department, since teaching requires educational qualifications. In 1996,
of twenty-five women teachers in the block, all of whom are local, only two are
Shi'ahs and there were about fifty local men, most of them Sunnis. There are also
around twenty-five male teachers from Kashmir and Jammu areas, all of whom are
well-qualified and are usually posted to Suru for two years.
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No. of HH's ___ 16
	 10 ___ 12 ___	 3 ___ 41 ___ 15
____ M FM F M F M FM F M F
Children	 22	 14	 11	 11	 31	 19	 6	 5	 70 49	 16	 16
Studying____ ____	 ____ ____	 ____	 ____ - ____ ____
Uneducated	 1	 6	 0	 1	 0	 7	 1	 2	 2 16	 0	 0
children____ ____	 ____ ____	 ____	 ____	 ____ ____
Educated	 0	 0	 5	 1	 4	 1	 2	 0	 11	 1	 10	 8
Adults23____ ____	 ____	 ____	 ____ ____
Employed	 0	 0	 6	 0 13	 1	 3	 1 22	 2 18	 5
Adults24____ ____ ____ ____ 	 ____	 ____	 ____ ____
Adult	 17	 15 12	 18 20 26	 1	 3 50 62	 4	 18
Farmers____ ____ ____ ____	 ____	 ____	 ____
Figure 4.1 - Education and employment statistics for surveyed households in
Thulus, Pursa, Prantee and Taisuru villages in 1993
One of the major reasons why Sunnis seem to have moved into education and
government employment is because the Kakpuris had already created a foothold in
that sphere in the 1 930s and 1 940s, so were able to help other Sunnis. Certainly
Kazim Sahib, in particular, still plays a very important role in representing people in
Government Departments, where it is extremely difficult for an ordinary person to
get anything done - even to obtain something to which they are fully entitled -
without an influential sponsor. The predominance of Sunnis within the education
department in Suru, also gives Sunni students an advantage, since their teachers
seem to favour Sunni students. 25
 The fact that Sunnis see themselves as all being
related, means that nepotism to some extent applies to the whole group.
I counted adults as educated if they have a 10th class pass or more in the government
education system, or if they are highly educated in the religious system.
24 have included those who have a major non-government source of income, such as
contractors, shopkeepers and builders.
25 For example, there is a Central Government funded school in Kargil called the Vidhyalaya
school, which offers a very high standard of English medium education and is free. The
headmistress told me that in 1995 eighty percent of the children who passed their
examination from Sun., were Sunnis. After they had been admitted, she received
representations from Shi'ahs in Suru who told her that as those supervising the examinations
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Although this was not true in the past, in the last two decades, bribery and cheating
has become a feature of the education system in Kargil tehsiL Seeing the
advantages that could be obtained from the possession of educational
qualifications, Sunnis apparently took to the practice earlier. They also had the
cash incomes to afford bribes, as the following account of a young Suru man
illustrates:
"When I first took my Matric exam (in the early 1 980s) the examiners were
asking for two hundred rupees as a bribe for copying (cheating). My father
was very poor so he didn't have enough money to pay this so I failed. At the
same time Ustanis (female teachers) X, V and Z were taking the exam.
Their parents paid the money and they passed, and subsequently got jobs
as teachers. I then went and got work and saved up the money myself and
went to take the exams in Kargil. That time the bribe had gone up to six
hundred rupees, which I paid; but then someone reported me for cheating
and F had my papers cancelled."
During this period of their changing fortunes, Sunnis seem to have also
reformulated their collective history to one in which they have always been the
educated people in the area. A number of older Sunni men told me that their
ancestors had come to the area because the local people were illiterate and
needed people to act as their munshis for letter-writing, particularly between Suru
and the men in the Punjab. One man said that people from as far away as
Karpokhar would send a horse and bring one of these educated men for a dinner
(dawat at their house - both of which are signs of great respect. As I have
suggested, this may have been true of one or two Sunnis in the past, but certainly
not most of them. So these stories must be understood as a justification of a claim
to higher status in the present.
For their part, Shi'ahs contest the Sunnis' reading of their history and origins. For
instance people said that the Sunnis had been wandering people who had settled in
Suru and that, except for the Kakpuris and one family in Prantee, all the Sunnis had
been poor in the past. While both the aghas and some other Shi'ahs had been
relatively well off and had been able to get milaks from most of the other houses.
had all been Sunnis, they had put the Sunni children in a separate room and helped them
with their papers.
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Apparently as recently as twenty years ago in Panikhar some of the other families
would work for a Shi'ah family that had plenty of land in return for the promise of
loans of grain in times of shortage and other such benefits. 26 It was also relatively
common in the past for a poorer house to send a child as a duksmi to a richer one
that had a labour shortage. A male child sometimes remained and inherited
property and became part of the new family's p'ha -spun, (see Chapter 2).27 Hence
what started as an unequal relationship of patronage was frequently transformed
into one of equality.
Nowadays, it is rare to find new relationships of this type being formed by non-
clerical Shi'ah households; however, they are increasingly common among Sunni
households, albeit with a different emphasis. Many of them are now able to use
their advantageous position in the Government economy and education to obtain
labour from Shi'ahs. For example, several Sunni teachers in Panikhar and Prantee
called a dozen or so children from their school to come and work as milaks for them
for a day during harvest in 1994. Since the wage for labouring in this way is at least
Rs. 50 a day and there is a shortage of labour at this time this was obviously very
economically advantageous for them, as well a being a public illustration of their
superior social standing.28
 Some Shi'ahs families also had a patron-client
relationship with a Sunni neighbour for whom they would do milaks and help them
out when needed.
26 In colonial times there was no limit on landholdings, and these larger landholders usually
had a number of client houses who were heavily in debt to them. However, the Jammu and
Kashmir government successfully enacted land reform, and outlawed these kinds of debt
relationships soon after Independence, wh ch however did not then immediately disappear.
27 For instance the family of Hajji Mirza, one of the richest Shi'ahs in Panikhar and a political
opponent of the yokma faction, have a young man Mehdi living with them who came to their
house from Parkachik when he was a baby. He has no educational qualifications and does
farm work; whereas Hajji Mirza's own sort studied and is now an engineer. Mehdi is now
married with several children and has his own separate household in Hajji Mirza's house.
28leachers can also ask other things of their pupils. For instance, teachers in the Noon
Public School could ask one of the pupils to bring milk, yoghurt and vegetables from home
and they would feel obliged to do so.
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In 1993 there were also a number of Sunni houses in Panikhar and Prantee which
had young Shi'ah men as duksmi. These men were almost all studying in 9th or
10th class and worked for a Sunni family for low or no wages in the expectation that
they would use their influence with government departments to find them a job.
Some, but not all, of these relationships differed quite markedly from similar ones in
the aghas' households and what I understand to have been their nature in the past.
Since it was increasingly becoming the case that they were being treated as social
inferiors rather than as a relatively equal member of the family. For example, they
were often spoken to in a rude manner and given orders; whereas the duksmi in
the aghas' households were not treated markedly different from the family
members. Sadiak, the young man from Kargee who is a duksmi in Agha Miggi
Ort's house, is expected to do more farm and heavy work than the young aghas,
and is not encouraged to study to the extent that they are. Nevertheless, he had a
joint wedding with Au Agha, Agha Miggi Ort's second son and, like the other
duksmis, he is treated as a social equal and valued member of the household.
Thus these relationships are being used by some Sunnis to create a social
inequality between them and Shi'ahs. In all the patron client relations involving
Sunnis, Sunnis were the patrons and Shi'ahs were the clients. All free labour
arrangements between Sunni households are of a reciprocal kind known as Iaktsig
(which Shi'ahs also use). This is used for particular agricultural tasks, for instance
the job of taking the fertilizer soil from the earth latrines and barns to the fields in
the spring. So again Sunnis seem to emphasise social equality among themselves,
although economically this is far from the case.
Another factor in their success has been the Sunnis' location in and around
Panikhar, which has been the administrative centre since Dogra times and hence is
where the first schools and jobs were created. Shi'ahs from the four most central
villages of Panikhar, Prantee, Choskore and Taisuru have also been far more
successful than those from remoter villages, both in obtaining Government jobs and
in other areas of the new economy, such as shop-keeping and contracting.
However, as my statistics showed, even in the central part of the Block, there is still
a marked discrepancy between the level of educational qualifications of Shi'ahs and
Sunnis, and hence the kind of jobs that they obtain.
155
As the previous account has shown Sunnis have managed to substantia'ly improve
their economic position, by taking advantage of the opportunities that the state
offered and using their new position to form patronage relations with some Shi'ahs.
One of the reasons why they have been so successful in this is that in the past the
Shi'ite majority did not compete with them for government benefits and resources.
In the next section I will look at some of the reasons why this has been the case
and offer some suggestions as to why the situation has changed in the last few
years.
(v) Shi'ahs, Secular Education and Government Employment
In Kargil tehsi!, the numbers attending school have increased enormously in the last
decade, as the following statistics demonstrate, although some allowance must be
made for the fact that there is a high drop-out rate (Kaneez Fatima forthcoming,
Kargil Youth Voluntary Forum 1993).
Figure 4.2 - Numbers of Children Attending School in Kargil TehsiP
In the villages that we surveyed in Suru, nearly all children of primary school age
are now attending school, as I showed in Figure 4.1. Sunnis were already sending
all their children to school in the early 1 980s, so the great increase in school
attendance has been because Shi'ahs have also started sending their children en
masse. This high rate of school attendance, particularly in a relatively remote rural
area, is unusual in India as a whole, in which only a quarter of children complete
primary school (Drury 1993: vii, Census 1991). One of the reasons for it, is
undoubtedly that the special status of Jammu and Kashmir in the Indian Union and
the strategic importance of Ladakh, means that the State Government (with Central
29 The population of Kargil tehsil was 86,000 at this time.
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Government funding) provides free education and medical services on a scale that
is not available in most parts of India. Recently there has also been a small subsidy
and free uniform for older girls who attend school. Now in some primary schools
there are also free school meals and this scheme is apparently being extended
throughout the tehsll. 3° Nevertheless, there are also other factors involved in the
increase in school attendance among Shi'ahs.
As recently as ten years ago, Shi'ahs in Suru were not very interested in secular
education for a number of reasons. One was their historical lack of involvement
with the government - of whatever period, and their experience of state power as an
external and coercive force. Hence they did not regard schools as being benign
providers of education, but as just another example of an arbitrary and cruel
imposition of an external authority. Several men associated with the school said
that they had been treated very badly by the teachers when they were at school
and some of them said that they had abandoned their studies as a result.
This reluctance to engage with the Government institutions also had resonances
with some of the anti-secularist ideas coming from the Shi'ite centres in the 1 960s
and 1 970s, which were a result of the erosion of influence of the clergy due to a
rapid and divisive process of state-led modernisation (Cole & Keddie 1986:22). By
the 1 970s some of the Shi'ite leaders in Kargil tehsil were apparently discouraging
their followers from being involved both in secular education and the use of Urdu
and English the main languages of government. 3' This suspicion continued until
very recently in some quarters. For instance in Kargil town, the first private school
was the lslamiya school that was opened in the 1 950s as a madrasa for the
religious training of young men who will later go to study in the Middle East. 32 The
Suru Valley Public School, the first non-religious private school, was not opened
until 1982. It was started by a predominantly Sunni management committee. Mr.
Chisti, a Tibetan Muslim, who was the principal of the school from 1985-1990, said
In 1994 the grants were Rs200 twice a year for girls in 6th - 8th class, and Rs.300 twice a
year for girls in 9th and 10th class.
31 There was apparently a time in the 1960s and 1970s when some preached aga nst the
wearing of modem dress and men cutting their hair, which were seen as un-Islam c.
By 1996 they had also opened some English medium private schools.
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that when he first arrived in Kargil most Shi'ahs were not interested in sending their
children to the school, because they objected to the secular nature of the syllabus
and to the wearing of uniform - particularly the dresses for girls. Partly in opposition
to this school, the more religion-oriented Mutahan School was opened in Kargil by
some Shi'ites. However, after many months of persuasion, the principal managed
to persuade more Shi'ahs to send their children to the school. 1 n 1985, there were
20 students in the Suru Valley Public School and 40 or 50 in the Mutahari School;
but, by 1986, there were 100 in SVPS and only about 15 in the Mutahari School.
There was certainly also a discouragement of parents sending girls to study, as the
current levels of female literacy among Shi'ah women in Suru illustrate (see Figure
4.1). Agha Hyder told his followers that girls should be married at about nine years
old, as soon as they had reached their religious maturity (baliaq thongse), although
women said they had been married at about twelve. He also discouraged parents
from sending older girls to study. When we visited Sankhoo in 1981 there were 300
boys in the high school, but no girls; whereas in Panikhar there were many Sunni
and a few Shi'ah girls. 3' In Sankhoo Block, the sons from the Sangra yokma-pa
akhun family were the exception, in that they all studied to university level; but
some of their sisters have never attended school. In Suru Block, the first Shi'ah
graduated in 1993; whereas, by then, there were a number of Sunni graduates in
the 40 households in Panikhar and Prantee. However, there was no particular
difference in the levels of male or female education between the two Shi'ite
factions.
The Mutahari School now offers the full secular curriculum, and has several branches in
villages around Kargil. The lslamiya School organisers also apparently opened a branch for
secular education in 1996.
The atmosphere was the same in Kargil at the time. Munshi Khadim, who is the nephew
of Munshi Habthullah in Kargil, and the main organiser of the school, said that his mother's
family came to Kargil from Skardu before 1947. He educated all his daughters despite being
severely discouraged by the Shi'ah clerics who said that it was against their religion, and one
of his granddaughters became the first woman from Kargil to graduate. She then became
the Headmistress of the Girls' High School in Kargil in the mid-1970s, at which time there
were only 10 girls studying there, but soon she had raised the number to 350.
158
One reason why Shi'ahs did not send the children to school in the past, was
because their main focus was on the land, both symbolically and economically, and
therefore they did not want to spare their children from work on the land. It is
significant in this respect that those who entered secular education earlier, such as
the Sangra akhun family, could get milaks for their agricultural labour. Another
major difference between Sunnis and Shi'ahs can be found in the different focus of
their leadership and role models. Sunni leaders, possessed secular education and
had pre-existing links with the governmental economy. Hence secular education
and government employment were seen as both attainable and desirable in
themselves. Whereas, Shi'ite leaders stressed the attainment of merit through
religious education and donation. Higher status could be obtained through going on
ha]], or sending a son to study in a Shi'ite madrasa in the Middle East. However,
the latter was always out of the reach of most ordinary Shi'ahs and the aim of
Shi'ah household heads was to go on ha]] or ziarat.
Nowadays Sunnis are critical of Shi'ahs' practice of going on ziarat, particularly the
fact that men frequently go when they still have younger children. They say that
you should only go when you have brought up and educated all your children. Only
a few Sunnis go on ha]] (to Mecca) and it is nearly always when they are fairly
elderly. For instance, Kazim Sahib went after his retirement. Some Sunnis also
say that the fact that they go on ha]] shows that Shi'ahs are not really poor at all.
In fact, only a minority of Shi'ahs ever get to go on ha]]. Out of 41 Shi'ah
households from various villages that I surveyed in detail, eight of them had a male
household head who was a ha]]! and there was only one female ha]]L
The differential initial entry of Sunnis and Shi'ahs into secular education, is
analogous to what Rizvi observed in a village in Spiti, a close neighbour of Ladakh,
that was part of the pre-Dogra Ladakh kingdom. He says that the breakdown of
polyandry in this area, had the result that there are two major types of household:
the khangchen, which are those of older brothers and have both more land and a
higher status in the village and the hin]ung, which are the houses of younger
brothers, who have much less land due to the customary rule of primogeniture
which is still largely observed. Rizvi says that the hinjung were ready to send their
children to school and try out agricultural innovations; whereas the khangchen
were very unwilling to change. The hin]ung started to look for other opportunities,
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and refused to work on the land of the khangchen as they had in the past (Rizvi
1 987a:424-425). As in Suru, it seems that the khangchen had an attachment to the
land as a symbolic manifestation of their status as full citizens of the village, and
therefore were unwilling to change this position. Thus differences in their position in
the kinship system from that of the h/flung had a marked effect on their attitude to
change. Similarly Hastrup has shown that in Iceland a collective representation of
the society being primarily agncultural, caused those with larger landholdings to
both discourage and avoid fishing as a source of livelihood, leading to a failure to
produce sufficient food (Hastrup 1 992b:1 11). I am not trying to suggest that
Shi'ahs were wrong to avoid secular education, merely that differences in focus had
an important effect on their attitudes to it.
I would suggest that in the 1 970s and 1 980s, Shi'ahs entered the government
economy in a largely instrumental way, to get money to finance their religious
activity, particularly to go on ha]]. Initially, Shi'ahs did not send their children to
school, as they saw no merit in secular education per se and at that time there were
government jobs that could be obtained without educational qualifications, for those
that wanted them. Nevertheless, most Shi'ahs do not seem to even have had the
expectation of obtaining a government job at that time.
However by the late 1 980s the situation was changing rapidly. Firstly because the
division of land, and undermining of the agricultural economy and increasing
monetization of the economy meant that many households were forced to look for
alternative sources of income. An additional factor in the last decade has also been
the escalation in brideprice (rintho), in order for young men to marry, as I shall
discuss in Chapter 6. Secondly, the rapid increase in government employment in
the late 1 970s and 1 980s had almost completely stopped. For instance, in 1994,
there had been a freeze for the last three years on any new appointments in the
education department. The government's response to this situation was to increase
the educational qualifications required for government jobs, so that by 1993 it was
necessary to have a 10th class pass even for unskilled jobs. At the same time the
number of students obtaining qualifications is increasing very rapidly, both because
of the larger numbers now attending school and because of a great escalation in
the scale of bribery in the last few years. The result is that there is now a growing
unemployment problem in Kargil tehsi!, where people talk of 7,000 or more
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unemployed (Urdu: bekar). This situation is apparently similar to that found in most
parts of India, where there is a serious unemployment problem among those with
educational qualifications (Drury 1993:vii).
Men in Suru and elsewhere in the tehsil no longer want to go labouring, as they
know that it is both much harder work and worse paid than a government job. Only
men from the poorest families now go labouring, and it is generally regarded as
being rather demeaning. As I have suggested, in practice, the majority of
government jobs are rather undemanding on the incumbent, both in terms of
workload and their actual attendance at work. So to some extent Shi'ahs have been
forced to obtain educational qualifications in order to get government employment,
not because they particularly value the education itself, rather they see it as a
means to an end. As a Suru woman once remarked to me: "Urdu and English are
good for getting a job, but Arabic is the language which is close to our hearts."
However, just as Shi'ahs entered secular education in large numbers, the idea that
educational qualifications, particularly pre-University ones, give access to a
government job is becoming increasingly unrealistic. Nevertheless people's
expectations of such an outcome are rising rapidly at the moment. An important
reason for this is that in the last twenty or so years people in Kargil tehsil have
witnessed the state in an unusually generous mood and as the main source of
waged jobs and other cash opportunities in the area. This seems to have given
people the impression that the state can and will provide. Secondly, all political
parties and most politicians, make promises to provide more government facilities
and jobs, even though this may be extremely unrealistic. For instance, it is
noticeable that the visit of a politician from outside, or a disaster that befalls the
area (such as the shellings of Kargil in 1997), is nearly always the occasion for a
State or Central Government statement saying that money will be spent or jobs will
be created in Kargil tehsiL As Jalal and others show, this is now standard practice,
for politicians in India, particularly in areas that are seen as being dissident or
strategic (Jalal 1 995:94ff), and is clearly linked to Chatterjee's notion of the
developmental state (see Chapter 1).
The eftect in Kargil is a rapidly escalating expectation that people are entitled to a
government job that could be provided. By 1994, this situation was exacerbated by
the disruption in the state in the last five years, which had caused a decrease in
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business opportunities and an increase in bribery, which was already rife, as I have
suggested. One consequence is that greater numbers of students were passing
the Matriculation examination than in previous years, thereby increasing the
numbers of people who see themselves as being unemployed. In the mid-i 990s,
this resulted in demonstrations in Kargil by students' organisations, demanding to
be given jobs.
This situation has strong resonance with an article by Degregori on highland Peru,
an area that has similarities with Suru (and Ladakh) in terms of its history of
external domination and current peripherality to the centres of power. He says that
there education is regarded as a "black box" the contents of which are not very
important, but which must be obtained to get access to the resources of the state,
therefore he says it is similar to a cargo in a cargo cult (Degregori 1991:241).
In this context of increasing demands for government resources, a conflict has
emerged between Sunnis and the yokma-pa in Suru, particularly over access to
and control of education. This is the context in which the yokma-pa leadership
decided to open the Noon Public School, as I shall discuss in the next section.
(vi) The Causes of the Sunni Yokma-pa Conflict
As I have shown, by the 1 990s about half the adult Sunnis in Panikhar and Prantee
had a government job or occupation that brings in a reasonable income, such as
shop-keeping, compared to just over a sixth of Shi'ahs. Of the Shi'ahs that I
surveyed, the majority had non-government jobs, such as being a contractor, shop-
keeper or skilled craftsman. Nearly all the Sunnis had government jobs, most of
which were white-collar. In Suru Block itself, they dominated employment in the
Education Department, where all but 2 of thel 8 female teachers were Sunni, as
were the majority of the local male teachers, and they had most of the posts in the
Medical Department which required educational qualifications.
By 1993, the advantageous position that Sunnis had attained in respect of
education and government service meant that many Sunni households had
managed to move into the position of being patrons for poorer Shi'ah families and
were able to draw on their free labour both for farm work and household servants.
Thus indirectly challenging some of the aghas' power over their followers. At the
same time, the leading aghas were finding it difficult to operate as patrons for their
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followers in the government economy. For instance, Agha Miggi Ort is highly
educated; however, he is literate in Farsi and Arabic, but not in Urdu and English,
the main languages of the government administration. He is also an expert in the
Shi'ite system of administration, but not in that of the government in Jammu and
Kashmir and the departments in Suru and Kargil. For example, one day Agha
Miggi Ort asked me to help him fill in a school application form, which was in
English and Hindi. On another occasion, I suggested to a young man from a family
that are his devoted followers, that he should ask Agha Miggi Ort to help him in his
representations to a government department in Kargil. He laughed sarcastically
and said "Why? What should he do, say some prayers?"
That young man's family had a patronage relationship with a Sunni family in
Panikhar by which he was a duksmi in their house, and his family provided milaks
for the other household. This kind of arrangement between Sunnis and Shi'ahs
was on the increase at a time when the aghas were finding it more difficult to get
free labour from their followers, and non-clerical Shi'ah houses no longer used
milaks. There was also a growing feeling among Shi'ahs that Sunnis were not
honouring these patronage relationships. One Shi'ah man remarked to me in 1993:
"We have been very helpful to them, but they do not help us". To some extent this
was true, since several of the young Shi'ah men who had been servants (duksm,)
for Sunnis in Panikhar and Prantee, had not been found Government work by their
employers, which had been the understanding on which they had taken the work in
the first place.
Nevertheless, education was not a matter of dispute between the yokma faction
and Sunnis as recently as 1988, when they co-operated to open the short-lived
English-medium Crystal school in Prantee. The main organiser of the school was
Headmaster Guizar, a Sunni from Prantee, who was the Principal of the Boys' High
School there; but Agha Miggi Ort was also enthusiastically involved in the school
and sent one of his sons there. The Crystal school did not last for more than two
years, partly because of the tragic death of Headmaster Gulzar, after which no-one
else was interested in taking over the organisation.
Api Cho-cho, one of Agha Hyder's widows, told me that in the past they had a much larger
household, because of all the duksmi.
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The growing antagonism between the yokma-pa and the Sunnis apparently came to
a head in 1991, when there was an ugly incident in Prantee in which a yokma-pa
woman was allegedly raped by some young Sunni men and the ensuing furore
seems to have left both sides feeling very disgruntled. 36 After that there was a
growing openness in the hostility between the two. For example, in 1993, Sunnis
told me that two years before they had been made to feel unwelcome when they
attended matam at the yokma-pa masjid in Taisuru, and so they no longer went.
This emergent competition was to some extent exacerbated in 1992 by the granting
of Tribal Status to Ladakhis. This status gives advantages in terms of reservation
of government jobs and access to higher education in particular. Due to an
extraordinary decision by the caretaker government of Jammu and Kashmir, the
initial implication of this status was that Sunnis were excluded, since they claim
origin outside Ladakh. However, in Kargil tehsil, most of them have now obtained it
under the Purigi-pa status that is used for the majority of people in the tehsil. In
1993, some Suru Sunnis who were given prestigious Government jobs still did not
have their Tribal Status certificates and yokma faction members were apparently
challenging their appointments in the courts. Thus there was a growing feeling
among the yokma faction that Sunnis were taking things to which they themselves
were rightfully entitled, which was similar to the anti-Sunni discourse among
Buddhists that was prominent in the politics of the Tribal Status demands in Leh
tehsll. The goma-pa, do not seem to have taken the same position in respect of
Sunnis, which is in keeping with their generally less proactive politics.
By the early 1 990s, Sunnis had also entirely stopped intermarrying with Shi'ahs in
the Block. Marriages between them had been relatively infrequent in the decades
before, but had been common in the past. This change had occurred because
Sunnis had recently started to claim a degree of social superiority over Shi'ahs.
However, whether it had this effect is a moot point, since correspondingly, they felt
that they could no longer ask for Shi'ah women, as they were bound to be refused,
since Shi'ahs were starting to resist the attempts by some Sunnis to turn them into
36 I know very little about what happened, but I have heard that some of the young men were
arrested and beaten by the police.
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inferiors. At the same time, Sunnis were increasingly differentiating themselves
from Shi'ahs in other ways, particularly in claiming to be more educated and
modern.
However, this was by no means a fait accompli in the eyes of the Shi'ah majority,
who were becoming increasingly uncomfortable with the situaton. Another factor
was that the yokma faction had fragmented a bit since the death of Agha Hyder in
1988, and apparently could no longer count on all of its previous following. So its
leadership were also having to look for new ways to retain their power among their
followers. This is the context in which the leaders of the yokma faction decided to
start their own private English-medium school in Suru, as I shall describe in the next
chapter.
(vii) Conclusions
In this chapter I started by describing how the Sunnis in Suru, have moved from
being relatively poor and undifferentiated from Shi'ahs as recently as twenty years
ago, to being an emergent administrative elite in the 1 990s. I identified two main
reasons why this occurred: firstly Sunnis had different kinship practice from Shi'ahs
and consequently were not as closely linked to the land ideologically; secondly, the
leading Sunni family in the area already possessed both secular education and a
connection with the administration, and acted as role models and patrons for other
Sunnis entering this part of the economy.
At the same time, Shi'ahs were not interested in secular education when it was first
introduced as they were more interested in their own Shi'ite world and system of
merit and status, than that of the government. However, some of them did take
unskilled government jobs but, by and large, they seem to have mainly engaged in
agriculture supplemented mainly by labouring, trading and shop-keeping.
I then showed that in the last decade changing economic conditions have meant
that many more Shi'ahs are now seeking government jobs. Since these can only
be gained by possessing secular education, this has caused a corresponding rush
for education at any cost. I then discussed how this tendency has been
exacerbated in Suru and Kargil tehsil, by the rapid introduction of the government
economy, the constant raising of expectations by all political parties and the local
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factors which means that the government is virtually the only employer. By using
the example of the bribing with which most people pass exams, I demonstrated that
most people's desire is not for education per Se, but for the qualifications that they
think will entitle them to a job.
One of the consequences of Sunnis' early and successful move into government
education and jobs, particularly in education itself, is that they have increasingly
been able to obtain services such as free labour from Shi'ahs and are starting to
make claims of social superiority over them. To some extent, they are also
threatening the position of the yokma aghas as patrons of their followers. This has
led to a rift emerging between the Sunnis and the yokma-pa in the early 1 990s,
when they previously had been amicable. The yokma-pa leadership made the
decision to open the school partly as an attempt to challenge the Sunni dominance
in secular education.
As I have emphasised the opening of the school by the yokma faction was partially
a political act, and was interpreted as such by a predominantly Sunni faction, who
almost immediately became actively opposed to its existence, as I shall describe in
the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
The Yokma-pa, the School and the anti-School
Faction
(I) Introduction
The Noon Public School was opened by the yokma-pa in order to address their
disadvantage in respect of education and government jobs and to challenge the
Sunnis' dominance in these areas. In my examination of the management committee
of the school and its internal politics, I shall show that the committee and the pupils of
the school are mainly drawn from a tiny elite in the yokma faction and that the majority
of its members support the school as part of their religious duty to the leading aghas
rather than from any apparent interest in the aims of the school itself. In a description
of the committee's discussions concerning the location of the school, I shall show that
the faction is not monolithic, and that other issues of locality and village are also
extremely important in its politics.
During the two years when I was conducting my fieldwork in Suru, there was a truce
between the yokma and goma-pa, and a conflict had emerged between the Sunnis
and the yokma-pa. This dispute was particularly public around the issue of the Noon
Public School, which the Sunnis boycotted almost from the start. However, it became
increasingly apparent that they were not in a position to challenge the yokma-pa, and
that many Sunnis were ambivalent about the politics of the anti-school faction. It was
also clear that most of the overt disputes around the school were between the elites of
the various factions involved, including members of the administrative elite in Kargil.
When I returned to Suru during the local elections of 1996, I was extremely interested
to find that there had been a number of changes in alliances in the area, and that the
return to democracy had also seen a revival of the split between the yokma and goma
factions. At the same time, the differences between Sunnis and Shi'ahs appeared to
be less in evidence. Generally it was my observation that religious organisation
continued to be important, but religious affiliation as a basis for faction formation was
less so. These political changes that I saw in 1996 led me to revise my initial analysis
of the situation made in 1993/4.
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(ii) The Management Committee and Supporters of the School
By the time that the decision was made to open the school in the spring of 1993,
several members of the Kargil administrative ebte had suggested such a move to
members of the yokma faction without any success. However, in 1993, a pre-emptive
move by Sunnis to set up a rival school was feared, which might thwart the leading
Shi'ahs wish to have a local school that was under their political control. The yokma-
pa elite also wanted their children to become qualified for jobs in the higher echelons
of the government administration, but did not want to have to send their children away
from Suru, so that they would lose their existing culture and traditions. There is a
strong historical association in India between English-medium private education and
the senior administrative jobs (Drury 1993:24). As I have suggested, possession of
such jobs gives access to membership of the administrative elite in Kargil tehsil.
However, it is important to stress that this was only the ambition of a tiny minority in
the yokma-pa, and I do not even think of the Whole of the management committee.
A further incentive came from outside the area. In the winter of 1992/3, when Agha
Miggi Ort was in Delhi, he had met with Zaidi, an Iranian Shi'ah, who is a travel agent
in Delhi. He had developed a plan to build a large school in the Suru area of Kargil
tehsil, and was keen to put his idea into practice. It appeared at the time that he
would be able to raise large amounts of money for the project. He was asking for
money from western development organisations, such as Oxfam, although nothing
came of this. His interest and enthusiasm encouraged Agha Miggi Oil to go back and
form a committee to open the school, as he gave people in the yokma faction a sense
that they were being supported by the wider Shi'ite world which is an important frame
of reference for them.
Consequently, a management committee was set up, chaired by Munshi Khadim, the
Block Development Officer (BDO) for Suru Block. Agha Miggi Ort, Agha Baqir, and
Mahi-ud-din, the Headmaster of the Boys' High School in Prantee (a Sunni from
Prantee) were leading members, supported by two more Sunnis, 11 members of the
yokma faction, and one goma-pa. 1 At the initizd meeting, where various pledges of
money were made, it was decided to open the school in early June in an abandoned
1 The District Commissioner and Chief Education Officer were made the honorary chair and
vice chair of the committee.
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government school building in Taisuru. Initially it was to have a nursery and two
kindergarten classes, as it did not yet have permission for higher classes. Later, the
Sunnis withdrew their support for the school, leaving a management committee
consisting of the yokma-pa members, one goma-pa and the BDO. Apart from the
leading aghas these men came from a small group of Shi'ahs who had become
successful in the new economy. Six of them have at least 8th class educational
qualifications and five have government jobs of a reasonable status, such as teacher,
junior engineer and store-keeper (that is the people who manage and sell the rations
such as rice, sugar and kerosene). The remaining six have lower levels of secular
education, but are nearly all contractors for government work which can be a very
lucrative business. The majority of them are hajjis and are politically close to the
aghas; and they also have a good understanding of the government system.
From this group the leading donors of money to the school are the family of Ghulam
Hyder in Choskore, who is a successful contractor (see Chapter 4). The other most
influential figure is Hajji Ghulam Mohammed from Trangole, who is a Junior Engineer
with the Public Works Department. He is the son by a previous marriage of Api Cho-
cho, the most active of Agha Hyder's widows, hence he is part of the inner circle of the
Agha Hyder's family and the yokma faction. He works for Munshi Khadim, the BDO,
who is the nephew of Munshi Habibullah, the leading political figure in Kargil, and ex-
minister in the Jammu and Kashmir state government. This family form the core of
what I term the administrative elite in Kargil (see Chapter 6). Munshi Khadim's
presence on the management committee of the school reflects a long association
between his family and the yokma faction, since Agha Hyder and Munshi Habibullah
had been very close politically for some decades.
In addition to these members the yokma-pa akhun family from Sangra were also
involved in the school. Qamer Ali, one of the brothers, studied at Aligarh Muslim
University in the plains, but gave up his studies in the late 1 980s, and was elected as
the MLA for Kargil tehsil, with the support of the yokma faction among others. In
1993/4, after democratic politics had been suspended in the State in 1990, he still had
an important political role at both the local and State level, like other previously elected
representatives. In 1996 he unsuccessfully stood as the MP for Ladakh district, but
later in the year he was elected as the MLA for Kargil again. Qamer Ali himself is not
on the management committee, but plays a key role in supporting the school's case in
Kargil and with the State-level authorities at Jammu. His brother, Dr. Jaffar, was the
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first man from Suru Block to qualify as a doctor. From 1994 to 1996 he was posted at
the Primary Health Centre at Panikhar, and became the Secretary of the Noon Public
School during this period. He is married to one of Munshi Habibullah's nieces, and
their sister Latifa is married to a member of Munshi Habibullah's p'ha-spun. They
were the only yokma-pa family to have marriage links with the Kargil administrative
elite. Dr. Jaffar is also a founder member of the Kargil Youth Voluntary Forum
(KYVF), which is a social welfare and cultural organisation set up by a group of young
Shi'ah men from the Kargil administrative elite.
The number of people from the yokma faction who are actively involved is very small
as compared with the thousands of yokma faction members in the block. The main
supporters, management committee members and parents for the school were less
than thirty in number in 1993, and several of these families are certainly not very well
off. The actual roll of the school is also tiny compared with the several hundred young
yokma children who could attend as they live in walking distance of Taisuru. 2 Even by
1996 the numbers in the school had only increased to sixty, of whom seven were
orphans with free places. Obviously a significant proportion of yokma-pa supporters
could not afford to send a child to the school, but for many it was simply not a priority.
In the first year it had eighteen pupils, of whom only one was a girl. In 1994 there
were thirty-five, of whom five were girls, three of whom and four boys had free places;
by 1996 there were sixty, with only seven girls, two goma-pa and two Sunni children (a
brother and sister from Prantee). These statistics raise the question of what meaning
the school has for ordinary members of the yokma faction, and also why some of the
parents did send their children to the school.
When the school was opened the yokma aghas used their influence with the faction
members to get them to give children to the school and to donate money. The notion
of giving to the school was clearly seen by most people as being in the same category
as religious donations that they periodically make at the aghas' request for special
expenses such as for religious ceremonies and buildings (see Chapter 2). The yokma-
pa aghas can raise sums as high as Rs. 100,000 from their followers, as every
2	 are in excess of 3,000 yokma-pa in the Block, of whom over a thousand are in villages
that are within realistic walking distance from the school, hence there must be at least two
hundred children in this age group.
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household in their following will donate a small sum at their request. However, in the
case of the school, they asked for individual voluntary donations. Most of the initial
funds came from a few members of the management committee, and the parents of
the first set of children also each gave Rs. 5,000, which is meant to be returned at
some point in the future. 3 Wealthier yokma-pa households with no child to give to the
school were also persuaded to make donations of several hundred rupees.
Of the original eighteen families putting children in the school, most had above
average incomes for Shi'ahs and could easily afford the donation and the one hundred
rupees monthly fees. However, there were three families who were not at all well off.
One was that of Husain from Panikhar. Due to a division of the pha -spun's land and
animals a few years ago they did not have sufficient land and animals to support the
household that consists of Husain, his wife Sakina, their daughter and three sons. He
also had a job as an unskilled assistant in the Animal Husbandry Department, and
their eldest son was a 9th class pass and worked as a duksmifor the neighbouring
Sunni house (see Chapter 4). Both Sakina and their daughter aged sixteen have
never been to school and spend their time doing farm and housework. Another son
was studying in 8th class at the Boys' High School in Prantee, and the second
youngest was placed in the school.
Although they were clearly not in a position to easily afford the fees at the school, their
enthusiasm for it was partly because they are from Panikhar, where most families
have at least one person with a government job and place an above average
emphasis on educational qualifications, and partly because they are particularly close
socially to the aghas in Taisuru and their families, and enthusiastically follow their
leadership. However, Husain did not take any part in the management of the school,
or discussions about it, as he is not in the inner circle of the more influential yokma-pa
members.
A number of the parents who have children at the school took a good deal of
persuading before they agreed to give a child. It is clear that in the end what
persuaded them was the wish to please the agha, which was construed as a pious act.
3 An initial entry fee is payable at all the private schools in the area, and is usua ly about Rs.
1,000. In this case it was higher and returnable (theoretically) as it was seen as being the start-
up capital for the school.
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One of the parents from Yuljuk - which is about an hour's walk from the school - said
that the fees were difficult for him to pay as he is only a coolie (day labourer) and that
he had had doubts about the distance that his son had to walk to school. He said that
he is close to Agha Miggi Ort, who sometimes visits their house, and who kept trying
to persuade him to give his son to the school, so that eventually he agreed. He was
clearly not sure about his decision, but he was the only parent who expressed such a
doubt. The goma-pa did not boycott the school, but only two goma-pa children had
been sent by 1994. These are both from prominent akhun and shaikh families, one of
whom is the cousin of Qamer Ali and Dr. Jaffar. The main reason why hardly any
goma-pa sent children, was that without the encouragement of their aghas, there was
not sufficient incentive, as for them it could not be construed as a religious donation.
Sunnis, who did see a point in English-medium education, effectively boycotted the
school (see below).
Nevertheless, many yokma-pa members could not afford to send their children to the
school, even in the second year when the initial donation was reduced from Rs. 5,000
to Rs 3,000. But many others could not see any point in sending their children to an
English-medium private school when they did not see themselves as having the
means or contacts to help their children into while collar jobs. In stark contrast, when
a branch of the school opened in Sankhoo in 1996, it immediately attracted around
sixty fee-paying pupils.4 This difference is to do with the fact that Sankhoo is the main
administrative centre for the whole Suru valley, and therefore there are many
government employees, either from there or with lodgings in Sankhoo, and there is a
larger population within walking distance of Sankhoo, and a better bus service in that
area. Therefore, there is a much larger pool of families with a steady cash income
from government employment and a greater interest in getting their children higher
level educational qualifications.
(iii) Management Committee Meetings and the Yokma-pa Leadership
In this section I shall look at some of the discussions within the management
committee about the location of the school, in order to show how politics are
conducted among the leadership of the faction. The school had originally been
located in Taisuru both because it was the most satisfactory location for the yokma-pa
' In 1996, this school was temporarily housed in Agha Hyder's astana in Sankhoo, but a
permanent site was already under construction.
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aghas and ensured that the school was very much an extension of the faction, and
also because there was an empty government school available. However, the building
was very small and basic and only temporarily available. It was therefore planned to
build a permanent school after one or two years.
Initially three possible locations were suggested. The first was to use a school
building and adjacent land in Prantee near the Boys' High School. Most Sunnis and
Shi'ahs in Panikhar and Prantee supported this, but it was unpopular with some of the
yokma-pa leaders who saw Prantee and Panikhar as being predominantly Sunni. The
second proposal was to use an uncultivated piece of land called Choskore Thang, on
the roadside about a mile above Panikhar. This was the most convenient and
cheapest of the sites available and that favoured by the BDO. The third option was to
build on some land near the school's current location in Taisuru, a solution favoured
by the two leading aghas and many parents in the locality. In fact, for several years
the yokma-pa leaders had been campaigning to have the Block headquarters moved
from Panikhar to Taisuru, but the DC had recently refused such an idea.
When the location was discussed in committee in the spring of 1994, the first option
had been completely ruled out by the aghas, and was not even mentioned. The
meeting took place in a large guest room in Agha Baqir's house. The floor of the room
was carpeted, and the two aghas, and the BDO sat at one side of the room, forming
the main focus of the group, and myself and the other teacher who was a Kashmiri
Pandit, sat to their right and were flanked by three of the most important hajjis. In all
there were about twenty people present. During the discussion, the main protagonists
were Agha Baqir - for Taisuru, and Hajji Ghulam Mohammed - for Choskore Thang.
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Picture 5.2 - The Management Committee meeting at the Oak Bungalow
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Picture 5.4 - The visit of the KYVF to the school in 1994
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Picture 5.5 — The children eating dinner during the KYVF visit to the school
Picture 5.6 — The Middle School in Kargee in 1993
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They did most of the talking, arguing very heatedly and sometimes shouting at each
other, with occasional interjections from other people. Hajji Ghulam Mohammed, could
argue this strongly with Agha Baqir as he is from the inner circle of their family, but
other yokma-pa members never did so at any of the meetings. A few days before, an
ordinary woman had argued heatedly with Agha Miggi Ort while he was trying to settle
a land dispute, and everyone was commenting on how shameful it was to argue so
openly with the agha, not that she was a woman and did so. Both Agha Miggi Ort and
the BDO said little, except when the latter intervened to calm people down. Most other
people did not contribute to the discussion, and in general only a few of the members
said much at the meetings.
Finally, it was agreed to build the school at Taisuru, on land that was mainly to be
donated by the aghas. At the end of the discussion, people turned to Agha Miggi Ort
and asked him for his agreement which was given. A document was then drawn up
and signed by both aghas and some witnesses, saying that they each intended to
donate land for the construction. Two other members, one from Taisuru and one from
Namsuru, offered to donate money for additional land as they also wanted the school
to be in Taisuru, because they had small children for whom Choskore Thang would be
a long walk.
By the early autumn, Agha Baqir had withdrawn his offer of land, and seemed to be
losing interest in the school, so that no action had been taken to start building. Later,
in the summer, at an open day for parents, to which each of the families with children
in the school had sent a male representative, Hajji Ghulam Mohammed raised again
the question of building at Choskore Thang. We all sat in a circle on the ground
outside the Dak Bungalow for the discussion. He reiterated his support for the
Choskore Thang site, and although Agha Baqir did oppose it, he was not nearly so
vehement this time. The two parents who had offered additional land in Taisuru
objected more strongly to Choskore Thang, but they were in a minority. It was finally
conclusively agreed to start building the school there the next spring. In fact the
construction started in the summer of 1996, and it was due to be completed in 1997.
At this meeting several of the parents, who are not on the management committee
prepared food for everyone, which they served after the discussion. They were all
present while the subject of the site was being debated, but none of them contributed.
It was normal in any such discussion, that only a few prominent people would presume
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to venture an opinion. Agha Miggi Ort often says little at these discussions both
because part of his authority lies in his ability to stand back and act with a degree of
gravitas. Also, people already know what he thinks and ultimately he has the final
word on such things. As with any organisation, much of the discussion does not take
place within the management committee itself, but occurs on an ad hoc basis, in other
contexts. If I discussed a school matter with another management committee
member, and we agreed that something needed to be done, they wou'd often say
something like: "Go and speak to Agha Sahib (Agha Miggi Ort) about it, and if he
agrees to it then we can do it", or simply "The Agha must decide." In which case, I
would then informally speak to him about something when I was visiting their house.
At the same time, Agha Miggi Ort's leadership is built on the voluntary support of his
followers, and therefore he does have to listen to their opinions, particularly those of
the more powerful supporters such as Hajji Ghulam Mohammed. In the case of the
location of the school, he won the argument, because Agha Miggi Ort had come to
see that the Taisuru site was impractical, particularly without Agha Baqir's land and
that the school could be built at Choskore Thang.
This example shows that the yokma faction itself is by no means monolithic. The
members have a number of other cross-cutting ties, as well as a sense of community
within the yokma-pa and allegiance to the leading aghas. For example, the disputes
within the management committee and between them and the Sunnis, over the issue
of the location of the school, were in part fuelled by the normal inter-village rivalry that
exists in Suru.
Another interesting aspect that this example highlights is the difference in vision of the
school between two main groups in the management committee of the agha-pa and
those who were usually referred to in meetings as the hajji-pa - particularly Hajji
Ghulam Mohammed and Ghulam Hyder. In general terms the former saw the school
as being merely an instrument for gaining secular education, but the latter saw the
school as to some extent transforming their children into modern people. This came
out in the two locations of the school, since the Taisuru site was seen as creating a
school that was an extension of the faction, and located close to the aghas
themselves; whereas the Choskore Thang site was a completely new place, that was
unconnected with the pre-existing centre of the faction. I shall return to this topic in
Chapter 7 when I examine further aspects of the organisation of the school.
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(iv) The Truce Between the Yokma and Goma Factions
By the early 1 990s the relations between the yokma-pa and goma-pa were not nearly
as hostile as they had been in the past, but intermarriage between them hardly ever
occurred, and they remained politically divided (see Chapter 3). However, the
occasion for a more significant truce between them came in the winter of 1993/4 over
the issue of the treatment of Suru Block by the administration in Kargil.
In common with other Blocks in the tehsi!, Suru Block has a single Primary Health
Centre (PHC - locally known as the Hospital), with a single doctor who is called the
Block Medical Officer (BMO). They have under them a number of Medical Assistants
and other paramedics, some of whom work at the Hospital and others at Medical Aid
Centres which are located in a number of villages in the Block. In the autumn of 1993,
the doctor at Panikhar was transferred to Kargil at the end of his two year posting and
was not replaced, although there were doctors available at Kargil. Panikhar is a very
unpopular posting, due to its relative remoteness and the fact that the road is cut off
for several months of the winter. In addition there are fewer opportunities for
supplementary private practice than in Kargil. When the Suru post became vacant, all
the newly qualified doctors in Kargil managed to use family influence with the
administration to avoid being posted there, with the result that Suru was left for the
winter without a doctor. Luckily, the weather was relatively mild that year and so the
road remained open until late January. However by February, snow had closed the
road, necessitating a five-hour walk to Sankhoo and then a bus ride to reach Kargil. In
emergencies a helicopter could be sent from Srinagar to fly patients to a hospital at
Srinagar or Kargil itself.
In February two Shi'ahs in Suru became seriously ill at the same time. One was a
woman from Pursa who needed a caesarean operation, and the other was Ali the
manager of the hotel in Pan ikhar who was suffering from appendicitis. The Medical
Assistants called for a helicopter to take them both to Kargil, but it took two days to
arrive, by which time the woman had died. A large group of Shi'ahs rioted, smashing
windows in most of the government buildings in Panikhar and Taisuru - including those
of the Noon Public School. During the riot, they clashed with the two policemen at the
police post at Taisuru, one of whom was beaten up. The government reacted quickly,
extra police were sent in and four men were arrested, one each from Pursa and
Namsuru, and two from Taisuru. By coincidence, since the demonstrators had been
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from both factions, all of them were goma-pa. They faced charges which could lead to
imprisonment, and two who were government employees faced dismissal if convicted.
In order to avert this, the leaders of the two factions met together, and agreed to
campaign jointly to defend the arrested men.
After the riot, the government sent Dr. Jaffar to Suru Block to investigate the
complaints about the medical service. At that time, he was the Block Medical Officer
in Sankhoo. He wrote a report saying that the Block urgently needed a doctor, but he
found that in addition some of the medical staff were not carrying out their duties
properly. This latter part was to lead to further trouble later in the year, since the
medical workers he particularly criticised were Sunnis. For a few weeks a senior
doctor from Kargil was sent to Suru, but he shortly returned to Kargil. 5
 Later one of
the newly qualified doctors stayed in Suru for a few weeks. After that Dr. Jaffar was
temporarily given both Blocks to deal with, but was persuaded by the yokma-pa aghas
to agree to a posting to Suru Block for two years. The yokma-pa aghas and Qamer
Au were heavily involved in negotiations with the administration, and in April, Agha
Baqir returned from Kargil with a copy of an order posting Dr. Jaffar to Suru Block.
When the old doctor had been transferred the previous autumn, the medical
authorities had kept the Panikhar Hospital jeep in Kargil, and had refused to send it
back until a new doctor was posted in Panikhar. That had left the whole Block without
any transport except for the Kargil bus, which only runs once a day in the autumn and
early winter. Some of the Sunni Medical Assistants were very frustrated by this, as
they have no illusions about the lack of services for everyone in the Block.
Nevertheless, most Sunnis would not publicly take common cause with the Shi'ahs
over this issue. In fact, some of the Sunni leaders criticised the Shi'ahs for having
rioted, and used it as further evidence that they were lawless and needed keeping
under control. The administration seemed to take the same attitude, since the police
presence at Taisuru was increased by the addition of an officer in the spring of 1994.
The desire of many Sunnis to distance themselves from the Shi'ahs' actions, despite
the fact that they too suffered from the lack of a doctor and a hospital jeep, shows
their keenness to establish themselves as a separate group, and perhaps to show that
He is a Sunni from Leh, and he was sent because he does not have much influence in Kargil
and so could not avoid the posting.
180
they were intrinsically more responsible and co-operative with the administration than
Shi'ahs.
So, in 1993/4 as relations between the two Shi'ite factions improved they were
deteriorating between the yokma-pa and the Sunnis, particularly over the issue of the
Noon Public School.
(v) The Sunnis and the Anti-School Faction
Despite the fact that the Sunnis in Suru are largely a community of equal households,
they do have some laymen who are considered as leaders. In Kargil tehsil as a whole
the leader is Kazim Sahib, who is now retired and divides his time between Sankhoo
and Kargil. He occasionally visits Panikhar, when many Sunni men will come and visit
him to discuss politics. In Panikhar/Prantee, there are two local leaders. The first is
Ghulam Rassool, from Panikhar, who is a relatively wealthy contractor, with a brother
who is a Senior Engineer with a house in Kargil. Another works in the Tourist
Department and is the highest ranked Ladakhi officer in the Jammu and Kashmir
administration. The other leader is Hajji Mirza, also from Panikhar, who was a yokma-
pa until recently, but is now extremely opposed to their leadership and is an active
Congress supporter. However, Fatima, his wife who tragically died in the winter of
1993, continued to be an active and highly respected yokma-pa, and regularly
attended their matams in Taisuru. Although he is still a Shi'ah, Sunnis refer to Hajji
Mirza as being one of their leaders.
In 1993/4 these two men led a faction that was explicitly against the Noon Public
School. Some Sunnis saw the setting up of the school as being a challenge to their
traditional authority in respect of secular education. Apparently at an initial planning
meeting for the school, the Sunnis who attended felt that their opinions were not
respected, but they co-operated with the school until the day of the opening ceremony.
This was a large affair, held at the Dak Bungalow in June 1993, and attended by the
DC, some army top brass from Kargil, and all the yokma-pa aghas from both Blocks.
Apparently the day started badly because Hajji Mirza from the anti-school faction took
the opportunity to complain publicly to the DC about the actions of the BDO in the
Block. This was clearly designed to cause maximum embarrassment for the
management of the school, since Munshi Khadim is on the committee. Later in the
day one of the other Sunni leaders took offence at something and returned to
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Panikhar before the end of the ceremony. After that all of the Sunnis stopped taking
part in the management committee and did not enrol any children in the school. I had
not yet arrived in Suru at this time, and I received different accounts of wtat happened
from each side, but the events of that day seem to have been an open expression of
the rift between a predominantly Sunni faction and the yokma faction wh ch had been
brought out into the open by the founding of the school.
The anti-school faction remained fiercely opposed to the school, and appeared to be
telling people not to send their children there. They told me that the organisers of the
school had never really wanted to have Sunnis involved and had insulted them on the
opening day. They also claimed that the Shi'ah leadership were mainly uneducated in
the government system, and would never be able to run the schodl successfully,
whereas Sunnis understood about secular education.
However, I joined the school in August 1993, and during my time in Suru, a number of
Sunni women teachers told me that they would like to send their children to the school.
In fact, the mother from the Kakpuri house in Panikhar where we were staying in 1993
used to send her young daughter with us regularly, although she was never registered
in the school, and her mother stopped sending her in 1994. These women did not
seem to be particularly interested in the anti-school politics, which were always a
predominantly male phenomenon. However, it seemed that no one wanted to be the
first to break ranks and send a child to the school, and the women could not make
such a move without the permission of their male relatives. Also, despite the fact that
a number of older Sunnis, including Mahi-ud-din's father, had given donations to the
school, by 1996 only one Sunni family from Prantee had enrolled their children. My
understanding was that many of the Sunnis were not actually against the school, but
were under pressure from their leadership not to send their children there.
In the winter of 1993/4 the school's application for registration went to the State
administration in Jammu, and Qamer Ali, went personally to the education office there
to make sure that the application was accepted. He was told that someone from
Panikhar had already visited the office to try and persuade them not to register the
school. Nevertheless registration was granted, and the school added first year
primary for the new year, starting in March 1994. There were an additional seventeen
children, seven of whom had free places, which were paid for by the BDO, Dr. Jaffar,
the Kargil Youth Voluntary Forum and the Save the Children Fund Project in Kargil
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(the Kargil Development Project). One more goma-pa family also sent a child to the
school, but there were still no Sunni children. Several representations had been made
to the DC asking him to second a government teacher to the school, which was by
then common practice among private schools in the tehsiL An order had been raised
the previous autumn to this effect, but various workers in the education department in
Panikhar had said that there were no spare teachers. Finally, after lobbying by
supporters of the school in Kargil, a yokma-pa teacher from Achambore, was
seconded in the spring of 1994. He was already the school's treasurer, and had been
asked personally by Agha Miggi Oil to come and work there.
Apparently, the most contentious issue for most Sunnis in respect of the Noon Public
School was its location in Taisuru rather than Panikhar/Prantee, the administrative
headquarters for Suru since Dogra times. Over the last few years the yokma faction
had tried to establish Taisuru as the administrative headquarters instead of Panikhar,
although the DC had declined to do this in 1993. However, as a result of their
lobbying, some new government departments such as the Bank and the BDO's office
have been placed in Taisuru, as opposed to Panikhar. Both of the buildings are new-
built, one is owned by Agha Miggi Oil and the other by Agha Baqir, and they receive
rent for them. Understandably, most people in Panikhar and Prantee did not want the
headquarters moved, whether they were Sunnis or Shi'ahs; but for Sunnis the
proposition held a particular threat, since it was partially directed against their power
base in the administration.
Even those Sunnis who otherwise seemed well disposed towards the school would
explain that the location was the main reason for not sending their children. However,
they did not raise the Block headquarters issue, rather they would usually say that it
was too far away, and near dangerous water, so therefore it was not safe to send their
children there, rather than politicise the issue. Once there was even an entirely
groundless rumour in Panikhar that one of the school's children had been swept away
in the river. Since the school is only ten or fifteen minutes walk from Panikhar along
the main road, and therefore the walk there is not really dangerous, it was clear that
moving the centre of power to Taisuru was the real issue.
Despite the decision to locate the new buildings in Choskore Thang, the anti-school
leadership did not change their opinion; on the contrary, their attitudes hardened. So
in the spring of 1994, they decided to set up their own social welfare organisation and
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start a rival school. This was called the Suru Valley Education and Environment Trust
(SVEETS). None of the yokma-pa leaders were invited to join; but most of the Suru
Sunnis, Hajji Mirza's son, and Master Bakhshi, Ghulam Rassool's cousin from Taisuru,
whose family were previously Sunnis but are now goma-pa took part in the
organisation. When important SVEETS meetings were held, some of the Suru Sunnis
who are now usually resident in Kargil also attended. The organisers set up an office
by the road in the Panikhar bazaar. The first scheme implemented was to organise
rubbish bins in the bazaar, since previously rubbish has been thrown into the street.
This scheme was not very effective since the SVEETS members lacked the authority
to persuade people to do what they wanted; moreover many of them were away from
Panikhar most of the time.
By this time the Kargil Youth Voluntary Forum (KYVF), were sponsoring two
'orphaned' (which in Suru means without a father) children at the Noon Public School.
This organisation's members mainly consists of young Shi'ah men from the
administrative elite in Kargil. In response to the emergence of SVEETS, they were
invited to pay a visit to the Noon Public School and to open a branch of their
organisation in Suru. A large function was held at the Dak Bungalow in Taisuru to
welcome the KYVF, and commemorate the school's first year. It was an elaborate
affair that consisted of a number of speeches and displays by the children from the
school. As well as a dozen Kargil Youth Voluntary Forum members, Sunni
representatives from Panikhar and Prantee also attended and the son of Agha Najibul
the goma-pa leader who was on a visit home from his studies in Iran, made a speech
supporting the school.
The next day, there was a meeting in the Kargil Youth Voluntary Forum office in
Panikhar to inaugurate the Suru branch of the organisation. It was attended by some
of the leading Sunnis as well as mainly yokma Shi'ah. An office was found for them
across the road from the SVEETS office in Panikhar bazaar, rather than in Taisuru, so
the signs of the two organisations faced each other across the road. Thus the point
had been made that the school was supported by the Kargil Shi'ah administrative elite.
The rivalry between the school and SVEETS considerably worsened in August when
the latter had its opening ceremony. This was a large event, and was held at the
Tourist Bungalow at Panikhar. The location is significant since the Tourist Bungalow
is historically very much a Sunni location, as it was built under the auspices of Mr.
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Kakpuri, the half brother of Ghulam Rassool, who is now a senior officer in the State
tourism department. For several days before, a teacher from the Higher Secondary
School in Kargil drilled some of the older boys in songs and skits to be presented at
the ceremony. Invitations were sent well in advance to all the senior government
officers in the tehsil and many of the other members of the Kargil administrative elite
were expected to attend. However, the invitations to the local Shi'ahs such as the
aghas and Dr. Jaffar were only given on the morning of the event. Although this is in
accordance with normal custom for invitations to local people, it was disrespectful in
the light of the prior distribution to people in Kargil.
On the morning of the ceremony, the yokma-pa aghas informed the organisers that
there should be no un-Islamic singing and dancing at the event, thereby forcing the
organisers to cut down on the entertainment in order to avoid trouble. Such a ban
fitted in very well with the view of many Kargil clerics, who have discouraged the
singing of secular songs and dancing at weddings and other events in Kargil itself.6
However, I had used English songs, often accompanied by dances, in the everyday
curriculum of the school, and this continued to be actively encouraged by the
management committee as being enjoyable and beneficial to the children.
Apparently the District Development Commissioner (DC) and the Superintendent of
Police (SP) had said that they were coming, but the day before they were warned off
by people in Kargil - presumably yokma-pa members. I met someone connected with
the school in Kargil the day before, who obviously knew that something was going to
happen as he suggested that I should go to Panikhar later in the day to avoid the
event. On the day, the Assistant Commissioner, who is a Shi'ah from Chigtan, came
to represent the administration. Although a reasonable number of people from Kargil
did come there was nothing like the attendance that had been expected, and it was
known that many others had been discouraged from coming. The AC came in a jeep
from Kargil which was stopped on the way by a yokma-pa deputation, including Agha
Baqir. The deputation debated with the AC for two hours and tried to stop him from
attending the event; however, eventually he went on.
6 1 was present in Kargil in 1982 when the showing of a film in the Government cinema hall in
Kargil resulted in a riot and the removal of the DC who had sanctioned it.
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There were two very different accounts of what was said. According to yokma-pa
sources, it was put to the AC that his attendance at what would be a social event
would be contrasted with his lack of interest in their sufferings the previous winter
without a doctor. Further, that SVEETS was a purely Sunni organisation for whose
benefit teachers were taking time off work. These points are valid, but nearly all
teachers in the Block shirk their duty, whether they are Sunnis or Shi'ahs. Similarly,
the problems in the medical service the previous winter had affected everyone, not just
Shi'ahs. However, the yokma-pa deputation were trying to claim that Shi'ahs were the
only ones who suffered from the local difficulties. Ironically their position, was
indirectly supported by the attitude of the more status-conscious Sunni leaders who
tried to avoid casting themselves as being equally disadvantaged, because it
contradicted their claim of elite status and social difference from Shi'ahs.
The complaints of the yokma-pa, had reportedly been delivered in inflammatory
language which caused severe offence to the organisers of the event. They said that
the yokma-pa delegation had called them 'little Militants' (i.e. supporters of the
independence movement in Kashmir), and claimed that they should be thrown out of
the Block. This may be a slight exaggeration, just as the yokma-pa account makes
their input sound more moderate than it actually was; nevertheless in the current
climate to even hint that someone might be a militant is very inflammatory, since
Sunnis are in much greater danger of being falsely connected with militancy because
of their claim to Kashmiri descent.
Some Sunnis were very angry and upset about what had happened and several said
that now it would be impossible for them to relent in their attitude to the Noon Public
School. They maintained that they were the educated people of the Block and merely
wanted to work for the common good, therefore they were very aggrieved at having
their efforts rejected in such a dramatic way. The SVEETS organisers had
experienced considerable loss of face by the disruption of the event, which had also
made public what had previously been a fairly local dispute.
However, I think that many people from both sides thought that things had now gone
too far and nothing would be gained by continuing the dispute. Agha Miggi Ort was
not actively involved in the boycott, and almost certainly felt ambivalent about such a
strong display of opposition to the event; however, he arranged to go to Parkachik on
the day and did not attend the ceremony. I gathered from other people that he was
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not happy with Agha Baqir's confrontational stance towards the Sunnis. I suspect that
Agha Baqir was also attempting to build his own power base within the yokma faction.
I also heard that there was meant to be a boycott of the event by Shi'ahs from
Panikhar and Prantee, but many Shi'ahs - including parents of children in the Noon
Public School - enjoyed the spectacle, without receiving a rebuke from any of the
yokma-pa leaders.
Despite the fact that Sunnis were boycotting the Noon Public School and they
supported the setting-up of SVEETS, many of them were not interested in having a
quarrel with the yokma-pa faction and wanted to maintain the good relations that they
had had in the past. Prominent among these was Shaikh Nabi, a schoolmaster from
Prantee. He comes from a Shaikh family who place a greater than average emphasis
on religion and religious studies and are the equivalent of lay preachers. He is the
only Sunni who continues to attend the Muharram processions as an active
participant.7
In the autumn of 1993, he decided to organise a Koran reading contest in Panikhar at
the Tourist Bungalow. He approached Agha Miggi Ort, Agha Najibul and a Kashmin
Sunni Pir who was posted as a teacher in Panikhar to act as advisors. His desire to
co-operate with Agha Miggi Ort was unusual at that time, since the majority of Sunnis
no longer even visited his house as they had done until the early 1 990s. None of the
local Sunnis would help in the preparations, because it was organised with the yokma-
pa. But Agha Miggi Ort, and the Tourist Officers from Kargil together with the
headmaster of the Girls' High School, all of whom are Sunnis from other parts of the
tehsi!, were all very helpful. On the day about twenty people came to read the Koran
in the competition, including several relatives of Shaikh Nabi. 8 The winner was a man
from Pharona (a village in Sankhoo Block). Au Agha, Agha Miggi Ort's middle son
was second, and a Sunni from Wardwan was third. Shaikh Nabi told me that, on the
day, quite a large number of Panikhar and Prantee Sunnis turned up to watch,
although only his relatives participated in the contest itself.
7Others do attend as part of their duty for the medical department.
8Master Nabi told me that there are only about ten good Koran readers in Suru Block, but many
more know the basics.
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By and large, Sunnis did not support the overtly hostile stand taken by the anti-school
faction, as the reaction of many of the Panikhar Sunnis to the refurbishment of their
masjid in 1994 suggested. In 1992 the Sunnis had built a large new masjid in Prantee.
This coincided with the period when the split between the Sunnis and the yokma-pa
became more public, and Sunnis were made rather unwelcome at Shi'ah religious
ceremonies. Therefore it partly represented the Sunnis' move to stress their identity
as a different and equally legitimate religious group; whereas, in the 1 970s, when the
two factions had built their masjidsñmam-barahs in Taisuru, they had obviously not felt
the need to have such a prominent monument. The Prantee masjid was built with
donations from every Sunni household in Panikhar and Prantee. Apparently, each
one of them had given the equivalent of two and a half months' wages to the project
(about Rs. 5,000). The fact that the amount given was defined as wages for
government jobs is extremely significant, expressing as it does the extent to which
Sunnis associated being Sunni with government employment by that time.
The project of rebuilding the Sunni masjid in Panikhar started in 1993 and was
instigated by the Panikhar Sunnis involved in the anti-school faction. The masjid was
to have its own hot water system for ablutions prior to prayers (nimaz), and a septic
tank. These amenities were particularly emphasised by several people, I believe
because they were seen as being symbols of modernity expressed though the masjid.
Although the rebuilding went ahead in 1994, about half of the Panikhar Sunnis refused
to donate to it, mainly the poorer and less politically active households who apparently
thought that the project was unnecessary and very expensive. Although no one
voiced this opinion, I suspect that they were rejecting the anti-yokma-pa politics.
A little earlier in the summer, I had been told by a number of Panikhar people that
Ghulam Rassool's brother, who is a senior government engineer living in Kargit, had
been advising people to send their children to the Noon Public School. Apparently he
also took his brother-in-law Mahi-ud-din to task and said that there had been no
reason for him to resign from the management committee of the school. He
suggested that it would have been better for them to stay with the school and to work
to improve it. It is not surprising that he should advocate a more moderate approach
to the issue of the school, since as a result of conversion to Shi'ism by a number of
eFte families, there is now only a small number of Sunnis in Kargil and they are a
minority in the administrative elite there, to which most of them belong. So it is not in
their interests to become severely aFenated from the Shi'ahs.
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Later in 1994 there was another occurrence that revealed the tenuous nature of the
authority of the Sunnis in Suru itself. The occasion was a demonstration by students
from the Middle School in Kargee, near Taisuru. I was told by Agha Miggi Ort's son,
Agha Abbas, an 8th class student in the school at the time, that the students often had
to organise morning prayers as none of the teachers had arrived. The women
teachers in particular always arrived after prayers in the morning (which are at about
10 a.m. when the school day begins). Women teachers often left at midday and the
men, who were mostly from Kashmir, were frequently absent on permitted home
leave.
On the day in question, all the non-local teachers were visiting their homes, and the
women teachers (all of whom were Sunnis from Panikhar and Prantee) arrived very
late. This was the last straw for the students, so they marched to the police post in
Taisuru to complain. Meanwhile, the women teachers all fled home. The officer in
charge of the police post returned with the students to the school, and having checked
that what they said was true, he used the radio to inform the DC and Chief Education
Officer (CEO) in Kargil about what was going on. The Zonal Education Officer, who is
in charge of government education in the Block , was on one of his periodic visits from
Kargil. So the next day, he went to teach at the school himself. Within a short while
all the women teachers had been posted to other schools in Panikhar and Prantee,
and were replaced by male Shi'ah teachers.
In this case again, the criticism of the teachers was made into a Sunni-Shi'ah issue,
when in fact it was not so straightforward. At that time all of the women teachers in
the Block were local and all but two of them were Sunnis. It was common practice for
them only to attend school in the morning and to take lots of time off, because many of
them have small children and virtually all of them have farming and household work to
do at home. Nevertheless, the fact that female Sunni teachers were replaced by male
Shi'ahs made it seem that the issue was Sunni women neglecting their Shi'ah pupils.
In fact, the majority of teachers in the Block are very lax about their attendance at
school, including the male Shi'ahs. Women teachers were probably the target of this
protest, merely because they exert less authority over students than male teachers
and the students would not have demonstrated if the male teachers had been present.
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These examples show that a significant proportion of Sunnis did not support all the
activities of the anti-school faction but were interested in retaining or restoring the
good relations that they had had in the past with the yokma faction and their
leadership. The Sunni leadership did not have the authority to persuade all the other
Sunnis to follow their point of view, so although most Sunnis boycotted the school,
partly because of its position in Taisuru, many of them were not interested in engaging
in an open dispute with the yokma-pa. At the same time, the Sunni claim to higher
status had been relatively successful in the 1 980s when Shi'ahs had not competed
with them over the government economy, but had by the early 1 990s become
somewhat flimsy and easily challengeable by the Shi'ah majority. Moreover, the
unrest in Kashmir had led central government to falsely associate Ladakhi Sunnis with
militancy.
When I left Suru in the winter of 1994/5, the most prominent politics in the area had
shifted from a conflict between the yokma and goma factions to one between the
predominantly yokma-pa pro-school faction and the predominantly Sunni anti-school
one. Thus factions seemed to be forming around the issue of common religious
affiliation. However, as Qamer Au pointed out in 1994, the issue was not primarily
religious but resulted from the suspension of democratic politics. Thus, an abnormal
situation encouraged people to retreat into religious division. This had also occurred
in Leh tehsil, where during the period of suspension of politics in the state, the major
political divide had continued to be between Buddhists and Muslims, although the anti-
Muslim boycott by Buddhists had ended in 1989. The truth of what he said was borne
out in the elections of 1996 in which he played a major part.
(vi) The 1996 Elections
Democratic politics in Jammu and Kashmir had been suspended in 1990 and the last
elections had been in 1989. In 1996, in an attempt to end the unrest, the central
government decided to end Governor's rule of Jammu and Kashmir and to hold
elections there again. The parliamentary elections were held first in the spring and
were boycotted by the National Conference and alt the specifically Kashmin parties,
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with the result that Congress(l) won five of the six seats. 9 In Ladakh, Qamer Au, the
ex-MLA from the yokma faction and brother of Dr. Jaffar, stood as an independent,
although his normal party is National Conference. The other main candidate was P.
Namgyal a Leh Buddhist who stood for Congress(l). This pattern of a Buddhist
Congress(l) candidate standing from Leh side, and a National Conference Muslim
from Kargil side has been standard for parliamentary elections for several decades in
Ladakh, the only exception being the 1989 election when most Muslims backed
Commander Hassan who was the anti-boycott candidate.
In 1996, as usual, the Congress(l) candidate won by a few thousand votes. It seems
that both in Kargil and Leh tehsils voting patterns in the parliamentary elections
returned much to what they had been before the suspension of democratic politics in
the State, which is that the majority of Buddhists vote for the Congress(l) candidate
who is always a Buddhist and the majority of Muslims vote for the National Conference
candidate who is a Muslim, but at the same time, a sizeable minority of Muslims in
Kargil tehsil vote for the Congress(I) candidate. However, one important shift in the
politics of Kargil tehsil was that Munshi Habibullah and his family supported the
Congress(l) candidate, whereas previously they had been political allies of Qamer Ali.
In Suru itself the goma-pa allegedly voted en masse for Congress(l), and thus
returned to their usual political opposition to the yokma-pa. One of Qamer Ali's
campaign supporters from Kargil told me that they were surprised by this, as they
thought that the yokma-goma-pa rift had ended; apparently most Muslims in the
tehsil had promised to vote for Qamer Ali.
I was lucky enough to visit Ladakh in August 1996, during the campaigning for the
elections to the Legislative Assembly (MLA), two of whom are elected for each tehsil in
Ladakh. By then the National Conference had decided to fight the election. In Kargil
ward, which includes some of the villages in Suru Block, the two candidates were
Qamer Ali standing for National Conference and ex-Superintendent of Police (SP)
Khan standing for Congress(l). He had previously been a National Conference
supporter, but changed his allegiance to Congress(l). In the Suru/Zanskar ward the
National Conference candidate was ex-SP Abbas from Kargil, who himself had
previously been Congress(I). Their two sons were both members of the Kargil Youth
9The National Conference is the party which is local to Jammu and Kashmir State and has
controlled the state government for most of the last few decades.
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Voluntary Forum and had been married on the same day to two sisters who are nieces
of Munshi Habibullah.
The Congress(I) candidate in SurulZanskar was Kacho Mali Khan from Pashkyum
who had previously been a minister in the Jammu and Kashmir government and stood
for Congress. 10 The BJP also put up three candidates in the tehsil, but they are a
minority party in this area. In Kargil some of the most enthusiastic supporters of
Qamer Ali's National Conference candidature were leading Sunnis who are loyal
supporters of National Conference. In Suru the majority of Sunnis had reputedly
supported the Congress(t) candidate for MP, but would always support the National
Conference at the state level. However, Ghulam Rassool and some of the leaders of
the anti-school faction had changed allegiance and were supporting the Congress(l)
candidate, hence there was a split among the Suru Sunnis. The yokma and goma-pa
returned to their normal split of National Conference for the former and Congress(l) for
the latter. In the event National Conference won both of the seats in Kargil tehsil and
each party got a seat in Leh tehsil. In the state as a whole, National Conference
dominated the election, although many people in Kashmir observed the request from
the more radical Kashmiri parties not to vote at all. Qamer Ali, who was re-elected as
the MLA for Kargil, was later appointed as the Minister far Public works in the new
National Conference administration, which is a significant and powerful post.
The candidature and voting patterns in these elections highlight several important
issues, as far as my analysis is concerned. The nature of the changes in political
allegiances that took place once democracy was restored, show that the cancelling of
democratic politics had noticeably increased the emphasis on common religious
affiliation being a basis for faction formation in the area. One example concerns the
Kargil Youth Voluntary Forum, which for the last few years had been supporting
Qamer Ali who they saw as the Shi'ah candidate. However, in 1996 the members
were split in their support of the two parties, which was the cause of a good deal of
acrimony. Similarly, both the Sunnis and Shi'ahs in Suru had been split by religous
differences for the last few years, but now each were internally split into supporters of
the two main political parties and the yokma-pa and the majority of Sunnis supported
the same candidate in the MLA eJections.
10 His grandfather was a Dogra administrator from Kashmir.
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A similar change was seen in Leh that year, where anti-Muslim sentiment among
Buddhists had abated and differential support for the two main parties often followed
factional splits within one religious group, so that party support was not on a religious
basis. For instance a Buddhist National Conference candidate was elected with large
numbers of Buddhist votes.
What these elections showed was that the policies of central government do have an
important effect on politics in Ladakh, albeit not the intended one. It also showed the
benefits of having a slightly longer term perspective on Suru, since the effects of the
withdrawal of democracy which was in effect during the main part of my fieldwork only
became clear in 1996. Another important change was that the appointment of Qamer
Au as a Minister in the Jammu and Kashmir government after the elections in 1996 left
the yokma faction looking less peripheral than they had in 1994.
(vii) Conclusions
In this chapter I first looked at the composition of the management committee and its
internal politics. I showed that only a small minority of yokma-pa are actively involved
in the school and that the majority of them are from the very small number of Shi'ahs
who have successfully entered the new economy. They now have ambitions of their
children obtaining elite administrative jobs, whereas the majority of the yokma-pa
support the school as part of their religious duty and merit-making, but do not send
their children there as they do not expect their children to attain those levels. In my
examination of the discussions over the location of the school, I showed that the
faction is not monolithic in its internal politics and that issues of village and location
remain important to faction members, who are subject to several different cross-
cuffing ties.
In the 1 980s and early 1 990s, there was an emerging divide between a predominantly
Sunni administrative elite and a predominantly Shi'ah peasantry. It seems that Sunnis
wanted to form such an elite in Suru, based on their possession of secular education
and white-collar government jobs. However once Shi'ahs started competing for these
resources and challenging Sunnis' claims to superior social status, it became clear
that the Sunni minority could not easily sustain a claim to superior status. In addition,
many Sunnis did not want to enter into an open dispute with the yokina-pa. Similarly,
although the yokma and goma-pas did find common cause in their protests against
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neglect by the authorities in Kargil, they did not seem to be interested in forming a
permanent alliance over these issues, and have returned to their usual rivalry.
Another important point revealed by this description of the disputes between different
factions in Suru, was the degree to which much of the hostility was between elites,
both in Suru and Kargil. However, in the next chapter, I shall look at marriage
strateges among the emerging Kargil administrative elite and show that in fact many
of their marriages cross cut the different factions that I have identified.
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Chapter 6
Marriage and Weddings
(I) Introduction
In the previous chapter I demonstrated that in 1994, neither the conditions nor the
will existed for the Sunnis to form a distinct administrative elite in Suru. In this
chapter, I shall show that marriage strategies and the enactment of weddings play a
key role in the formation of the urban administrative elite which is forming primarily
in Kargil town and has an urban non-agricultural focus. To illustrate my point, I
shall describe aspects of four of the weddings that I attended in Suru and Kargil in
the autumn of 1994, all of which involved people who are connected with the
politics of the Noon Public School and of education generally, that I described in the
last chapter. I shall demonstrate the role of marriage strategies and the form of
weddings in the emergence of a social division between the administrative elite in
Kargil and the predominantly peasant majority in Suru.
Marriage strategies are very varied and complex in Suru and it is beyond the scope
of this thesis to discuss the subject fully. However, as elsewhere in the region, one
aspect is that they have the effect of creating social distinctions in Suru. I have
already outlined some of the important features of marriage strategies among
sayyids and Sunnis. In this chapter, I shall focus on the marriage strategies of non-
sayyid Shi'ahs. Whereas Bourdieu, who has produced two of the most illuminating
analyses of marriage practice concentrates on the role of marriage strategies in the
reproduction of social prestige (Bourdieu 1990:147-199), I am going to look at the
role of marriage in the production of new social relations and distinctions.
I shall first look at the issue of choice of marriage partners in Suru and its
significance for the formation of social ties. I shall show that families from the upper
echelons of the administration intermarry and therefore the Kargil-centred
administrative elite is also a kinship group. Furthermore, membership of the
administration seems to make such a move possible by offering opportunities for
people to form relations of patronage with other villagers, rather than through
195
marriage. At present aspirant Suru people are shifting their social focus towards
Kargil and are starting to marry into the administrative elite, in the process cutting
across political factions, which peasants rarely do. My concentration on Shi'ah
marriages shows that the new social divisions that are emerging in the area as a
whole are not exclusive to the Sunni-Shi'ah divide and there is a process of elite
formation occurring in the area as a whole that runs counter to affiliations in the
overt politics of the area.
Weddings, which are the major social events of the year, provide an opportunity for
both the expression and creation of prestige. I shall describe parts of the ritual and
style of enactment of a number of weddings that I attended in 1994, in order to
show that there is a significant difference of emphasis between those of ordinary
peasants in Suru and those of people who are in, or aspiring to, the administrative
elite. The weddings of peasants in Suru are more 'local' in style and social
reference, whereas those of the administrative elite have a greater emphasis on the
regional elite and its social style. I conclude that although the administrative elite
that is emerging is primarily urban-centred, it is not necessarily urban in origin,
showing that the processes of elite formation are in large measure generated
locally, rather than being merely imposed from outside.
(ii) Marriage Practice and Stratification in Suru
In the last few decades in Suru, people seem to spent more of their lives married
than before and there is also a corresponding escalation in the value of brideprice
(rintho). These changes seem to be linked to the increasing monetization of the
economy over the same period. The increase in brideprice and desire to obtain a
wife has acted as an additional incentive for young men to seek waged and
therefore cash-generating government jobs in order to finance their marriages. In
1981/2, I did not conduct systematic household surveys, but a significant number of
men reported that they had either never, or only briefly, been married. We
observed that a number of households contained two or more middle-aged
brothers, some of whom were not married (Grist 1993). Further evidence of this
can be seen in the village of Thulus, where the number of households has
increased from ten to sixteen due to division by the current generation of household
heads. Suru people said that in the past the divorce rates were much higher than
they are today and it seems that many marriages were fixed-length mut'a
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contracts, rather than necessarily being permanent. Suru people also linked the
increased permanence of marriage to the fact that brideprice had become so much
higher. Therefore marrying was much more expensive than before and there was
correspondingly greater familial pressure on both partners to remain together.
The legal part of a Shi'ah wedding in Suru is normally enacted months before the
actual wedding by an agha or suitably qualified cleric and is known as sigheh
zercha, which means to read the wedding contract. This contract includes the
setting of a brideprice that will already have been agreed by the p'ha-spuns of the
couple during the marriage negotiations. The current generation of older people
(that is those over fifty) said that when they had got married the rintho had
consisted of goods in kind, such as rolls of snambu (woollen cloth), butter and
barley and had been very modest in the actual value. However, about twenty years
ago, people started giving cash as the main part of the rintho, which apparently
started at a value of about Rs. 1,000, but has now escalated up to a range of about
10,000 to 30,000. The largest payments are reputedly offered by men in Parkachik
who have difficulty attracting brides due to the relative remoteness of the village
and its local reputation for being particularly backward in its customs. Suru people
said that they really do make these payments, although others in Kargil said they
were only paper amounts and all the money is never actually handed over. The
payments are also not so burdensome for most families as a common strategy is to
marry a daughter and then use the rintho received for her, to bring a wife for a son.
The agreement also involves the specification of mahr, which is the payment to be
made to the woman's family in the case of her husband divorcing her under Muslim
law, which at the moment is usually around ten thousand rupees.
Most marriages of non-sayyidShi'ahs are with unrelated partners from a nearby or
the same village. Two thirds of marriages were with non-relatives; of those with
relatives, the majority were with those on the father's side.
197
Figure 6.1 - Origin of non-Sayyid Marriage Partners among Suru Shi'ahs
Surveyed in 1993
Figure 6.2 - Relationships between Marriage Partners among Suru Shi'ahs
Surveyed in 1993
Shi'ah families want a bride who will do farm work and a local woman is used to the
conditions and farming practice in the area. For instance, after a wedding between
a Suru man and a woman from Kargil, one of the grandparents from the school told
me that he thought she was a bad choice as she would not be any use (panche
man) in Suru. He meant that women from Kargil are neither used to farming nor
the conditions in Suru. Another example of this attitude to wives is illustrated by the
history of a woman from Prantee who was married to a man in Thangbu, who I
discussed in Chapter 2. She became epileptic after several years of marriage,
when she had already borne two children. Her husband's p'ha -spun persuaded him
to divorce her since they saw her as a liability who had to be looked after by
another adult some of the time. 3
 The other requirement is that a woman bears
children, and those who do not are often divorced. These women do not usually
remain unmarried as the high mortality and divorce rates in the area mean that
there is a constantly unmet demand for wives.
Among ordinary (am-pa) Shi'ahs, marriages are usually between people from
families of roughly equal social and economic status. Most of them are made on
the basis of the suitability of the individual partner, rather than for alliance
This is either a neighbouring village, or one within an hour's walk.
2 but one of these partners came from Suru or Sankhoo Block, the remaining woman was
a Buddhist from Leh tehsil.
also meant that she lost her two young sons, as she remarried and her husband's
family kept them with them, as they often do.
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formation. Hence partners are sometimes chosen on the basis of mutual attraction.
Nowadays universal marriage is the ideal, and no differentiation is made between
the children, who usually get married in age order. A person's first wedding is
attended with a major celebration, usually lasting several days, but subsequent
ones may be enacted very quietly. For example, if a man who is divorced brings a
new wife, even if she is previously unmarried, they will usually have a very small
wedding.
The first wedding in Suru is the rite of passage into adulthood and what I would call
full citizenship. By this I mean that on a certain level there is no stratification in
Suru, as every household participates as full and equal citizens in the village. This
is expressed in the wedding by the fact that the bride and groom are like a queen
and king for the period of their wedding. From the first day of the wedding, and for
several months afterwards, they are referred to by the titles bag-mo (bride) and
bag-pho (groom), rather than their own names. They are also treated with a great
deal of respect and considered to be auspicious during this period. For instance,
for several weeks after the wedding itself, they will wear new clothes and visit all
their relatives in turn for a dinner. This process is called skyilba (to be stopped on
the way), and they are always given meat and good food.
Similarly, the wedding itseff is also the opportunity for a household to show that it
has full citizen status in the village. It is also extremely common for more than one
wedding to be celebrated at the same time. Three out of five of the weddings that I
attended in 1994 were of this type, and people aim to have joint weddings if
possible. The Sunni weddng that I attended in 1994, was of a brother and sister
from Panikhar, who married a sister and brother from Zanskar, who are their
maternal cousins. The preference for joint weddings seems to be because it
provides an opportunity to express the prosperity and solidarity of the kinship group.
I suspect that this has become even more important now that division is more
common.
As I showed in Chapter 3, the endogamy practised by the lineages of aghas
produces a large and united core for the two factions, and their numerous and
intensive kinship connections within the faction are almost hyper-local. The
marriage alliances of the faction leaders' families are primarily used to consolidate
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the internal structure and solidarity of the faction, rather than in making external
political alliances. Hence their focus in marriage is localised to Suru and the
faction, just as it is for their followers.
Their strong preference for marrying within both the faction and Suru is in marked
contrast to an emerging trend for aspirants to the administrative elite from Suru to
marry into a small group of families in Kargil that centre on the wider clan of Munshi
Habibullah, the ex-Minister and paternal uncle of the BDO. For example in 1994 I
attended a large joint wedding that involved two of Munshi Habibullah's sons, his
sister's daughter, and the son and daughter of one of his p'ha-spun members
among others. This series of marriages (three in all) made up the most elaborate
and prestigious of the weddings that I attended that year, which was not surprising
since the Munshi Habibullah family have been the most politically important family
in Kargil in the last few decades and form the centre of the administrative elite of
the area.
ex-SP Khan
(Congress
MLA candidate)
Qamer Au	 AC (old noble
(MLA)	 family of Purig)
Dr. Jaffar
Munshi
Habibullah's
Clan
ex-SP Abbas
	 Kazim Sahib
(Conference MLA)	 (Sankhoo)
Ahmed Bagh
(Sankhoo)
Figure 6.3 - Some of the Kinship Connections of the Munshi Habibullah
Family
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At the core of their family there are the households of Munshi Habibullah, his
brother Munshi Sadiaq, and Munshi Khadim (the BDO in Suru) who is his dead
brother's son. Until relatively recently, this family were Sunnis and in the previous
generation they intermarried with both Sunnis and Shi'ahs in Kargil and other parts
of the tehsil. So they have affinal links with many of the important families in the
area, which are also used to consolidate their social group. For example, of Munshi
Habibullah's three sisters one is married to Ahmed Bagh from Sankhoo who is the
second Sunni leader behind Kazim Sahib, and their daughter is married to Kazim
Sahib's second son. Her cousin, who is the daughter of another of Munshi
Habibullah's sisters, who married into a Shi'ah family in Kargil, is married to Dr.
Jaffar the doctor in Panikhar. A third sister is married to the Assistant Development
Commissioner from Batalik, who is from one of the few remaining noble families in
Kargil tehsil. Their daughter married Gulzar, Munshi Habibullah's son, at the
wedding in 1994 that I have just mentioned.
They also have many other kinship connections in the area, such as with most of
the members of the Kargil Youth Voluntary Forum, and have relatives in Zanskar.
The creation of these kinds of affinal relations between different areas has long
been a feature both of the elites of the area and of Sunnis (see Chapter 4);
however, what seems to have changed now is that these connections are
increasingly within the administrative elite and focused on Kargil and it is important
for aspirants to the administrative elite to marry into this group. For example one of
the weddings that I shall describe was between Haddi, Hajji Mirza's son from
Panikhar, who is a Junior Engineer, and Nargis, who is the daughter of ex-
Superintendent of Police Abbas, who was elected as National Conference MLA for
Suru and Zanskar in the 1996 elections. After their marriage, a member of the anti-
school faction in Panikhar remarked with satisfaction, "Now we are beginning to get
some good brides.". He meant by this that they were marrying into the Kargil
administrative elite. Later that year, the same person also expressed
dissatisfaction that his relative had married someone from Zanskar rather than
making a more prestigious match with a family that is prominent in the
administrative elite.
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As I have pointed out, this emerging tendency of endogamy within the
administrative elite differs from the practices of the sayyids in Suru, including
leaders, who do practise endogamy, but also appear to use marriage and other
types of kinship link to build and maintain their following of ordinary people. These
relationships are based on patronage rather than equality, but the agha must
constantly create and maintain them, in order to be a leader. Members of the
administrative elite do not feel the need to do the same thing, as white-collar jobs in
the administration give their incumbents an automatic relationship with their
constituency in the general public. In Chapter 4, I showed that teachers have such
a relationship with their pupils, which they can use to get the children to act as
milaks for them. A similar relationship also exists between senior and junior staff.
For instance, one of the teachers in the Noon Public School used to send the peon
(general factotum) to do his shopping in Panikhar.
As I have described, the social circle of the administrative elite is becoming a tehsil-
wide but Kargil centred phenomenon, particularly since most of the families
involved have a house in Kargil, even if their primary home is elsewhere in the
tehsil. Another significant fact is that both in Sum and Kargil there is a sharp divide
between the new administrative elite and the religious elite. There seems to be
virtually no intermarriage between the families of the Shi'ite administrative elite and
those of religious leaders. In Kargil town, I have often heard people refer to Goma
Kargil, which is the village of Kargil above the town, and describe the people there
as being very religious and strict. For example, during the wedding season,
remarks were made about attending weddings in Goma Kargil which were regarded
as being very boring, as no one was allowed to dance or sing anything except
khasidas (hymns of celebration). However, in the marriages of the administrative
elite in Kargil there was plenty of secular dancing, although not everyone approved.
In general, there seems to be a growing social and cultural gap between weddings
of the administrative elite, and those of the majority of peasants in the area. This is
certainly the case in Suru, where there are now two distinct style of weddings.
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(iii) Weddings in Suru
In Kargil and Suru, weddings usually take place in October and November when the
main agricultural work has finished for the year and travelling is still easy, as there
is usually little or no snowfall at this time. People look forward to this season as
there are a number of such celebrations in every village, lots of parties and special
food to eat. In 1993/4, I attended a total of eight weddings, two in Kargil and six in
Suru, four of which involved more than one couple.4 In addition to those I attended
I was aware of numerous other weddings taking place on a daily bas s during the
season. In Kargil in November it was not unusual to see several bridegrooms'
parties in the bazaar in a single day and in the villages around the centre of Suru
Block, there was a wedding every few days.
Weddings normally involve thousands of rupees of expense for the two families,
both of which host various celebrations and dinners. The main part of the wedding
takes place over several days. On the first day the bride and groom are taken for a
dinner, called the bag-gron (bag means 'wedding', and gron means 'dinner'). This
is mainly organised and attended by their friends of the same age and sex. It is
paid for by a collection among those who will attend, some of whom prepare the
food. The party takes place somewhere other than the bride or groom's own home,
or that of their relatives. The participants, most of whom are young and unmarried,
eat a meal (usually of meat and rice) and then sing and dance all evening, during
this the bride or groom sits very quietly looking morose. This party goes on all
night, and the next day, the young people process back to the home of the bride or
groom. That night there is a celebration called sinmo-tse (literally 'the colour of
happiness') in the local language, or mehendi raat (which means 'the henna night'
in Urdu). This consists of a dinner, usually followed by singing and dancing, and
then late at night women bring henna and put it on the hands of the bride and
groom, and possibly the bride's feet as well.
The next morning, is when the dressing of the bride or groom occurs, which is
called the bag-ches. Among Shi'ahs in Suru, the bride is taken to another place,
which can be a relative's house, or in one wedding, it was the imam-barah in
Interestingly this was in stark contrast to my time in Leh, when in two years the only
wedding I attended was in the house where I was living.
203
Namsuru. This place is called the bomoi kangsa, which I understand to mean the
girl's place. This is the last time that she will be referred to as a girl (bomo), women
who are or have been married are called ane. Both the bride and groom are
bathed and dressed in their wedding clothes by their close relatives and friends of
the same sex. 5
 When they are ready, they will be given gifts and money by their
relatives and friends. The groom will then usually depart with his azhang as the
leader of his nyo-pa (groom's party) to fetch his bride. When the nyo-pa arrive at
the bride's house they are greeted by her relatives and gwen a large and varied
meal. Meanwhile she says goodbye to most of her relatives and friends at the
bomoi kangsa, during which she is weeping and lamenting. Finally she is taken
(often carried) to her own home, where she says goodbye to her parents. If one of
them is dead, she is also taken to their grave, where she will weep uncontrollably
over the grave until dragged away.6
She is then taken by her azhang and nene, with her groom's nyo-pa to his house.
On the way, they will usually be stopped several times by villagers, who ask for
money to let them pass, and then give them tea or snacks such as nuts to eat.
When they reach the groom's house, the bride is greeted at the door by women
carrying barley flour (pe), butter (mar), and a sheep, apparently as symbols of the
prosperity of the household which she is entering. She is then taken into the house,
where her feet are washed by one of her husband's sisters. They then lock the
front door of the house before the groom has entered. He then comes to the door
with his azhang, who knocks on the door and asks to be let n. After some
negotiation, the women open the door, and he must give them some money. That
night there is a small dinner for the bride and groom's parties, and the marriage is
consummated.
The next morning, the bride is taken into the kitchen of her new home, and she
makes some bread at their stove. This is a crucial part of the wedding ceremony,
and symbolises that the woman is married. I was told that in the past, when
people said that in the past the bride would be dressed in pleated woollen trousers,
and other garments that were only worn by married women.
6 Aggarwal (1 994:200ff) gives an illuminating account of similar leave taking in Achinatang, a
village between Leh and Kargil.
204
Muslims used to marry Buddhist brides in Zanskar, they would simply bring them to
their house and get them to cook food at the stove, after which they were
considered to be married. Straight after that, the bride and groom start a round of
visiting called Iakpa kruches (literally 'to wash hands'), when they go to the houses
of the groom's p'ha -spun and any other close relatives in the vicinity. These visits
usually last at least two days, and they are given luxurious food such as meat and
butter at every house and treated with a great deal of care and respect. During this
and the following weeks, they will also be invited for dinner at the homes of more
distant relatives. This process is called skyilba, which means to stop someone on
the way. Both the bride and groom are treated as being very auspicious at this time
and they both distribute sweets and such like to everyone they meet. This is called
skyes, which means a gift that does not need to be reciprocated and the bag-mo's
skyes is considered to be particularly auspicious.
After that they both go to the bride's house for a few days, when they go to visit all
her relatives. This visit is called sulum. Finally the groom returns home and the
bride follows with her young female friends and there is usually a lively and informal
party, which is mainly attended by young people, and marks the end of the wedding
ceremonies and her incorporation into the new household.
I am going to leave most of my analysis of the wedding rituals until after I have
described some of the weddings that I attended in 1993/4, as I am going to show
that there are some important differences of nuance. However, my description of
the outline of a wedding highlights one element that is common to all of them,
namely that it is a rite of passage from girl or boyhood into adulthood.
In fact, wedding ritual differs slightly in each part of Suru and there are some major
differences between Kargil and Suru, as (shall show in my account. However, the
main distinction that I wish to draw out is between the weddings of people who are
still primarily involved in the peasant economy of Suru, and those who are members
of, or aspirants to, the Kargil administrative elite.
(iv) Peasant Weddings in Suru
The wedding that was most closely connected to the Noon Public School was that
of Fatima from Achambore, the sister's daughter of Hajji Ghulam Mohammed from
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the school's management committee, who is the elder sister of one of the pupils of
the Noon Public School. She married a young man, who was the only person in
Thulus village to be a 10th class pass at that time. Although they were unrelated,
their families are both yokma-pa, and are part of a small group that are close to the
yokma-pa leadership. Most of these families have some involvement with the Noon
Public School and they are already connected by a number of previous marriages.
I joined the wedding on the second day, when the nyo-pa (bag-pho's party) were
due to arrive to take the bag-mo away. The hand-written Urdu invitation to the bag-
mo's house in Achambore had been brought to me earlier that morning by her
teenage brother. When I arrived, the bag-mo's house was decorated with bunting
and khasidas (religious songs of rejoicing) were being sung by men inside the
house and relayed over a loudspeaker on the exterior wall. Near her house there
was a large decorated ceremonial arch set up with tables and chairs for the nyo-pa.
Outside the house, makeshift shelters had been constructed as temporary kitchens,
and some men were preparing tea and food for everyone. 1
 Inside, a large room
had been prepared for guests, but there were only a handful at that time. Everyone
was saying that they had been up very late the night before because there had
been a really good party with lots of singing and dancing.
If they live in different villages his iiyo-pa usually go on horseback and all his male
relatives, friends and neighbours who have, or can borrow, a horse join the party.
Every house likes to have a horse for such occasions, since they offer an
opportunity, especially for the younger men, to show off both their horse and their
own prowess at riding. On this occasion, the nyo-pa arrived on horseback from
Thulus in the late morning. They came without the groom, because it is the custom
in Thulus and its neighbours, for him to stay at home while his bride is fetched. As
is customary, the nyo-pa were led by the bag-pho's azhang ( mother's brother), who
in this case was an elderly hajji from Pursa whose son is a contractor, and whose
grandson attends the Noon Public School. In addition there were about fifteen men
from Thulus and its neighbour Pursa. The nyo-pa tethered their horses, and there
followed a small ceremony in which the azhang cut a ribbon stretched across the
7Most of the cooking at weddings is done by men, in temporary kitchens outs de the house.
Relatives and neighbours who are known to be good cooks are invited to come to prepare
the food.
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ceremonial arch. The nyo-pa were then seated on chairs in the open air and given
tea and a variety of different delicacies, such as fried meat, cakes and pastries.
After some time, they were taken into the main house for another meal.
Meanwhile the bride had been taken to the nearby house of one of her family's
p'ha -spun, which was her bomoi kangsa, where she was to be dressed. Fatima
was in a small room, which was packed with women and girls who were singing and
crowding around her. Men and older boys kept out, but many were peeking
through the windows. She had already been bathed by a few of her female friends
and relatives, and was seated on a decorated platform which is called a 'stage'.
She was being dressed by two other women, one was her p'ha -spun member
Sakina, who is unmarried and the elder sister of another of the children in the Noon
Public School.
First of all the women did her hair, which was woven into small plaits and then
adorned with various clips and ornaments, some of which were brought by women
as gifts while she was being dressed. Then she was dressed in her wedding
clothes, which consisted of several layers of entirely new clothes, topped by a black
velvet phirin (the Kashmiri-style womens smock) and trousers, which had been
brought by her husband's relatives when the marriage was arranged. She also had
a phruk (thick local wool) smock but, after trying it out, the helpers rejected it.
Finally she had a small local hat, to which were attached various silver ornaments,
a tawiz (holy charm) and the baithot which is the piece of wool to be exchanged
with her new husband the next day. Over all of this, she had two good-quality
dahons (head shawls), which we kept swapping one for the other for good effect.
She had lots of rings and bracelets, some of which were given or lent by other
women, and some necklaces and gold butterfly pendants (pemar labste) encrusted
with turquoises, that her father had bought for her.
The bag-mo had been crying and moaning quietly all this time, and, while she was
being dressed, some of her mother's relatives - such as her mothers sister, and
Hajji Ghulam Mohammed's wife and daughter - came in and they all wept copiously
in remembrance of her own mother (ho/to yongse) who had been dead for many
years. Grieving and remembrance form an important part of the ritual of departure
of both the bride and the groom in weddings in Suru, but for the bride it IS
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particularly heart-rending as she is leaving her relatives. When she was dressed
her male relatives came in and gave her presents, and then other friends and
neighbours did the same. After this, they threw chola (sweets) over her, and
photographs were taken. Paba (a hot barley dough) was also distributed to the
participants at one point. Then she and her female helpers went into the kitchen of
the house and we all had tea, bread, paba and butter. At this point she was quite
cheerful and was chatting with us all, while the rest of the public were kept out of
the room. After lunch, she went to do her prayers (phyak or nimaz) before her
departure.
Meanwhile, I was taken back to her house, where the nyo-pa were being given
lunch. We were given rice and meat with various other curries, as well as specially
cooked ceremonial bread and tea. After some time, the bag-pho's azhang came to
the house where the bag-mo was again sitting on her stage, and insisted that they
should be allowed to take her away. She was then brought to the door of the
house, weeping copiously, and put on the back of another woman who carried her
from the house, so that her feet do not touch the ground. She took her to her
mother's grave. There, she fell on the ground and lay weeping and calling out for
her mother for some time. Finally she was dragged off the grave and carried to her
own house, where she was taken in to say goodbye to her family. The door was
shut and everyone else waited outside as they said their fareweUs.
Finally, she came out again, and was carried to her azhang's horse and placed
behind him with her head swathed in her outer shawl so that her face was invisible.
All the nyo-pa mounted, and her two female relatives - one of whom is customarily
her father's sister (nene) - and I, who were to accompany her, were accommodated
on the backs of some of the nyo-pa's horses. Someone suggested that the
groom's azhang from Pursa should carry me on the back of his horse, but he
declined, saying that I was far too heavy! The nyo-pa then threw chola to the
people gathered around, and we set off at a very slow pace, as the bag-mo was
frightened on the back of the horse.
The year before, I had attended the wedding of a young man from one of the
leading families in Taisuru to a woman from Pursa. The nyo-pa - including the bag-
pho - were all on horseback and had raced along the main road between the
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Namsuru bridge and Panikhar. This was very exhilarating but also alarming if you
were sitting on the back of someone's saddle hanging on to them for dear life
without stirrups or bridle.
A whole crowd of women and children accompanied us as far as the bridge, where
our path was blocked by a ribbon across the road. This had been put up by the
villagers of Kochik, on the opposite bank, who demanded some money from the
bride's azhang to let us pass. He paid them fifty rupees and was given some
apricots and nuts, after which we went on our way. This custom is called cha
pingcha (to bring out tea), and the wedding party may be stopped in this way a
number of times on its journey.
When we got to the bag-phds house it was getting dark and there was a crowd of
people outside. The bag-pho's relatives greeted the bag-mo with various
customary offerings, such as a sheep and plates of bread and butter. She also
dipped her right hand into a proffered plate of pe (barley flour) which is auspicious
on entering and leaving a house. Again her feet were not allowed to touch the
ground, so she was carried into the house on the back of another woman. Before
she was put down, her feet were washed by the bag-pho's elder sister, who is
married to a man in Choskore and has a son at the Noon Public School. My
understanding is that she has been carried and her feet washed, so that she does
not bring the earth from her old home, or any other place into her new home.
We were then all taken into a large room, in which the bag-p ho was sitting, flanked
by his azhang and some male companions. He was dressed in the traditional bag-
pho's white turban and a white goncha (or male local wool coat), which is
commonly worn as everyday wear by older, but not by young men. The bag-mo
was seated next to him but at some distance, with her nene (father's sister) and
Sakina and myself on the far side. First of all the nene of the bag-mo was offered
some bread and butter by the elder sister of the bag-pho, which she refused very
curtly. I was shocked, as I thought that she was being rude, but it turned out that
this is part of the ritual of a wedding, in which the bride's family act as if they were
giving her up unwillingly. She was then offered money, and eventually, after further
refusals, she took the money and ate some of the bread. Then we all had bread,
butter and tea, followed by marzan which are large plates of paba (or zan - lumps of
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cooked barley and pea flour) with a pool of butter in the middle, and oma (yoghurt).
This combination of paba and butter is traditionally used in a number of ceremonies
in Suru and all over Ladakh as an auspicious food to be distributed to participants.
After everyone had eaten, most people had a cigarette or smoked the hookah
(hubble-bubble). All the women in our party, except for the bag-mo, smoked
cigarettes, which is not normally done by ordinary women in Suru, and we also took
pictures of ourselves smoking. Then the bag-mo needed to pray, but she was
embarrassed, so she, her female companions and the two azhangs withdrew to a
more private room next door. We sat around chatting in our two groups of men and
women for the rest of the evening. Later we were served dinner of rice, meat and
various curried vegetables and pulses. The others were all served their food on the
large plates used for ceremonial meals that allow four people to share within sex
segregated groups.
Meanwhile, the nyo-pa and bag-p ho were being entertained in the larger room. We
could hear the sound of muted singing of khasidas, but there was no singing of
popular songs or dancing as far as we could gather. At one point, one of the
azhangs said to the other, "We should really be singing and dancing, but the agha
will tell us off if we do." Apparently, earlier that year Agha Miggi Oil had said from
the minbar that popular singing and dancing should not be mixed with religion,
under which category the main part of weddings were apparently classified.
However, this was the first time that such a ban had been imposed, and people
were still rather unclear about what was allowed and what was not. In the morning,
we found out that there had been a women's party for most of the night in the
neighbouring house of a p'ha -spun member with plenty of singing and dancing.
During the evening, the azhang from Pursa roundly criticised the cooks for serving
cold tea, and lamented that they had not got better people to do the cooking. He
and the other azhang also discussed the economics of feeding people at weddings,
and agreed that nowadays it is probably better to serve meat, because it gets
eaten, whereas if you serve marzan, most of the butter gets wasted. This had
happened earl er, as only a tiny bit of the large marzans had been eaten by us.
When I returned to Panikhar the next day and was telling Sunni friends about the
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wedding, some of them said, How could you eat marzan, isn't it disgusting. I can't
eat it at all. However, it is still served as a treat, in most houses in Suru.
We all slept in the room together, and in the night the bag-mo was taken off
presumably to consummate the marriage, but she was back by morning. The first
thing that she does that day is to go into the kitchen and prepare a symbolic piece
of bread (tag,) in her new house. Next the bag-mo and bag-p ho started on a long
round of visiting that continued for the next few weeks.
The first visit they usually make is to a member of the bag-pho's p'ha-spun. In this
case, they went with the rest of the companions to the neighbouring house of their
p'ha-spun members where the women's party had taken place the night before.
The bag-mo was greeted by all the adults of that house and the women all shook
her hand which is a respectful form of greeting. We were seated in a guest room
and were given tea, bread, yoghurt butter and other delicacies, which were hardly
touched, except to drink a cup of tea. Most of us left very quickly with only the bag-
mo remaining to talk with her new female relatives in the kitchen. I then left the
wedding to go to school in Taisuru, so I did not observe any more of the
ceremonies.
Another more local wedding that I attended was that of Jaffar, the brother of Au
from the Hotel in Panikhar, who married Sakina from Thangbu - a village between
Panikhar and Sangra. Both of them come from families that are about average
economically and who already knew and liked each other. Sakina had been staying
with her widowed and childless paternal aunt (nene) in Panikhar the year before
and she helped to arrange the marriage. Sakina was brought from Thangbu by
nyo-pa led by Hajji Mirza, who is Jaffar's azhang. The marriage had been arranged
some time before, but the wedding itself was organised in a hurry, because
Sakina'a younger sister was getting married on that day, and her father had asked
for the two to be held together as he could not afford the expense of two weddings.
Au, Jaffar's brother, told me that he wanted to make the wedding a fairly small affair
so they could save money for building up the business. He also said that he does
not believe in the socially competitive nature of some weddings. The house where I
was staying at the time was one of the Lampa-pa houses, who are Ali's p'ha -spun,
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so the whole family were helping with the cooking and organisation and their eldest
son went as one of the nyo-pa.
In the morning, Jaffar was dressed in his own house. This was supervised by Hajji
Mirza and his relative Akhun Jaffar, both of whom are from Jaffar's mother's family.
The main part of this ceremony consists of the creation of the turban (tot), that the
bag-pho wears on his wedding. This is task is usually performed by a cleric,
preferably an agha, but any man can do it. This is the only part of the wedding
ceremony in which an agha would take any role, besides coming as a guest. A
piece of wool from his house called the baithot (ba! means wool) is placed in the
bag-pho's turban, and this will be exchanged with the one in the bag-mo's hat in the
final ceremony of the wedding.
The nyo-pa travelled to Thangbu in a mini-bus that Au had hired from Kargil, and a
loudspeaker and ghetto-blaster were installed. The party consisted of the bag-p ho
and a dozen of his male relatives, including several members of his p'ha -spun and
some male neighbours, Api (meaning grandmother) Hani, the father's sister (nene)
of the bag-mo, who is a widow in Panikhar, and myself. When we reached
Thangbu, the nyo-pa and 1 were taken into a room in the house of a relative of the
bag-mo. We were given several courses of food, such as bread and butter,
apricots and finally meat, various curries and rice. It was a very jolly party, and
there was a good deal of joking and giggling, including during the prayers at the end
which were led by Hajji Mirza. The two bag-mos were already dressed when I first
saw them in their bomoi kangsa, which was in a small house near their own, where
they were seated on the floor, surrounded by a crowd of women and girls who were
singing and clapping in time to the music.
When the two parties finally left, Sakina's sister and her groom's nyo-pa, who had
been entertained separately, went on foot, as the groom's hamlet was very close.
A big crowd had gathered to see both parties off. The bag-mos were both walking,
and the nyo-pa were throwing lots of sweets to the crowd. 8
 When our party had all
got into the minibus, Api Hani, her father's sister, and official female companion had
In this instance the sweets are called skelda, maybe because da means arrow and is
associated with masculinity.
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a kind of tussle with the bag-mo who was weeping, and eventually pulled her onto
the bus.
When the bag-mo arrived at the house in Panikhar, there was a crowd of women
and children waiting, and the boys from the house where I was staying let oft lots of
firecrackers. The bag-mo had her feet washed by the bag-phd a older sister, and
then she, her nene, azhang and companion, were seated on a good carpet in one
of the two guest rooms, which soon filled up with women and girls of the village.
Latifa, a Sunni woman, whose wedding had taken place a few weeks before, was
there dressed in some of her new clothes, and everyone referred to her as bag-mo
still. Soon after, Mahi-ud-din's wife who is the sister of Ghulam Rassool, came up,
greeted the bag-mo, shook her hand and lifted the shawl that was covering her face
as a burqa. She did not seem to be happy with this and pulled it back down to
cover herself again.
We were given bread, butter and tea, and the bag-mo and her nene also ate some.
Afterwards, the bag-pho's older sister brought in two plates of marzan and offered
some to the nene, and they performed the pantomime of offering money and the
nene refusing, until finally both the nene and the bag-mo ate some. At this point
she still had her face covered, but one of the young Sunni women came up and told
her that she should uncover her face, and then teased her and kept trying to pull
her shawl back. Most people were laughing, but I found ft embarrassing, and later
one of the girls said to me that it had been unnecessary and disrespectful for her to
do that to the bag-mo.
That evening, they had invited guests from all the houses in Panikhar (prong ml
kyongcha - that is to bring the villagers), and at least one person from each house
should attend. They served everybody with rice, meat and curries, which had been
prepared by some of their male relatives. As this was a small wedding they did not
invite anyone but their relatives and fellow villagers for the celebrations. The
evening ended fairly early, and I was told by some of Jaftar's relatives not to give
my torch to any of the young girls who were hanging around. I was told that the
reason was that villagers would do anything to observe a couple in bed on their
wedding night. So Jaffar and Sakina sneaked oft to his family's old house in the
centre of the village to avoid detection. The next day, Fati the teenage daughter
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from the house I was staying in told me that some bridal couples in the village had
had tape-recorders and even people concealed in their room on their wedding
night.
The next morning, was the ceremony for exchanging the baithot, when the tuft of
wool from the hat and turban of the bag-mo and bag-pho were swapped by Api
Hani her nene. Again money was offered to the bag-mo's relatives, this time in
order to persuade them to break and eat some bread - usually with some sweet
ha/va as condiment, which is then distributed to everyone present. The bag-mo
and bag-p ho were sitting between their relatives, but with her nene in between
them. The ceremony of eating the bread and ha/va and exchanging the wool was
accomplished relatively easily, but then Hajji Mirza said that I should take a
photograph of the couple together. Api Hani said that the bag-mo was shy and did
not want to, and there ensued a long and hilarious argument between her and Hajji
Mirza. She continued to refuse for about ten minutes, and he kept saying things
like, "Well, you've taken the money and eaten the bread, so why can't we take a
photograph?' She said, "It's not the custom to do this". Finally she agreed and
moved from where she had been sitting between the couple, and a muffled cheer
went up from everyone else in the room. That day all the Prantee people were
called for a dinner.
About ten days later, after they had been to Sakina's house in Thangbu, she
returned on the bus with the customary group of her young female friends and
relatives. They were carrying baskets of bread and fried pastries which they
distributed to people as they went and later took to all Jaffar's relatives in Panikhar.
In order to make more of an occasion, they got down from the bus at the Police
checkpoint on the road by Taisuru and walked the rest of the way. Just as it was
getting dark, they arrived in the village where they were met by a crowd of women
and children who asked to be given the bread and pastries. There was plenty of
noise and excitement, and some of the boys and young men let off bangers to add
to the atmosphere.
They visited a couple of houses on the way, but soon arrived at Sakina's new home
where they and lots of mainly younger village people went into the guest room.
Sakina and her friends sat in a circle with their backs to the rest of us, and sang
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some local songs. Lots of banter was exchanged between them and the young
women from Panikhar. This evening Sakina was much more lively and not at all
shy. She knew all the Panikhar people as a year before she had been staying in
Panikhar with Api Hani to help her as she lives alone. The dancing and singing got
into full swing after we had all been fed. Most of us formed into two circles - one for
the bag-mo and her friends, and the other for the Panikhar people most of whom
were Jaffar's relatives by now. For the rest of the evening these two groups of
villagers acted out a friendly rivalry. First of all the Thangbu women were urged to
sing by the Panikhar crowd and roundly sneered at if they stumbled or forgot lines.
Myself and others were dragged up to do an individual turn" in the middle of the
singing group, although there was a general reluctance to dance, but soon things
got more lively.
The Panikhar group started to sing in competition with the girls from Thangbu, and
two jerry cans were brought in to be beaten in time to the songs. The singing got
louder and more raucous and there was lots of good-natured pushing and shoving,
particularly of the bag-mo by the Panikhar people. At one point, a teenage
Panikhar boy got up and did a hilarious wild pantomimic dance in the middle of the
Thangbu circle - which made most of us cry with laughter. I left at about 1 am, but
apparently the party carried on for several hours, becoming more hilarious and wild.
I was slightly shocked the next day to hear from the ever demure Fati (the teenage
daughter from the house that I was living in at the time) that even she and her
friend had got up and danced. The next day everyone was saying what a brilliant
party it had been.
These two marriages included a number of elements that are typical of peasants in
Suru, whose marriages are local in focus. The same people also enact their actual
weddings in a manner which I describe as being in the Suru rather than regional
style, albeit with local variations in customs between areas and villages. For
example, among peasants there is a preference for the nyo-pa to go on horseback
to fetch the bag-mo, as this is considered to be the most prestigious and exciting
way to do so. The year before, when Moqsin, a bus driver from Taisuru, had
married Zenab the sister of a contractor from Pursa, he and his nyo-pa had gone on
horseback, although he had also laid on a mini-bus for the female members of the
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party. Similarly the clothes worn by the bag-mo and bag-pho are in a local Suru
style, albeit with enhancements for the wedding.
In both of the weddings that I have described, the people involved were almost
exclusively close relatives of the two families, or from the same village. It is normal
practice for people from every house in a village to attend parts of a wedding,
except when there were the boycotts between the yokma and goma-pa. My
understanding is that families prefer to bring a bag-mo from a different village, as
the element of rivalry between villages (see Chapter 3), adds to the triumph with
which she is brought. This enjoyable competitiveness was very clear in the party at
the end of Sakina and Jaftar's wedding, when it was the difference between the two
villages and groups of people and the solidarity of each as separate units which
was emphasised. Similarly, on the main day of the wedding when the bag-mo's
nene negotiates with the bag-pho's sister over the eating of the bread after they
arrive at his house, she acts as if she is dealing with someone hostile, and is
unwilling to hand over the bag-mo. This seems to be connected with the theme of
capture, which is common in marriage all over this region.9
The passage of the bag-mo between her own and her husband's home during the
wedding, also emphasises the relocation of the woman from one place to another.
Near the beginning of the wedding, she is removed from her own house to the
bomoi kangsa for her bag-ches. After that she only returns home briefly to say
goodbye to her family when her husband's nyo-pa have come to collect her. Hence
her separation from her own home is emphasised before she even leaves to go to
her husband's house. This process of separation between the old and the new land
is particularly striking in the villages such as Achambore and Namsuru where the
bag-mo's feet are not allowed to touch the ground between her bomoi kangsa and
her new house. For example, at a wedding in Namsuru, where the bag-mo was
going to another house in the village, she was still carried on another woman's back
from her bomoi kangsa to her father's house and then to that of her husband. The
woman who carries her is called the bag-Ista (literally 'wedding horse'). Even in
Marriage by capture is found all over the Himalayas, and usually it is a mock capture, as it
is frequently in Ladakh, but in some areas, such as parts of Nepal, it is apparently often done
without the woman's consent (Schuler 1987:141).
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villages such as Thangbu and Panikhar where she is allowed to walk, her feet must
be washed as she enters the new house, which seems to be a ritual of washing off
the land where she came from.
Another striking feature of these weddings, is the degree to which mourning forms a
part of the wedding. The fact that the bride weeps is normal in both Ladakh and
other parts of India, but in Suru, the theme of mourning runs through the whole
wedding. It might appear to outsiders that it is coincidental that so many of the
brides or grooms in the weddings that I attended had lost their father or mother, but
that is not the case, it is simply a function of the high levels of mortality in the area.
Out of the eight weddings that I attended in 1993/4, four of the brides or grooms
had lost their mother or father. However, that would not necessarily mean that
mourning was stressed at weddings, and the fact that it is indicates that it is closely
connected to ideas of kinship, particularly for women. I have suggested that the
mother's grave is a most important site for women, once they have married out of
their natal home, as she forms the anchor point for their kinship (see Chapter 2).
This seems to come out clearly in Fatima's wedding, since she wept longest and
most uncontrollably over her mother's grave. Even if a woman's mother is still alive
their parting is the most poignant and demonstrative. When the woman leaves her
home, most of her female friends and relatives also weep. In other parts of Ladakh,
a much more ritualised lamenting is performed (Aggarwal 1 994:200ff). In Chigtan,
women practice a poignant lament which they recite when they are leaving their
parents and family. In Suru, however, the weeping is mainly uncontrolled and
similar to the tears wept when someone dies, or at matam ceremonies.
The aghas also used this more local Suru style in their weddings. For instance, Ali
Agha, Agha Miggi Ort's second son, said that he had had about fifty nyo-pa on
horseback for his wedding a few years before. When I discussed these kinds of
weddings with the people who had been involved in them, they often commented
that they were much more enjoyable than the more formal ones enacted by the
administrative elite that I shall describe in the next section. Of course the way that
they were celebrating weddings was not the exactly the same as it was in the past;
however, the style that was being used was seen by these people as being more
local and traditional than that of those of the administrative elite.
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Picture 6.6 - Sakina and her sister in their bomoi kangsa
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(v) A Suru Administrative Elite Wedding
A few weeks before Jaffar's wedding, his cousin Haddi, Hajji Mirza's son who is a
Junior Engineer, had also married but, in his case, into the administrative elite. The
bag-mo was Nargis who is a graduate with a government white-collar office Job in
Kargil. She is the daughter of ex-Superintendent of Police (SP) Abbas, who was
elected as the National Conference MLA candidate for the Suru valley in the
elections in 1996. Her brother is married to one of Munshi Sadiaq's daughters, and
is a leading member of the Kargil Youth Voluntary Forum.
The invitations for the wedding were given on expensively printed cards, and
delivered well in advance to guests both in Kargil and Suru-Kartse. As with other,
administrative elite weddings, the different parts of the wedding were referred to by
Urdu and Arabic names, for instance, the groom's party was called the barati. The
wedding started in Panikhar with the bag-gron for the bag-pho, which was held at
the Tourist Bungalow, the most imposing modern building in Panikhar. This was
arranged by group of young men who were to make up the barati, who were
predominantly Sunni. At the beginning of the evening, the bag-pho was sitting in
the main room of their house, wrapped in a blanket and surrounded by his male
relatives and other men who were singing khasidas, while his sisters and female
neighbours and friends were in the kitchen. Tea and bread was served to everyone
in the respective rooms, and a number of people were weeping as they
remembered his mother Fatima who had died in the winter of 1993. She had been
an auxiliary nurse (ANM) and an exceptionally popular woman, who had continued
to attend yokma matams with her daughters in 1993, despite the rift between her
husband and the yokma aghas (see Chapter 5).
After some time, the bag-p ho was taken in procession to the Tourist Bungalow, by
a crowd of men, women and children carrying torches and a ghetto-blaster. The
girls and young women, including his sisters, sang songs as we walked towards the
Bungalow and boys set of fireworks and bangers. Only the men and older boys
attended the party, which went on until the following afternoon.
By the following evening, the large marquee (shamiana), ceremonial arch, outside
kitchen, and stages for the bag-mo and bag-pho had all been set up. Another
procession brought the bag-pho back to the house, and he and the men occupied
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the main guest room. After dark, a car arrived from Kargil containing the snyen-go
and ha/pa, who are the representatives of the bag-mo's family and the person who
arranged the match - it is a Kargil custom for them to come. They were greeted at
the ceremonial arch and given tea and biscuits, then brought into the house. That
evening Kazim Sahib, the Sunni leader from Sankhoo from the Kakpuri family, also
arrived with Agha Jemal from Tambis Block near Kargil, who is a leading figure in
the local Congress Party. He was there to fill the ceremonial role that one of the
yokma aghas would have been asked to take, had relations been better between
them and Hajji Mirza.
The women were all in the kitchen, where the special wedding bread, pastries and
sweet tea were being served. Those who were helping were mainly Shi'ah relatives
and neighbours, and the guests were either women from the more prestigious
Sunni families of Panikhar and Prantee. There were also several Shi'ah women
who had come from other villages for the wedding. Later on, everyone was given
an elaborate meal of rice and various dishes, including some special Kashmiri meat
preparations - such as yakhni - which are served at weddings. Hajji Mirza had
apparently brought two cooks from Kargil to help with the preparation of these
specialities. After dinner, the younger women and girls went to a room in a
neighbouring house for singing and dancing. Meanwhile the men had a party in the
house, with a powerful public address system broadcasting their singing to the
whole village. This carried on until the middle of the night, when the bag-p ho's
sisters and her friends went back to the house to take the sinmo-tse (mehendi or
henna) in to the bag-p ho.1 ° They entered the bag-pho's room, singing much more
demurely than before, and the ceremony of putting henna on the bag-pho's hand
was performed. This ceremony is performed for both the bag-pho and bag-mo on
the eve of the wedding and ranges from simply smearing henna on the right hand
to the drawing of delicate patterns on both the hands and feet.
The next day, the bag-pho and nyo-pa set off to Kargil with a minibus, thirteen taxis
and cars and a motorbike (Dr. Jaffars). The number of vehicles is an important
sign of prestige for this kind of wedding, and people counted the vehicles and
° Sinmo-tse is the local term for henna, which literally means 'colour of joy', as it is used as
an auspicious colouring for happy events such as weddings and Id days.
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commented that there had been a very good turnout. Dr. Jaffar told me that he had
had the largest number of vehicles at his wedding that had ever been seen at that
time, since his had been a 'political' match, as he had married a niece of Munshi
Habibullah. Thus it constituted an alliance between the families of Munshi
Habibullah and Qamer Au, the two most important politicians in Kargil tehsil. With
the exception of Dr. Jaffar's motorbike, no-one in Panikhar or Prariltee had a vehicle
at that time, so all of the taxis were brought from Kargil by Haddi's friends and
relatives. The nyo-pa were nearly all dressed smartly in Ladakhi gonchas (long
garments), and had matching sashes and rosettes. The bag-pho's azhang, and
one or two of the other nyo-pa were also wearing white turbans. The bag-pho, who
travelled in a decorated taxi with his azhang and others, had on a very smart suit,
Kashmiri shawl and the wedding turban. Before he left, his eldest sister and other
people put khatags (ceremonial scarves) round his neck, and his eldest sister threw
rose-petal confetti and chola over him.
The men who went with him as his nyo-pa were a mixture of Shi'ahs and Sunnis,
mainly from Panikhar itself, although the majority were Sunnis. Some of the
Shi'ahs who attended and helped at the wedding are keen supporters of the Noon
Public School and the yokma-pa aghas, and there is obviously no contradiction
between that and their closeness to Hajji Mirza's family. For example, Sakina, from
the Lampa house where I was staying who has a son at the Noon Public School,
had been the chos-pun of Fatima, Haddi's mother, which means that the agha had
performed a ceremony to make them fictive siblings." She and all her family
worked tirelessly at the wedding, and at certain points she took the part of Haddi's
mother, but she told me that she would not have worked for them, had she and
Fatima not been related in that way. Similarly, Dr. Jaffar, who had been a
classmate of Haddi in Snnagar and is a great friend of Nargis's family took an
important role in the ceremonies and went as one of his main nyo-pa.
I did not go to Kargil with the nyo-pa, but I saw the video that the bag-mo's family
had made of the whole wedding. They had had a party the night before at which
there was lots of singing and dancing. Most of the participants seemed to be young
men and women from the Kargil administrative elite families. I was surprised to see
"This is not the same as moharam, as it is between people of the same sex.
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that the party was mixed, and some of the braver participants did individual disco-
style dances. The next day, the bag-mo was dressed in a family room, with just a
few female relatives. She wore an outfit of fine turquoise and gold diaphanous
material, and gold jewellery, and dainty gold sandals. This style is completely 'non-
local' and is that of a Punjabi-type wedding, which is the fashion for better off
people in northern India, and it made her look like a heroine in a Hindi film.
A supporter of the Ayatollah Khomeini Memorial trust and ally of the yokma-pa in
Kargil said to me that when the nyo-pa arrived there they were all amazed because
so many of them were Sunnis. He commented that Hajji Mirza had been split off
from 'his own', and that it was a shame for him. In Panikhar the nyo-pa reported on
their return that the bag-mo had left her parents without even shedding a tear,
which was seen as being very unusual, as a bag-mo normally weeps hysterically
when she leaves her family. When the party arrived in Panikhar, there were several
stops for tea and snacks. At one, the bag-mds azhang had to pay money for a pair
of scissors to cut a ribbon across the road, and, as is customary, everyone
commented on the meanness of his payments for these services. The bag-mo
eventually got out of the taxi near the door of the house, with her head bent and
covered by a large shawl. She was greeted by women holding a sheep and burning
incense and then, with the rest of the women in her party, she was led inside on
foot, and the men were served tea and snacks by the ceremonial arch.
Meanwhile the door to the house had been shut and the bag-pho's azhang had to
go through a pantomime of asking to be let in. Eventually he paid the bag-p ho's
sisters Rs. 200 for them to open the door. The bag-mo had been taken into
another room and seated on the stage with her relatives and the ha/pa next to her.
The bag-p ho went and sat on the stage in the main room. His main companions at
this point were a Kashmiri colleague, and Dr. Jaffar. In the bag-mds room there
was a deadly hush. She was sitting on the stage, with her nene (father's sister),
azhang, friends and relatives, and headmaster Mahi-ud-din to her right. In front of
her were three women from the more prominent local Sunni families, including
Farida, a woman from a highly prestigious family, who are the only Sunnis to
originate in Kargil and she is married to one of the Kakpuri engineers, Ghulam
Rassool's wife Zubaida, and Haqima, his sister who is married to Headmaster
Mahi-ud-din. The other people in the room were a group of mainly small girls and
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myself. Then Haqima, who had done the same to Sakina at Jaffar's wedding,
offered the bag-mo some tea and biscuits and very politely persuaded her to lift her
dahon to reveal her face and drink some tea. After that, the photographers - her
azhang who had a video camera and I - took photographs. The bag-mo and her
elder women companions did their prayers (phyak) for a long time. After that the
bag-phds sisters all came in and gave her wrapped presents and greeted her.
There was some desultory talking by the men and her nene, but for the most part
an awed silence was maintained.
During this period, Archo Mansura and Archo Sajjida, the daughter and
granddaughter of Agha Miggi Oil, arrived and were brought into the room. The
ha/pa, realising they were archos, tried to persuade them to come and sit on the
ceremonial carpets with the other non-Panikhar guests, but they refused and sat
with the group on the floor. The yokma-pa aghas' families had both been sent
invitations, but neither of the aghas attended personally. Agha Baqir did not send a
representative to any part of the wedding, as he is generally more open in his
opposition to the Sunnis. The next day Agha Miggi Oil asked me all about the
wedding, and seemed quite relaxed about it as he laughed uproariously when I said
that the bag-mo was very attractive.
Later on that evening, everyone was served an elaborate meal, consisting of rice
and a range of speciality Kashmiri wedding dishes, and the evening ended quite
early. First thing the next morning, Nargis performed the ceremony of making
bread, supervised by Sakina, Haddi's mother's chos-spun. The new couple had
spent the night alone in a well-furnished bedroom and in the morning there was a
good deal of speculation among the women about how the night had gone. The
next day there was a big lunch in the marquee to which many people came,
including a number of guests who came in taxis from Kargil, and the next day Haddi
and Nargis went to her house in Kargil for a few days. They returned to Panikhar in
her brother Dr. Raza's jeep accompanied by Najima her elder sister. During their
stay they all visited the Noon Public School one day. On their return to Kargil,
Haddi and Nargis stayed at his family's lodgings which are hired rooms in the
centre of Kargil, but they also spent a good deal of time at her family's house.
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(vi) A Kargil Administrative Elite Wedding
The final wedding that I am going to describe was the social event of the wedding
season that year in Kargil, as it involved a number of members of the Munshi
Habibullah family and their relatives. This wedding consisted of three marriages,
one of Munshi Habibullah's second son Gulzar and his maternal cousin, whose
father is one of the two Assistant Commissioners (AC) in Kargil; that of hts younger
brother Aijas to Roqia, who is from the family of Hajji Shafi who owns the Argali
Hotel in Kargil bazaar, and who are their p'ha-spun by virtue of their grandfather
having been given land by their family; and that of her brother Fida who married a
woman from a village north-east of Kargil.
On the first main day of this wedding two sets of barati left to get Gulzar's bag-mo
from his uncle's house in Batalik, and Fida's from her village. They both went off
with a number of jeeps and there was lots of noise and fireworks at their departure,
so that you could hear it all over Kargil. That evening it was Roqia's mehendi raat
at Hajji Shafi's house which is behind the hotel in the centre of Kargil. They had set
up two large marquees (shamiana) in the garden of the neighbouring house of
Commander Hassan, who stood, and was elected, as MP in 1989 to break the
Buddhist boycott. Roqia was dressed in her ordinary clothes and was lodking very
downcast as Latifa had done. She was sitting at one side of the extremely large
women's tent surrounded by her friends. There were about two hundred female
guests, including lots of her nene's family from Sanjak near Chigtan where she is
married. Roqia's mother died some years ago and her father is now marred to
Latifa, one of Dr. Jaffar and Qamer Ali's sisters. So several of their female relatives
from Sangra were there too. In addition there were women from most of the
important families in Kargil, although there were very few Sunnis there. I do know
that the only people they invited from Suru Block were the yokma-pa aghas'
families, and a Sheikh from Damsna, who has a son at the Noon Public School
from Suru Block.
The evening started with a dinner, which consisted of rice and a number of the
Kashmiri meat wedding dishes. All the Muslim guests ate in groups of four women
and children around a single plate, and the wife of the Headmaster of the Noon
Public School who is a Hindu by birth, although married to a Muslim and I ate oft
our own personal plates. Many of the guests were dressed in beautiful clothes,
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most of them wore saiwar kamiz, but some of them had on koshen gonchas
(brocade dresses), such as are the fashion in Leh tehsil. After the meal, some of
the women started to sing, but apparently the male guests were still in the next tent
at this time and so we were asked not to do so. This was presumably because
there were aghas and shaikhs in the next room who would have disapproved of
singing and dancing at a wedding. However, later on the dancing got into full
swing. One of Roqia's young female relatives acted as the master of ceremonies
as she took on the task of persuading women to dance. Some get up fairly willingly
to do a short soto turn in the middle of the seated company, but others had to be
dragged and pushed up and this causes a good deal of hilarity. The star of the
evening was the young daughter of Dr. Ghulam, who is from Leh and the Physician
in Kargil Hospital, who did a disco-style dance that brought the house down.
Gradually most of the guests left, leaving the relatives and Roqia's close friends.
They then performed the ceremony of sinmo-tse, and after that most people went to
bed. The next day, the bag-mo had her bag-ches in a room in the house, with just
a few female relatives and friends. She was dressed in diaphanous, gold-
decorated clothes in the Punjabi wedding style, just as Nargis had been, and she
changed into another similar outfit during the day. She then went down to the stage
in the women's shamiana where there was a very large group of well-dressed
young women and girls. Many women also wandered in off the Street to see what
was going on, including many of the young women from Panikhar and Prantee who
study in Kargil. There was lots of singing of local songs and dancing, although Hajji
Shafi came in several times to request everyone to sing khasidas (religious songs).
Later in the day, the bag-pho's nyo-pa arrived. Their leader (called the krashis-pa)
was Munshi Khadim the BOO in Suru Block from the management committee of the
Noon Public School, and his uncle Munshi Sadiaq was also with them. His
daughters are married to the son of ex-SP Abbas, who in 1996 was elected as the
National Conference MLA for Suru and Zanskar, and the son of the Congress
candidate who opposed Qamer Au for the MLA for Kargil in 1996. Dr. Jaffar was
also one of the nyo-pa, and Qamer Ali and Commander Hassan were also there
and took tea with the bag-pho and nyo-pa when they arrived. The bag-pho was
dressed very smartly in a suit and had a white turban and was wearing a veil of gold
tinsel that concealed his face.
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Once the nyo-pa had arrived the bag-mo's father and her younger brothers and
other male relatives brought her presents, and then many of the women d d too. At
this point the bag-mo started to weep, and was comforted by her nene who sat next
to her on the stage. When it was finally time for her to go she set up a more
concerted keening and her girlfriends refused to let her go until her father had paid
them Rs. 500. Later on that day Fida arrived back with his bag-mo. She was
immediately taken to a stage in the upper room of their house, where Aijas' nyo-pa
had been entertained earlier in the day. She was wearing a brocade Ladakhi
goncha and was quite relaxed and spoke to me and her nene and friends. Latifa,
Hajji Shafi and his elder brother Abdul Rashid among others came and put khatags
on her head and congratulated her.
I then went to the dinner at Munshi Habibullah's house. The two bag-mos were
sitting with their entourages on a stage at the end of a very large shamiana.
Gradually a large number of female guests arrived from most of the important
houses in Kargil, although there were not many Sunnis. Before the dinner was
served, I was taken to another room inside the house which was for the non-Muslim
female guests, who were a number of Buddhists and Hindus and myself. During
the course of the evening we were visited by several of the family members and
Munshi Habibullah himself. The meal was extremely elaborate, and Munshi
Habibullah said that he had brought in cooks from Kashmir to prepare it. There
were at least ten delicious Kashmiri meat dishes which were served to us by the
young men of several of the administrative elite families of Kargil, some of whom
are son-in-laws of Munshi Habibullah's family.
Later on, we were joined by the bag-p ho's, some of the women guests and more
family members, and there was a bit of singing and dancing, but we went to bed
quite early. There were two women guests from Leh, but Munshi Habibullah said
that he was disappointed because very few of those invited from Leh, Srinagar or
Jammu had come.
The next morning the ceremony of exchanging the baithots took place in two
separate rooms. The bag-mos with their nenes and all the female relatives were in
the kitchen, where they had earlier made the ceremonial chapatL The women who
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were preparing bread and tea at the stove brought two plates, one with ha/va and
chapati on it and the other with thick breads and butter. Everyone was offered
some of the bread and butter, and then the two nenes were given one hundred
rupee notes. Then the bag-mos each put their baithot on one of the plates, and
these were taken to the bag-phos in the next room. Someone then came in with
the bag-phos'turbans, and they took the ba/thots off those and attached them to
clothes of the respective bag-mos. Then a piece of halva was put on a plate and all
the bridal party were given a bit to eat, and afterwards it was offered to the rest of
us.
(vii) Conclusions
There were clearly some significant differences between the administrative elite
weddings, and those I described as being enacted in a peasant style in Suru.
•	 L''f	 11!71 I1A'I UjT
Mode of Transport	 l Horses	 Multiple vehicles
Dress	 'Suru' style	 'Modern' style
Food	 Marzan and 'ordinary'	 Elaborate Kashmiri dishes
curries
General demeanour Relaxed and informal 	 Formal and polite
Guests	 Relatives and village	 Relatives and village plus other
members of the elite
Another important difference is that rintho is not paid in Kargil among these families
now and instead a dowry is given according to the custom in Kashmir.
In various respects the administrative elite weddings used a regional style, which is
seen as being more civilised and modern. In Panikhar, in particular, where Sunnis
now also usually follow this regional style of wedding, several people commented
on how much better they were, and made derogatory comments about the
weddings that I had attended in the other villages. I was asked several times
whether I had been served beef at any of the weddings and considerable disgust
was expressed at the idea that I might have been. Beef is eaten by all Muslims in
Suru, and is not haram (forbidden) for them or seen as being in any way a problem;
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however, in a wider Indian context many people regard beef-eating as stigmatising,
and hill people in general are often derided for being beef-eaters.
There was also a major difference in the terms of who attended the wedding and
the social interaction between them. In the administrative elite weddings the people
tried to get as many members of that group as they could to attend the main
dinners, and that was the most important reference group besides relatives.
Secondly most of the events of the wedding are much more formal, and everyone is
treated with respect, so the egalitarian rivalry of the other weddings is not normally
present. I think that this is because these kinds of weddings are being used to
create a status distinction between those that are involved in them and other
people. Therefore these marriages are part of the process by which an
administrative elite is being constructed as a group of superior status to the mass of
people in the area. It also cross-cuts the factional divisions that I described in the
previous chapter. For instance, both Dr. Jaffar's marriage into the Munshi
Habibullah family, and Haddi's to Nargis represented alliances between families
that had previously been in opposed political factions.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that there are similarities between the
marriage patterns in the administrative elite, and those of the aghas in Suru, in that
in both cases the leaders practise a large amount of endogamy within their
lineages, thereby enhancing its solidarity. However, the difference is that whereas
the leaders among the administrative elite, do not appear to form kinship ties with
ordinary people, this is a major part of the aghas' kinship, since their leadership is
dependent on them constantly recreating their kinship ties with their followers in the
locality. As I have suggested, the administrative elite have a constituency simply by
virtue of holding a particular post, and hence they have no need of creating kinship
ties with their public through marriage. Hence they are free to separate themselves
socially from the mass of peasants in the area.
Similarly, the loss of associaton with the land is linked to processes of urbanisation
and regionalisation in the area. As well as having less reference to the land, the
weddings of the administrative elite, are also very urban and modern in style. I
would suggest that this is connected to a desire to join the administrative elite in the
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region, which is largely urban and self-consciously constitutes itself as being more
'modern' than the majority of ordinary people.
One interesting factor is that this difference is self-consciously referred to by people
in Suru. At the moment, the elite of the yokma faction in Suru Block appear to be
intent on retaining their focal focus, and remaining a cohesive group within the Suru
valley, rather than moving away and joining the administrative elite in Kargil.
Nevertheless, the processes of regionalisation and urbanisation in which they are
involved and often play an important part, ultimately do seem to be transforming the
social geography of the area, as I shall discuss in the next chapter.
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Chapter 7
Agriculture and the Urban Bureaucracy
(I) Introduction
I have identified one of the main aims of the school as being to bring education under
the political control of the faction and to provide a high standard of secular education
locally. I have shown that this was not merely an activity of elites, since the impetus
for creating the faction and its leadership has come as much from the followers as
from the leaders themselves. For its members, the school is a continuation of the
faction. Although the faction is internally stratified, it nevertheless remains a largely
cohesive social group, the members of which are all involved in agriculture in Suru.
Moreover, the faction is mainly a local organisation, despite the fact that it has
important outside connections.
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that there is an emerging administrative elite
in Kargil tehsil, largely urban in outlook and residence, although it includes a minority
from rural areas like Suru. More and more there is now a clear social divide between
them and the mass of ordinary people who are still primarily involved in the agricultural
economy. In this chapter, I shall further explore a growing divide between town and
country. In particular, attitudes to agricultural work are changing as the possession of
secular education and government employment are increasingly associated with
higher status. Such changes are symptomatic of a more general shift of focus that is
resulting in a restructuring of the social geography of Suru.
Corresponding changes are taking place in kinship and the organisation of the
household. One is that masculinity and male authority within the family group are
being redefined in some families at the moment. There is also a noticeable change in
patterns of speech and address between people outside the household and an
increased use of honorific terminology, especiafly for those who have government
jobs.
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Hence, there is an emerging social divide within Suru, that corresponds to various
divisions between the peasant agricultural economy and that of the government and
administration, rural and urban areas and a gender divide. This affects the access to
resources of women and peasants, particularly in that it leaves them effectively
disenfranchised in the conduct of development policies. It also has important
consequences for the ability of the yokma-pa leaders to represent the interests of their
members in Kargil and to turn their undoubted authority in Suru into effective action
when dealing with the administration.
I have suggested that the Noon Public School was set up to counter some of these
processes. So, finally, I look at the school to see how and whether some of these
issues are addressed in its organisation and policies. In doing so, I shall show that
there is an important difference of opinion within the management committee. The
aghas see the school as being merely instrumental in gaining educational
qualifications; whereas some of the men who are more involved in the government
economy want the school to transform their children into modern people.
This difference in conception is not at all surprising and highlights a potential
contradiction between the desire to bolster the power of the faction in the local area
and the potentiality for the attendance of their children at the school to hasten the
pace at which the elite of the faction move away from Suru and the peasant economy.
This contradiction also comes out in the educational aims of the school and most of
the parents, which is that their children will obtain jobs in the administrative elite. As I
showed in Chapter 6, one possible outcome of the education that the school offers is
that the elite of the faction will join the administrative elite and abandon Suru for an
urban centre.
(ii) Agriculture, Locality and Urbanisation
Farming still remains the main economic activity in Suru Block and all the families that
live permanently in Suru have agncuttural land and some animals. It also provides the
main source of livelihood for most households, particularly in the villages away from
the Panikhar area where there are far more people with government jobs. All land
owning households in Suru still farm, even those that have a considerable income
from other sources; however, attitudes to agriculture are changing at the moment. In
order to illustrate this, I shall describe the work patterns in two families in Panikhar,
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one being an economically average yokma-pa family who have a son in the school
and the other, a richer Sunni family which has a solid base in government
employment.
The first family is that of Safia and Mehdi, who have five children of ages varying from
three to nineteen, one of whom is a pupil at the Noon Public School. They had divided
their land with Mehdi's two brothers more than ten years previously and hence they
had under twenty kanals of land, which was less than they really needed. In addition
they had three bovines, from which they received a regular milk supply, a horse and a
few sheep and goats. Their income was supplemented by Mehdi's rather
undemanding manual job with the agricultural department which brought in around Rs
1,500 a month and, in 1995, they opened a small and as yet not very profitable shop
in Panikhar bazaar. Their eldest son had attended school until 9th class and was
unsuccessfully taking his 10th class exam in 1994. Their daughter was seventeen and
had never been to school. Their income was above average, as they had about the
average amount of land for Suru Block as a whole with additional income from a
government job and, latterly, the shop as well; however, they were one of the poorest
of the fee-paying families of children in the Noon Public School and were poorer than
the majority of households in Panikhar.
Safia and Mehdi's eldest son was working as a servant (duksmi) for a neighbouring
house for part of the time, in which he was involved in both household and agricultural
work. At times of intensive agricultural work, such as ploughing and harvesting, his
mother and sister also performed some milaks (free labour) for this household. For
their own work, they occasionally received mutual aid (!aktsiks) from relatives in
Panikhar. Both parents and the two oldest children, who were not attending school,
spent the majority of their time on agricultural tasks during the summer months.
Mehdi did, of course, have to attend to his duty but, in common with many government
jobs in Suru, this was not very arduous and he was always able to take leave when his
labour was urgently needed at home.
The two boys who were attending school would help with the animals in the morning
and evening and the older one might take a day off school when it was their turn to
provide labour to take the animals to the mountains for the ba-res and ra-res. Safia,
Roqia her daughter and sometimes Mehdi also went regularly to the mountains to
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collect dung and furze (burtse) for cooking when they were not engaged in other
agricultural tasks. For instance, for a long period after harvest, Roqia got up before
light every day and returned a few hours later with a large basket of dung.
Their neighbours are a Sunni family, who have a larger than average plot of land.
They are said to have two shares (po) of land, as Nazir, the household head's paternal
uncle went as a mag-pa to another house and subsequently sold his half of the land to
Nazir's family. Despite having a shortage of labour at the moment, they farm all the
land themselves rather than letting out a part to tenants. It is common for households
in this situation to give their land as shazma (leased land), to another household who
will farm it and give them a share of the grain crop. However, Nazir, the household
head, wanted to farm all the land. In 1994, their household consisted of himself, his
younger son and his wife and three children, his cousin and his daughter and his
eldest son's son from his first wife. He himself has a part-time administrative job,
which involves him in a small amount of work every day. Both his sons are teachers,
one works in the Kargil area and spends nearly all his time there; the younger one is
posted in Sankhoo, where he stays in a relative's house and occasionally visits
Panikhar. His wife Sara, who is also a teacher, was posted in Suru Block and stays
there, as does his cousin, who is a janitor at the Girls' High School in Panikhar. They
also had a young man from Panikhar who came every day and worked as a servant
(duksrni) doing both house and agricultural work.
Sara, Nazir, his cousin and the duksmidid most of the agricultural work in this family,
with the assistance of his eldest grandson, who was about fourteen and the occasional
help of one of Nazir's daughters who is married in Panikhar. His sons never engaged
in heavy agricultural work, in common with many other Sum men who have
government jobs. Hence their family had a shortage of labour, particularly at harvest
when labour demands are heavy. The previous year they had been able to hire four
labourers from Doda who came up via the Chelong Nala route, but in 1994 the
deteriorating security situation meant that no one came. They were unable to get
hired labourers in Sum, although Sara managed to get some of the girls from her
school to come as milaks one day and the family of their duksmi also helped out.
Like other women in Sum with government jobs, Sara had to go to school six days a
week and work on the harvest for the rest of the day as well as preparing all the food
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for the family and performing numerous other tasks such as milking. Nazir toiled in
the fields from morning until night during this period, despite his age, at which most
people in Suru have given up agricultural work. In both 1993 and 1994 they also used
a tractor for part of their work. For example, in 1994 Nazir's younger son brought a
tractor from Sankhoo for both ploughing and threshing. There are only a few tractors
available in the valley, which can be hired by the day. They were used qwte
extensively for ploughing in Panikhar and Prantee, but I did not see them being used
at that time in any other village in the Block. Agricultural work is seen as being
demeaning by some men, but using or driving a tractor is regarded as modem and
exciting. Most of the families that used a tractor for ploughing were those in which the
men have white-collar government jobs and do not engage in agricultural work. So
the tractors were used both to allow men to withdraw from agricultural labour and
because they provided a symbol of being modern.
The withdrawal from agriculture labour is already seen as a sign of status in Kargil and
the trend is increasing in Suru. In Kargil itself, a significant proportion of the families of
the administrative elite do not have land in that area, either because they come from
other villages, or because they were never an agricultural family. It is now rare for
either women or men from this group to engage in agricultural work, besides tending
small vegetable and flower gardens next to the house, although most women still
engage in domestic work such as cooking and the washing of clothes. As one young
Suru woman remarked: "Of course women in Kargil have fair skins, because they just
sit at home smearing cream on their faces twenty-four hours a day. They usually do
not expect their children to help with the household work as women would in the
village. For example, one day a woman in Panikhar asked me why I used to fetch
water and do the washing-up instead of getting my children to do it, which is the
normal practice in Suru. She phrased this by saying: "Are you doing like the Officers
in Kargil ?", by which she was suggesting that I might be putting on airs.
Thus the use of tractors for ploughing seems to have been an attractive option for
status-conscious men with aspirations to the administrative elite, as it allowed them to
avoid manual labour in this exclusively male task and seem modern at the same time.
The use of a tractor-powered threshing machine was much less widespread and
seems to have only been resorted to by households that have large amounts of land,
a more practical reason for its use. The time of threshing and winnowing s a
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particularly critical part of the agricultural cycle in Suru, since adverse weather
conditions can considerably delay the whole process and ultimately risk the crop. In
Suru the grain (which is mainly barley) is all cut by hand using small scythes. At that
point if it has rained, the cut crop is left to lie in the fields until the sun dries it out and
then it is gathered into haystacks, which can be covered in the case of rain. Then a
round flat area is prepared called a yultak and a number of animals are tied to a
central post and made to walk round and round to trample the grain and remove it
from the straw. This task takes several days for the average household in Suru.
Then the winnowing process takes place, which consists of throwing the grain and
stalks into the air, so that the chaff is blown off by the wind. This is dependent on
there being little rain and a reasonable amount of breeze. In Suru, the weather can
break at any time and there is a considerable amount of precipitation in the summer.
For instance, the famine of 1957 was caused by a heavy snowfall in June which
destroyed the entire grain crop and, in 1996, there was a snowfall in August when the
crop was at its most vulnerable having been cut and not yet collected from the fields in
some villages. Thus the period between the harvest and the final extraction of the
grain is a tense and often frustrating one, which can take many days for those with
larger amounts of land; and the use of machinery can reduce this process to a single
day's work.
In comparison ploughing is a much less risky activity. It takes less than two days to
plough the average land holding in Suru. 1 Ploughing is done by two draught animals,
usually horses or dzos (male yak-cow cross-breeds), which pull a wooden plough
tipped with metal. They are driven by a single man and there is a taboo against
women performing this task. Then both women and men use various types of wooden
rakes to smooth the ploughed soil and build the pattern of banks for the irrigation
water in the field. Households usually combine with a neighbour or relative for this job
in a reciprocal exchange of assistance, so that each one need only have a single
draught animal.
1 Osmaston eta! have calculated that it takes about six days to plough the average land holding
of 30 to 40 kanals in neighbouring Zanskar (Osmaston, Frazer & Crook 1994:100).
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Picture 7.1 - Sadiak ploughing Agha Miggi Ort's fields in Taisuru
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Picture 7.2 - Threshing with a tractor and machine in Panikhar
241
Picture 7.3 - One of the Noon Public School boys at home in Panikhar
Picture 7.4 - Houses in Taisuru
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The yokma-pa aghas received help from their followers in the form of milaks, as for
other agricultural tasks. In 1994 I visited the team that was ploughing one of Agha
Miggi Ort's fields in Taisuru. It was the day that the milaks were to come from Taisuru
itself and, rather to my surprise, the people who were helping were mainly young men
from the richer and more prestigious yokma-pa households in the village and all the
younger members of the agha's household were engaged in the work. There were
two teams of animals and about a dozen people and the work was accompanied by
lots of joking and laughter. There was quite a contrast between the working team at
this time and at harvest, when the milaks that came were predominantly women from
among the 'ordinary' followers and only the women and male duksmifrom the agha's
house were engaged in the work. This is because there is an important difference in
the prestige implications of the various agricultural tasks. Agha Miggi Oil's younger
sons do not do a great deal of agricultural work; however, both they and he help with
the animals in the morning and evening, although I have never seen Agha Miggi Oil
himself do any heavy physical work.
Although Agha Miggi Oil and other important religious leaders do not engage in much
manual labour, there is no implication in his family's general attitude that suggests that
it is demeaning. However, the withdrawal from agricultural work among certain men in
Suru is now becoming much more widespread, as it is associated with being modern
and of higher status, particularly for men. In Panikhar there are now a number of
families in which the men and teenage boys no longer do farm work, whereas their
female relatives do. Ali's Hotel which is the only tea-shop/restaurant in Panikhar, is a
major focus for such men, particularly the younger ones. For most of the long summer
afternoons, there is usually a small gathering from Panikhar and the surrounding
villages, particularly young men with government jobs who come after work.
Meanwhile the women in their households do not visit the hotel and will often be
engaged in agricultural tasks until dusk. The older men tend to sit by shops and along
the bazaar, often minding their grandchildren as they are accustomed to do.
A few households who are more engaged in the non-agricultural economy, are starting
to withdraw from agriculture altogether. For example, neither Hajji Mirza nor his son
Haddi engage in agricultural work and the main part of their farming is done by Mehdi,
a man who they adopted from Parkachik when he was a child and his wife, who live in
the lower pail of the house. Nargis, Haddi's new wife from Kargil, will not be required
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to do agricultural work, as is the case of the other wives from the Kargil administrative
elite in Panikhar. In fact, all of the couples in such marriages effectively live in Kargil
rather than Panikhar. For instance, Haddi's family have lodgings in Kargil and he and
Nargis either stay there or at her family's house in the town. Engineer Nazir, Ghulam
Rassool's brother and his wife live in Kargil and occasionally visit Panikhar. The other
engineer who is married to a woman from the Kargil elite also lives in Kargil most of
the time and they occasionally visit Panikhar. By 1994 a number of other Sunnis from
Suru were thinking of building houses in Kargil. Kazim Sahib, the Sunni leader from
Sankhoo, was said to be in the process of selling most of his land as his family would
no longer farm there. Several Sunni Panikhar families had either moved or were
thinking of moving to the Kashmir valley, as opposed to Wardwan. In 1994, it was
noticeable that the majority of people who were moving out were Sunnis, largely
because more Sunnis had government jobs and were in a position to aspire to the
administrative elite. However, as I have shown, Shi'ahs such as Dr. Jaffar and Hajji
Mirza's family were also making closer ties with Kargil and moving more in that
direction.
The drift to Kargil has partly occurred because of a social preference on the part of
aspirants to the administrative elite but, the organisation of the administration itself
also plays an important part in this mobility. The majority of the administration of the
tehsil is situated in Kargil and government employees in the higher grades will spend
most of their career in Kargil or its environs (see Chapter 4). In addition, increasingly,
people from Suru are having to spend more time in Kargil and even further afield in
Srinagar in particular, for work, education and business. So a significant number of
people from Suru now have a (usually single roomed) lodging (dera) in Kargil, where
one or more family members stay a good deal of the time because they have to work
or study there.2 Nevertheless, the vast majority of households do not have such
lodgings in the town.
2 People who have white-collar government jobs are usually allocated a lodging in government
quarters, most of which are in Baroo, the administrative area near Kargil town. These are quite
salubrious and have amenities such as their own kitchen/bathroom and access to a toilet.
Some richer families also have better quality lodgings, but most people have very small rooms
without adequate facilities.
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The rural people from all parts of the tehsil, who are spending more of their time in
Kargil are predominantly male. There are however, a growing number of young
women, both Sunnis and Shi'ahs, from Suru who have gone to study in 11th and 12th
class in the Girls' Higher Secondary School; 3 but the older people in their families
usually insist that they spend a good deal of their time back in the village, both during
periods of intense agricultural activity and in the winter. Educated young men and
women are almost universally uninterested in agriculture as a possible occupation,
which almost inevitably will lead to the further marginalisation of the agricultural
economy. Thus they join the swelling ranks of the urban students and unemployed
who are becoming more disgruntled at their position, as was illustrated by their
demonstrations during the election of 1996, but for whom it is difficult to see a role in
the foreseeable future.
This progressive relocation of the administrative elite to Kargil and the shift of focus
away from agriculture among the majority of educated people are having serious
consequences in terms of both the development of agriculture in the rural areas, as is
officially supported and encouraged by government development efforts, but
practically neglected; and in the phenomenon of the rapidly increasing numbers of the
urban-oriented unemployed. Unfortunately, both of these problems seem to be partly
the result of government policies which are intended to develop the area. In the next
two sections I want to discuss other changes that are taking place in social behaviour
in Suru and, in later section, I shall examine some of the political consequences of
urbanisation for Suru.
(iii) Changes in the Household and Gender Roles
The change of emphasis away from agriculture and towards a more self-consciously
modern style is also reflected in changes in the architecture and organisation of
houses particularly in Panikhar. When I first visited there in 1981/2 the houses in the
village were small and single storey and built in a cluster in the centre of the village.
Internally most houses only had a small and simple kitchen with a rudimentary central
hearth; although some had an additional room for receiving guests called a bokhari
and occasionally one or two other small rooms. These living quarters were usually
3	 are also several dozen younger Suru children, who are mainly from Panikhar and
Prantee who are attending the govemment-sponsored Vidyalaya boarding school in Baroo..
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raised off the ground and reached by some stone steps, the lower part of the house
consisting of stables for the animals.
Since the mid-i 980's many houses have been built in the new style. The majority of
these are in Panikhar and Prantee, but there are now several of this type in other
villages. These are initiatly made with a single storey and then a further floor is added
later. They are normally constructed of stone and concrete, as opposed to the stone
and mud-brick of the older houses and they usually have large windows and several
rooms, often including a glass room that catches the winter sun and a bathroom. In
most houses the bathroom consists of a concrete or tile-lined area with a drainage
hole and water is brought in jugs. As far as I know, only Ghulam Hyder's house in
Choskore and Ghulam Rassool's in Panikhar have bathrooms with their own water
supply.
In Panikhar and Prantee in particular, a number of these new houses do not include
animal shelters, since people now often keep the old house to use as an animal
shelter and barn. This physical separation of people from animals and the other
paraphernalia of the agricultural economy is significant and is also reflected in a
growing fashion towards orderliness and cleanliness within the house itself. For
example, in the last few years in Panikhar there has been a fashion, particularly
among women with government jobs, for constructing a new style of kitchen. These
usually contain a set of elaborate shelving (tsangs) with a display of gleaming pots and
other kitchen utensils that is almost universally found in kitchens in Leh and is
common in Kargil; and the kitchen itself is kept as clean and tidy as possible. These
are in marked contrast to the majority of kitchens in the area, which are much more
disorderly and do not contain any special features of display. The leading aghas'
families in Taisuru have larger than average houses with many rooms and concrete
bathrooms, which are still rare in Suru; but, in other respects their houses are much
like those of the majority of peasant households.
Among those who espouse the new tidier style there is a tendency to compare it
favourably with that of the average Suru house, as the following quote illustrates. The
speaker is a woman from the village of Chushot near Leh who was married to a man
in Panikhar in about 1970, describing what Suru seemed like to her when she first
came there:
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"You would not believe how dirty it was. You know that when you go into a
house in Leh that everything is clean. The pots are all washed and set out
nicely on the shelves. Well, here everything was filthy, the animals lived in the
kitchen with the humans and nothing was ever washed. They used to cook the
food in the same pan that they had used before without washing it - ever. The
whole village was filthy and, as you know, most of it still is. Even when you
look at houses like X (a Sunni household which is now relatively wealthy and
have a large smart house), they were exactly the same then too."
This emphasis on orderliness and cleanliness in the newer houses is frequently
commented on by the women that live in them, particularly Sunni women from
Panikhar. Several of them said that neighbouring villages were dirty and they would
question my willingness to visit houses in them, saying that everything was so filthy in
contrast to Panikhar and their houses. They also sometimes made derogatory
comments about the state of other women's houses and housekeeping in Panikhar
and Prantee. I also felt under considerable pressure to keep my own room clean and
tidy, so as not to seem slovenly.
In such households, there is also a noticeable increase in authority, order and
differentiation between people, that to some extent corresponds with the increasing
order in the house itself. Aspirants to the administrative elite are much more likely to
treat their servants as social inferiors; whereas, even in the aghas' households they
are treated as social equals. This is just one indication that within the household,
differentiation and authority were relatively weak in the past and in most continue to be
so (see Chapter 2). Although in theory, authority is mainly vested in the household
head, people nearly always referred to their parents rather than just their father when
decision-making was discussed. Most peasant households work as a team, with both
adults and children working with little prompting, although obviously children are more
likely to be told what to do and scolded, as they are learning their roles. A striking
degree of co-operation also marks the mother-in-law - daughter-in-law relationship,
which is often quite cordiai and close.
However, this lack of differentiation and strong notions of authority within the
household is now changing. One aspect of this is a particularly marked shift in the
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way that masculinity is constructed. A number of Suru men stressed to me that in
Islam it is one of the most important duties of the father - as opposed to the mother -
to feed and educate his children. This view represents a change in focus, since their
major priority in the past was to fulfil religious duties and to go on ziarat. Some men
are also quite noticeably attempting to exert authority over their wives and children
and create a new role for themselves as patriarch - not always completely
successfully. I think that one reason for this is the recent trend for universal marriage
and the division of households in each generation. Nowadays, there is much greater
emphasis on the household as a unit and many contain a single adult male and, as a
result, authority and masculinity within the household had to be renegotiated.
This is particularly marked among men who aspire to the administrative elite. What is
striking about this is that formal behaviour - that would normally be reserved for certain
public gatherings is now often found in the intimacy of the immediate family and home.
In several households of my acquaintance, all the women and girls whisper, when the
male authority figures are present. Similarly, men may insist on sitting in a guest
room, or special place and being served food and tea in a more ceremonial and
respectful way than other household members. When a guest arrives at the house, it
is not unusual to hear a man bossing his wife about preparing tea in order to exert his
authority.
Such men are likely to subscribe strongly to the ideal of the Islamic male, who has
authority and provides for his family. They also commonly comment on this,
describing themselves as being more moral as compared to the more profligate
ordinary people in Suru, who, they say, do not bother about these things. It is striking
that this kind of behaviour is much more common among men who have government
jobs and who are absent from the household because their work or posting is
elsewhere. These attitudes were most common among Sunni men. However, these
are also the views of some of the parents and management committee of the Noon
Public School. For example, in the family of one of the Noon Public School pupils, the
father insisted that his children said their prayers before and after dinner and sat very
quietly when they were in the kitchen. He also frequently gave frequent orders to his
wife, as she prepared the meal.
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In these families the notion of 'the agha will tell me off' (aaghas kha tseat') is being
replaced by 'my father/brother will tell me off'. Thus there seems to be a shift of
authority away from the agha into the household.
There are also some significant changes of attitude taking place among women who
have government education. The manner in which these women enter into
employment is very different from that of men. Nearly all employed women work in
relatively junior positions either as teachers, or in the medical service. Although they
enjoy a degree of respect and enhanced status in Suru, they are still restricted in their
movements and normally expected to do a large amount of agricuPtural work as well.
The government policy is to place women in jobs near to their home as much as
possible; however, in Suru, even most of the local men with similar jobs are normally
posted within the area. Nevertheless it is difficult for a woman to aspire to higher
levels of education and employment, as this would require them spending time in other
parts of the tehsil or even the State and their male relatives will usually not agree to
this. For instance, a young woman from Panikhar wants to train as a nurse (which is a
well-paid and respected occupation) but her father refused to let her, as the training
college is in Srinagar.
As a result, educated and employed women in Suru have to limit their field of activity
mainly to the house and the village. One of the places where their relative wealth and
status can be expressed is in the house itself and this can be seen in their kitchens
some of which have elaborate shelving and many utensils, much in the style of a Leh
kitchen (see above). Similarly, these women dress quite smartly and wear brightly
coloured clothes made of synthetic materials, whereas peasant women usually wear
darkly coloured clothes some of which are made of local wool.
Thus, at a time when Suru men's field of activity is expanding and most importantly
finding a focus in the town and outside of Suru, most women remain relatively
restricted to the rural area, as they were in the past. However, women with
government jobs do gain a degree of independence unknown to peasant women since
they have their own income through employment which they can use for their own
purposes. For instance, one of the younger teachers in Panikhar went on a trip to Leh
in 1994 without telling her husband; and other employed women use their salaries to
make similar trips to Kargil. Nevertheless, women are not usually encouraged to
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continue their studies beyond the point that they will be eligible for a job, which means
10th, or increasingly, 12th class; and they nearly all work in jobs such as teaching and
medical auxiliaries, which are considered both respectable for women and do not
usually involve working outside Suru Block.
In Kargil itself, there is now a sizeable older generation of women in the administrative
elite who have nearly all been teachers for several decades and there are many
younger women with government jobs. The older women in particular have a good
deal of freedom in how they run their lives. For instance, one of the BDO's relatives
who s widowed effectively runs her large household and is quite capable of taking on
any man in a political debate. On one occasion a prominent agha was extolling the
virtues of Shi'ism to me and she kept countering his points. For instance, when he
said that Shi'ahs were peaceable, she said: TMS0 what about the Iran-Iraq war?" When
he said that the lslamiya school was providing education, she said: aBut not for girls."4
A number of Kargili women in their twenties and thirties now have degrees or are
studying for degrees. Nevertheless, there is a noticeable difference in the access of
women to the most public and political spaces. For example, there are no women
activists at all in the political or religious parties locally and local women do not visit
cafes or restaurants in Kargil, or wander too much in the bazaar. The only Kargili
woman who has a prominent government post is the BDO's sister. She was the first
female graduate from Kargil and is currently the headmistress of the Central
Government funded Vidhyalaya School in Baroo.
I am not suggesting that this gendering is a standard or inevitable process, since for
example, in Leh, gender relations are very different from those in Suru and Kargil, so
the role of educated women is not the same. Of course, men in Suru went outside the
area to labour, study and trade in the past, whereas women stayed in the village, so
the gendered ordering of space was there before. However, at that time, men's
primary focus was on the village and local area, whereas now, for some of them at
least, it has shifted towards the town and the wider urban context.
' A man in Kargil, complaining of the forceful nature of some of the elite women's personalities,
famously remarked: "Why is it that we in Kargil have to live in Iraq?", which is a reference to
some of the wives being like Saddam Husain, who is an arch enemy of Shi'ism.
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At the same time, the emergence of the elite woman, who has a salary and a relative
amount of control over her life, is a common phenomenon in India and elsewhere.
Similar processes have been described by a number of writers, such as Connell,
Sangari and Vaid and Chatterjee, who have recognised the importance of gender in
processes of modernisation, urbanisation and the creation of a national elite (Connell
1987:119, Sangari & Vaid 1989, Chatterjee 1993:127). But, as I shall show, despite
the relative autonomy of a minority of women in the administrative elite, the majority of
peasant women, do not have the same opportunities and to some extent their situation
is worsening.
Another aspect of these emerging roles, is that there are some significant changes
taking place in the ways that people interact, particularly in patterns of address, as I
shall show in the next section.
(iv) Changing Modes of Speech in Public Interactions
When I first visited Suru in 1981, it was very noticeable that the Suru dialect of
Ladakhi (Purigi) - like that of neighbouring Zanskar - was markedly less differentiating
than that of the Leh area to which I was accustomed. In Leh, variations in vocabulary
and terms of address are used extensively to express status difference. There is an
elaborate honorific vocabulary to be used with or between people who are of high
status, or whom the speaker wishes to respect but, nowadays, are widely used in
public contacts so that it seems impolite to address acquaintances and strangers
using the non-formal terminology. 5 There are also a limited number of terms which
are reserved for talking to or about highly respected people, especially rinpoches (re-
incarnate lamas). In Suru, you normally use the same forms of words irrespective of
whom you are speaking to or about. A very limited honorific vocabulary is used for
aghas and their families alone, such as agha and archo (agha's daughter), sangma
(food touched by the agha), zizi (mother), no-no (boy or younger man) and cho-cho
(non-sayyid wife of an agha). However, with the exception of the terms archo and
agha, they are used much more for the families of aghas who are also important
religious leaders.
5 I am referring here to the use of terms such as skyod - for come and go.
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People in Suru have started to use a very limited number of honorific loan-words from
the Leh dialect (such as skyod for both "come"and "go, particularly when speaking
to male members of important agha families. However, this usage is of recent
adoption by all accounts and the terms are used patchily and often incorrectly. The
most enthusiastic use of these words was by some of the archos when speaking to
the aghas in their own families. A limited use of the term "skyod" is also becoming
common among men of the bureaucratic elite, although most people still use the more
egalitarian style of speaking and some people now subtly emphasise that they do, as
a sign of resisting these changes.
Normal speech is also extremely direct in its content as well as its form. A typical
chance encounter with an acquaintance or stranger may go something like this:
Other person: "Where are you going?" (Non-honorific language)
Self: "Up the valley, ' (This is a standard answer)
Other person: "Why?"
Self: "I'm going to see Fatima."
Other person: "Why are you going to go and see her?"
In this exchange, the interlocutor could have been a small girl or an old man, as the
way that I was addressed would have been perfectly appropriate for either, since age
is not a basis for ranking in ordinary interchanges. Gender considerations would
however come into play, if those concerned were unrelated people of opposite sexes -
and most particularly if they were unmarried - in which case some avoidance or
circumspection is necessary. Nevertheless, despite the fact that both gender and age
are undoubtedly important organising principles in some aspects of social life, these
distinctions do not imply differences of status.
Only leading aghas are treated with any particular respect. For others, any honour
with which they are treated is based on the individual having gained a particular status
such as haffl or government servant. Thus to a large extent status is not ascribed by
birth, but is to do with a particular level of learning or employment status. This is
reflected in words used as respectful terms of address, such as: hajfi (used for both
men and women, doctor (sometimes used for other medical personnel as well),
munshi (used for learned people and miscellaneous government servants), tikadar
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(contractor), ustani and master (female and male teacher respectively) as well as a
plethora of government job titles.
The use of most of these occupational terms is very recent (as are the jobs
themselves) and so they are often used rather inaccurately. For instance., one of my
best friends always called me ustad which is the Urdu for male teacher. At the
moment there is a great deal of ambiguity and room for manoeuvre. I might be
addressed by others as "angrez Nicky" (English Nicky), which is the most
disrespectful, or uustani (respectful term for a female teacher), "madam" (which was
the name used by many of the school parents and management committee for me and
is used for female teachers of non-local origin), or even "Nicky sahib" At the moment
there is an increase in the use of the terms for the higher status new occupations, but
they are not used for people with low-status government jobs - such as chaprassi (a
general factotum in schools and offices). Thus to be addressed with a title is an
important marker of being of above average status in Suru.
There has been a similar shift in the use of Urdu words in everyday speech,
particularly among the educated members of Sunni families in Panikhar and Prantee.
In these families, the normal kinship terminology used in Suru is being replaced by the
use of Urdu terminology, which is seen by them as sounding more sophisticated and
respectful. They are also much more likely to use Urdu words for other things, even
those for which there is a Suru dialect term.
Originally, I wondered whether these families had always used a greater admixture of
Urdu, because of their putative origins in Kashmir. However, most older and
uneducated people - especially women - still normally only use the Suru dalect words.
One striking feature of Suru life at the moment, is that many uneducated women do
not understand Urdu at all, even if they have access to it on the radio or the television.
For instance, one of Dr. Jaftar and Qamer Ali's sisters, Latifa, who is now married to a
member of the Munshi Habibullah p'ha -spun in Kargil, told me that she does not
understand the Urdu/Hindi television programmes that all her family watch.
In Kargil town, the use of honorific titles and more formal modes of address has
become much more widespread than in Suru. For example, the term "kacho", is a
term which in the past was only used for men from the handful of hereditary noble
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families of Kargil tehsil but is now used as a respectful title for Shi'ah men from the
bureaucratic elite, for whom there is not an obvious occupational title. The term
"sahib" is usually used for Sunnis of a similar status. The Zonal Education Officer to
the upper Suru valley was referred to simply as "the ZEO"or as Tanveer Sahib -
Tanveer being the name he uses for Urdu poetry. Thus it would seem, that as in
Suru, the Sunni bureaucratic elite tend to use Urdu terms as being indicative of higher
status.
As with the other changes I have described, these are more marked among the men
and those involved in the administration. One place where this is particularly evident
is on the bus journey to Kargil, which acts as a rite of passage from the rural to the
urban area.
(v) Going to Town - the Bus Journey to Kargil and the Changing Political
Geography of Suru
A high degree of mobility is not new to Suru people. Nevertheless, I would argue that
the trends away from agriculture as an occupation and towards the town represent a
significant shift in the political geography of Suru in the last two decades. One of the
most striking illustrations of these changes can be seen in the personal experience of
one of the leaders of the anti-school faction. He told me that when he was a child he
had had the opportunity of going as a government-sponsored student to a boarding
school in Jammu, but his parents had refused to let him go because he would
inevitably be unable to keep to the strict 'sherpa' prohibition on touching anything wet
that had been touched by a non-Muslim and consequently come to harm. But by the
1 990s his brother lived permanently in Kargil and he himself spent most winters in
Delhi with his wife and children and his sons were attending a religiously mixed
boarding school in the plains; his parents, however, preferred to stay in Suru.
Another example is that of a young Sunni engineer from Prantee who had a very good
job working for a company in Calcutta, but he had returned to the area at his parents'
request and was working as a government Junior Engineer. Hence ideas of social
space and boundaries appear to have changed quite dramatically over one
generation.
As notions of social space have changed with increasing urbanisation, so too has
power shifted to the male urban-focused administrative elite. One place where this
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distinction is constructed is on the bus to and from Kargil, where men with government
jobs create a mutually enhancing camaradene, that excludes both peasants and
women.
This bus journey to Kargil is a social event in itself, since any traveller from Suru can
expect to travel with a number of acquaintances. The bus runs twice a day in the
summer and once in the spring and autumn and takes about five hours to cover the
fifty-eight kilometres to Kargil. The main stop for the bus in Suru is Panikhar, where
the evening bus remains over night, although in the summer, it goes on to Parkachik -
at the top of the valley - once or twice a week. The morning bus is usually quite empty
when it leaves Panikhar, but the midday one is already full. The bus fills up
considerably as it travels towards Kargil and on the return journey it is already full
when it leaves Kargil, hence many passengers cannot get a seat for the long
uncomfortable ride.
There can be a range of travellers on the bus, including foreign tourists in the summer;
but the majority are people travelling to or from Kargil for work, business or study.
There are usually few peasant women, as they rarely visit Kargil and are often
discouraged from boarding the bus if they want to take a short ride with their baskets
within the valley, because they bring in dirty baskets and loads. When they do
manage to board, they are rarely able or try to get a seat, even if they are rather old
and infirm, but small children will usually be accommodated on someone's lap. The
time when peasant women take local trips is during the autumn marriage season,
when they attend weddings in other villages.
Educated young women, such as teachers and younger women who are studying in
the Girls' High School in Kargil and older women who have sons working in Kargil, are
treated with more respect and, if all the seats are taken, they may be offered a seat by
a relative. However, since most of these women came from Panikhar and Prantee, a
relative would save them seats on the outward journey and for the return journey
seats could be reserved in advance in Kargil. There is no general obligation for men
to give seats to women. I was particularly aware of this myself since, on many
occasions, I boarded the bus without a seat and had to stand for a long time. This is
embarrassing for women, as the bus is a very male and public space, so the ideal is to
be able to sit down and not appear conspicuous. On one occasion, when I boarded a
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packed bus at Sankhoo, Agha Mehdi, one of Agha Miggi Oil's sons, got up and gave
me his seat and there was an audible muttering of disapproval among some of the
passengers, who were saying things like: "Fancy an agha standing up for her."
There is a marked contrast between the way that women are treated and the way that
many men treat each other on the bus. As the bus approaches Kargil, what seems to
happen is that a marked male camaraderie and ranking emerges, particularly among
the men from, or with aspirations towards the administrative elite. The seats near the
front of the bus being the most prestigious, since the road is extremely rough and
people sitting at the rear of the bus are constantly thrown about. If an important officer
- maybe a 'non-local' - gets on the bus, then lesser government employees in the front
seats will normally leap to their feet and offer him the seat and may in turn be offered
another seat by someone else. Often during the course of the journey the seating will
be rearranged several times in this way as people get on and off.
At the same time, these men usually greet each other effusively and shake hands.
The conversation is in Urdu if a non-local officer is present, but otherwise it is in the
local language. However, some honorific language is normally used. An officer can
expect to receive this kind of respect from other male government employees and
men working in the new economy, but not from other people. Thus their status is
enhanced and displayed, not by acts of deference from peasants, but by the
behaviour among themselves. This is in contrast with the treatment of an important
agha who will always get a seat and will be offered a front seat by anyone from Suru.
His family members will also get a place, although not necessarily a front one.
By the time that the bus reaches Kargil from Suru, the camaraderie that is created on
board, shows that not only educated women are excluded from the society of
government workers, but so too are ordinary peasants, possibly to a greater extent.
This has real consequences for people's access to resources in Kargil. For women,
the differentiation between public and private space is particularly marked in the town.
I myself found it very difficult to spend too much time on school business in Kargil, as
the constant visiting of government offices and walking in the bazaar that it involves
entails one in effectively parading in predominantly male spaces, which is difficult,
although educated women are treated courteously in the offices themselves.
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Male peasants can move around Kargil without notice, but they are ignored when they
make requests in many offices and so find it very difficult to obtain things to which they
are fully entitled. I witnessed a particularly poignant example of this in the summer of
1996. Husain, Sakina's husband from Panikhar, who was in his early forties, had died
a few weeks previously, leaving Sakina and children whose ages ranged from
nineteen down to three. He had had a job in the Agricultural Department.
Government rules specify that his widow is entitled to a small pension and that his job
(which is unskilled) should be given to his eldest son, who was nineteen at the time.
However, both of these concessions needed to be authorised by an officer in the
department in Kargil issuing an order to that effect.
During the three or four weeks that we were there, the eldest son made the five hour
bus journey to Kargil several times and was forced to stay there one or two nights
each time, to try and obtain the necessary orders. After having no success for a
couple of weeks, he went to Qamer Ali, who tried to help. When we left several weeks
later, he still had not got the orders he needed and it was suggested that the officers in
the department were expecting him to bribe them. I frequently heard similar stories
about other departments - even Kargil-based teachers with relatively good contacts
have to pay bribes to get their pay rises enacted. It was also said that people have to
pay bribes of thousands of rupees in Srinagar and Jammu for sought after places at
university to study medicine and other prestigious subjects.
The aghas and other members of the management committee encounter similar
difficulties in performing management committee business. Agha Miggi Ort rarely
dealt with school business when he visited Kargil, despite showing much more day-to-
day interest in the school than anyone else. This is because he does not have any
particular authority in the urban administrative environment. He and his family stay in
the more rural muhal!ah of Goma Kargil, above Kargil town, rather than the town itself,
or Baroo, where most of the administrative elite live. They mainly move in circles
outside those of the administrative elite, as they do not have kinship connections with
any of those families and their main contacts are other Shi'ite clerics. Agha Miggi Oil
is also unfamiliar with the structures and the major languages of the administration.
For example, on one occasion he asked me to help him to fill in a primary school
registration form in Engi sh and Hindi for one of the young aghas from Langkartse
who stays at his house. He always had to ask someone else to write school reports
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and records in English or Urdu. Thus the structures in Kargil make it very difficult for
him to translate his powerful position in Suru and his control of a significant proportion
of the tehsll's electorate into a modicum of power there. However, Qamer AU is able
to be much more effective in dealing with the administration as he has secular
education and his family are now married into the administrative elite and hence he
can expect a degree of help from relatives in the administration.
The social reverse of the bus journey to Kargil is when officers from Kargil visit the
villages. Most of them come by jeep and stay for very short periods in the rural area.
A particularly farcical example of this was a visit by some agricultural officers to
Taisuru, who had come to talk to farmers about ways to kill pests on vegetables,
which are now grown by some families in Suru. They held a meeting in one of the
richer houses in Taisuru, which I attended, as I was called out of school by a villager
insisting that I came as my presence had been requested by the officers. When I got
there it turned out that they had heard about me and just wanted to meet me and the
Taisuru people had obliged, as they felt they had to please them. The meeting
consisted of the officers, who were 'non-local', their Kargili assistant and a number of
the male householders from Taisuru. The officers described how to prevent slugs in
Urdu, while the assistant urged the Taisuru people in Purigi to ask them to give them
some free sprays. In fact no one responded to this and there was very little dialogue
between the farmers and the officers.
Many of the officers in Kargil, dismiss the Suru people as being backward and
religious fanatics and use these stereotypes as an excuse not to implement policies or
engage in community development initiatives in the area. The people in Suru are also
frequently blamed for their own poverty. For example, it is government policy in
Ladakh to try and promote family planning and many Sunni women in Suru do use
contraception, as do a few Shi'ahs. But it is often said that it is impossible to promote
its use among Shi'ahs since the religious leaders refuse to allow any kind of
contraception. Certainly in Suru in recent years, very little effort had been made to
give women information on contraception. 6 However, in the winter of 1993, Dr.
Asghar from Kargil visited Suru to initiate the household surveys by the medical
6 Contraception has been effectively banned in Kashmir by militant groups, but this has nothing
to do with Kargil.
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department in which I took part. He was very keen to promote family planning in the
area, particularly in order to increase spacing between pregnancies, s nce a major
cause of the very high levels of maternal and infant mortality is the physical weakness
of mothers caused by short birth intervals. He also stressed that the use of
contraception for spacing of births is not un-Islamic, as some people claim, as it is
being used for the preservation of health and life.
Dr. Asghar went to see Agha Baqir, who agreed for the surveyors to promote the idea
of contraception among women in the area and the next day Agha Miggi Ort also
agreed. We then talked about the benefits of increasing the birth interval and ways of
improving mother and child nutrition to all the younger Shi'ah women that we met. We
found that the vast majority of them were very interested in the idea of contraception
and in the next few months many women spontaneously asked me about it.
To summarise, on the bus to Kargil there is an increase in various divisions which are
certainly not absent, but are relatively muted, most of the time in the village but come
to the fore in the urban context. In particular, I have illustrated the social divide
between the urban administration and the countryside. In the next section I shall look
at how some of these issues pertain to the Noon Public School and how they are
negotiated by the management committee.
(vi) The Yokma Faction and the School - Resetting the Balance?
In 1993/4 the Noon Public School was a very modest affair, as it was housed in a
typically small primary school building and did not have much equipment beyond some
floor mats, blackboards and a few chairs for the teachers. However, it was clearly
regarded by many of the children's parents as being a separate social space that was
primarily for those with secular education and inside which they felt uncomfortable
entering. These were primarily the mothers and older uneducated female relatives
and older men who do not have any secular education. They would normally hang
around near the school but would very rarely even come up on to the veranda or
speak to the teachers. Whereas people who had secular education were usually
much more confident and would come straight up to the veranda and might sit down
with the teachers. The obvious exception to this general rule was Agha Miggi Ort. He
was the most regular visitor to the school, but Agha Baqir virtually never came there.
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Avoidance of the school by women who do not have secular education reflected the
more general lack of involvement of any yokma-pa women in the school, in marked
contrast to their importance in the faction itself. I was the only woman on the
management committee and the only female teacher. There was a degree of
commitment to have at least one female teacher after I left, but mainly in order to have
someone who would be kind to the younger children. Initially there was only one girl in
the school and, even by 1996, there were only six as compared to fifty five boys.
Three of these had free places.
The lack of girls among the pupils is not because they do not attend school at all,
rather the parents usually send daughters to the government school as they are not
expected to continue to the highest levels of education. I never heard anyone express
disapproval of girls attending the school, on the contrary, the management committee
were pleased that sponsorship was obtained from the Save the Children Fund project
in Kargil for three girls in 1994. Within the school itself two of the girls were very quiet
and unconfident and being there seemed to have an automatically infantilising effect
on them. The youngest of these two was a girl from Taisuru, who was almost
incapable of even putting a mark on the paper of her copybook after she had been in
the school for several months and had not settled down in school at all. However, one
day I saw her by the stream in Taisuru with a big pan of dirty dishes that she was
competently washing. Clearly the small number of girls in the school ties in with the
more general attitudes to male and female occupations, which the school may be
reinforcing.
One of the initial management committee meetings adopted a school uniform identical
to that worn by the children at the Suru Valley Public School in Kargil, which itself is
modelled on that of the Moravian Mission School, one of the largest and most
successful private schools in Leh. However, that of the Noon Public School has a
more Islamic style of dress for girls. The uniform consists of a shirt, jumper, tie and
trousers for boys; and a salwar-kamiz head-scarf, jumper and optional school smock
for girls. This uniform, would have been politically contentious for many Shi'ah clerics
only a decade before, but in 1993 apparently it was adopted without any particular
argument. But by the early 1 990s, even the Mutahari School, which is run by the
Ayatollah Khomeini Memonal Trust and has several branches in and around Kargil,
has a standard school uniform, albeit with an Islamic green shirt and no tie, since their
use is apparently frowned upon in post-revolutionary Iran. The religious objections to
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the wearing of uniform seem much less important than in the past and western-style
dress is now standard for most young men with secular education in Suru.
Nevertheless, there are contradictory opinions in the management committee itself
about the general purpose and effect of the school, which are neatly illustrated by the
attitudes to this uniform among the members. Despite the similarity in the form of the
uniform to that of the schools in Kargil and Leh, there is a great difference in the way it
is worn by the pupils of the Noon Public School. In the towns, children turn out each
morning in a full set of uniform, which is normally very well-kept, clean and ironed.
They themselves are also freshly scrubbed and have their hair neatly combed. Urban
schools strictly enforce cleanliness and the wearing of full uniform for the students and
children in the town - particularly those from the administrative elite - are always
cleaned up when they go out.
However, in Suru, only a few families dress their children in clean clothes for everyday
wear. Most wear local style clothes outside school and these are usually dirty, as are
those of their parents, since they are involved in agricultural and other heavy work
much of the time. In the Noon Public School, all the children possessed a uniform,
which they were meant to wear every day dunng the summer months. Each morning
one of the teachers usually made a cursory inspection of the children's' uniform at
prayers and he would tell them off if they did not have the correct uniform, or if it was
not washed. However, they would often come to the school in other clothes and both
those and their uniform were frequently not in very good shape.
The two boys from the aghas' families rarely came to school in the correct or clean
uniform. Their families thought it was unimportant and they had some misgivings
about the dress-code. For instance, Archo Taiba, Agha Baqir's daughter and Agha
Miggi Ort's daughter-in-law, who has a child at the school, was very incensed one day,
because a temporary teacher from Kargil had criticised the school's children for being
dirty and unkempt. As she pointed out, parents such as herself in the villages had far
too much work to do to be washing their children's clothes all the time, as women with
jobs and no land in Kargil could do. Similarly, as soon as the weather got cold in the
autumn, Agha Miggi Oil made a point of asking the teachers to tell the children that
they should wear some decent warm local clothes to school. The aghas' attitude was
commented on by two members of the management committee, both of whom had
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firm footholds in Kargil in terms of government employment and commercial
occupations. They criticised the way that certain parents sent their children to school
without taking any care over their appearance and their studies. One of them likened
this to the way that people sent their animals to wander freely in the hills during the
day. As far as I could gather, they regarded a transformation in their children being a
necessary part of the educative process; whereas the aghas saw secular education
as being an addition to the existing person, who remained basically unchanged.
This difference of opinion is at the heart of the dilemma that the yokma-pa faces,
which is whether they could simply take on secular education and government jobs
and remain much as they were before, or whether the elite of the faction would join the
administrative elite in Kargil and, so some extent, leave Suru behind. This was
illustrated quite neatly by the events at my own leaving ceremony, which was one of a
number of large and impressive social events that the management committee
organised, such as the opening ceremony and founding day, that were clearly
designed to increase its profile and prestige. This event took place at the Dak
Bungalow at Taisuru on a Sunday at the end of the school year in December 1994. It
was organised by the management committee, all of whom attended, in addition to all
the children and some of the fathers. The ceremony consisted of a presentation to
myself of a pashmina shawl by Dr. Jaffar, on behalf of the management committee,
which was wrapped over the dahon (head scarf) that I was already wearing. I was
then given a katag (ceremonial scarf) by each child from the school in turn. This was
an entirely invented ceremony, but several people commented jokingly that I was like
a bag-mo festooned with the two dahons and the katags.
Only a month before I had been present at the departure of Master Salaam, a
Kashmiri teacher from the Girls' High School in Panikhar, who had been one of the
most popular teachers in the Block. He had been posted back to his home area of
Anantnag, but before he left he assured everyone that he would try and return to work
in Suru in the future. He also tried to arrange for his son to come and work at the
Noon Public School. When he left on the bus for Kargil he was seen off by a large
group of women teachers and older girls from the school, some of whom had wept
every time his departure was mentioned for several days before. Everyone was crying
and some of the older girls were quite grief stricken. Master Salaam himself wept
much of the way to Kargil. By the end of my own leaving ceremony I was getting a bit
tearful but no one else was. I would like to think that this was because I was the only
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woman there, as the only other females were the young girls from the school, who are
not yet of an age to weep in that way.
After the main part of my leaving ceremony, most of the adults went into the glass
room in the Dak Bungalow for a meal of meat and rice that was being prepared by
some of the non-management committee parents. Inside the room, the two aghas
and another from Langkartse, Dr. Jaffar and I were all seated on chairs in the places
of honour at one side of the room. A few others were sitting on chairs at the side, with
some of the younger men standing at one side. As people came and went in the
room, there was a huge amount of polite offering of chairs going on and, eventually,
all the hajjis were also seated. We then had a debate about the curriculum. At the
end of a brief discussion, involving about six of us, the haul-pa's suggestion that we
should continue to follow the pattern of the Suru Valley Public School in Kargil was
adopted.
When the meeting started to break up, the topic of the hospital jeep came up, as it
was currently in Kargil when it should have been in Suru. The driver had apparently
taken it to Kargil without Dr. Jaffar's authorisation and had then complained that Dr.
Jaffar had attacked him. The officer in charge of the medical service, who is a
'difficult' person, was ill-disposed to Dr. Jaffar. So, rather than sending the jeep back,
he had kept it in Kargil. The yokma-pa leadership decided to use the opportunity to
send a signal to Kargil from the police post demanding that the jeep be returned. This
incident illustrated two things, firstly that the yokma faction was using its influence to
get resources for the area that would benefit everyone, as they had in the case of Dr.
Jaffar's own appointment; and, secondly, that it is always an uphill struggle for Suru to
get what it is entitled to from the administrative centre in Kargil, as the politics of Kargil
are very removed from their interests.
By the time I returned to Suru in 1996, the situation was about to change dramatically
in some respects, since Qamer Au (Dr. Jaffar's brother) was elected as the MLA for
Kargil and was subsequently appointed to the important position of the Minister of
Public Works in the Jammu and Kashmir government. Thus the yokma faction
seemed to have become more central than it had been in 1994, aided by the fact that
Qamer Ali's family had obtained secular education and entered urban politics and the
administration, but had remained loyal to the yokma-pa leaders and the interests of
people in Suru. However, it is pertinent to the theme of this chapter, that the political
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geography of administrative power means that Qamer Au shall have to spend most of
his time in Jammu and Srinagar, so he will be physically removed from the area he is
representing.
(vii) Conclusions
In this chapter, I have described two types of changes that are taking place in Suru at
the moment. The first are explicit changes in the aspirations and style of behaviour
among people who are engaged in the government economy, who increasingly
distance themselves the agricultural economy and the rural area. Nevertheless, as I
have described in other chapters, the attainment of a job let alone membership of the
administrative elite may be an unrealisable dream, for most men, evidence of which
can be seen at the moment in the considerable student and young unemployed unrest
in Kargil.
As in the last chapter, I have also tried to emphasise that the changes in attitude that I
am describing are not confined to any particular religious group, although they are
more marked among the Sunnis in Suru, largely - I believe - because they currently
have a greater involvement with the government economy and because, in the past,
their kinship practices involved a weaker link to the land and locality than those of
Shi'ahs. The reference point for the emerging administrative elite is now increasingly
urban and non-agricultural; and it seems likely that the social gap will continue to
widen between them and ordinary peasants. Particularly since they are creating new
marriage ties with people in Kargit (see Chapter 6). At the same time, agriculture is
increasingly regarded as a female occupation, whereas public politics are virtually
entirely male. Thus a shift of power is taking place away from the local area to the
urban centres of the government economy, which in the case of Suru are Kargil,
Srinagar and Jammu. This is having a profound effect on the allocation of resources
and development efforts towards farming and the rural areas.
In the last section I looked at the possibility of the yokma faction being able to reverse
some of this process through the school. By creating their own people with secular
education, who will remain part of the faction and continue to keep their primary loyalty
to Sum and the yokma-pa leadership. However, as I have suggested this is going to
be difficult given the political economy of the administration. Also, the school seems to
almost totally exclude the adult women, particularly those who have not attended
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school, in marked contrast to the other rituals and activities of the faction, in which
women play an important role. This de facto exclusion may have important
consequences in the future. Moreover, the school itself may represent the start of a
process of the yokma-pa elite joining the administrative elite rather than bringing
advantages to the wider faction membership, which it does not seem to do as yet.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
(i) Introduction
The main objective of this thesis was to examine the role of the yokma-pa as a
political organisation. It also sought to challenge the idea that the yokma-pa could
not be both a kinship group and act as an interest group in the 'modern' politics of
the Indian nation state.
In examining this question I have shown that internally the yokma-pa has witnessed
a great deal of continuity from the 1 960s to the 1 990s, during which time it has
experienced two major political phases, which, of course, have also overlapped.
The first was characterised by the millenarian movement and the dispute with the
goma-pa and the second by its increasing role in electoral politics and acting as an
interest group for its own members and Suru people in general. This second phase
resulted in the opening of the Noon Public School which was a focus for my
research.
Despite the remoteness of the Suru valley, the politics of the yokma-pa cannot be
understood in isolation, as their relatively peripheral position in larger polities over
the last three centuries has also had consequences for the present. When I started
this research my focus was mainly on their position as Shi'ahs, Muslims and
Kargilis in the context of Ladakh. However, the horrendous situation in Kashmir
and the fear of violence that I encountered dung fieldwork in Suru, forced me to
look at more general political issues in India to understand what was happening
there.
I came to realise that some of the processes occurring in Suru, ranging from the
expansion of private schooling to the increase in communal tension are common all
over India at present. While Suru and the yokma-pa may seem extremely
peripheral, events there lie at the heart of the current political crisis in India. So too
do the dilemmas that they face, particularly the contradictions that are encountered
in the Noon Public School.
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(ii) The yokma-pa as a Kinship Group
Land and location are the key elements in official kinship in Suru as membership of
several types of kinship group is assigned to people who share the same piece of
land. There are several levels to this official kinship: all Kargili Muslims, the Block
or subdivision, the village, the pa and the p'ha-spun. At the highest level, Kargili
Muslims see themselves as forming a community that is separate even from
Muslims from other areas, with whom, until recently, they still observed the she rpa
taboo against commensality and other 'wet' contact. Thus being located in the area
seems to be central to being a Muslim in Kargil. Similarly, someone is a Suru-pa by
virtue of living in one of the households that have land in Suru. Villages can also be
understood as kinship groups as each village is seen as a distinct entity and its
constituent households are regarded as sharing a single piece of land. Moreover,
citizenship in a village is assigned by the possession of land which carries with it
rights to take part in decision-making in the village but also the obligation to
contribute labour for village activities.
The importance of land for official kinship can be observed in the p'ha -spun,
membership of which is exists by virtue of sharing a piece of land. Hence, new
members can join a p'ha -spun by sharing its land irrespective of physical descent
(rgyud); and those who move right away and no longer share the land are
regarded as being of the same physical descent but are not members of the p'ha-
spun. This form of descent is almost exclusively male. Although land is sometimes
passed through women, these links are soon erased and it is rapidly absorbed into
the male structures of official kinship.
Another important aspect to the relationship with the land is that people should be
buried on their p'ha -spun's land. Even women, who in life are only loosely linked to
the land and the p'ha-spun, are buried on the land of their husband's p'ha -spun and
therefore become part of the official descent group. The graves of parents also
become the site for renewing kinship links with the natal home, particularly for
women at the time and after marriage. The central importance of burial to Suru
notions of kinship can be seen in the fact that I was frequently asked by new
acquaintances: Do you burn or bury your dead?", as this is how Suru-pa
distinguish themselves from Buddhists who bum their dead.
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Earlier this century the pa seems to have been the most important kinship group in
Suru. The effective pa was a village-level kinship group and each one had a
graveyard (qabristan) on its own land. At that time, there seem to have been origin
stories for pas in which they had a founding ancestor who was attributed with
settling in the village, fragments of which are still sometimes remembered and
correspondingly kinship terms existed for five generations of ancestry. However,
the sense of history which was previously invested in the line of ancestry and myths
of the pa is now found in the faction itself.
The p'ha -spun is a subdivision of the pa but, unlike the pa, it is regularly re-
constituted as the land that it is based on is divided. Hence, the ancestors that are
remembered are only those within living memory (both male and female) and the
p'ha-spun relationship is not traced beyond the grandparents' generation. Parents'
graves are still marked in the qabristan and feature in rituals at the time of marriage
in particular (see Chapter 6) but people do not distinguish even their grandparents'
graves and previous generations are completely forgotten.
The faction is the main kinship group for its members now and it also acts as their
lineage and history. Through their links with the aghas members share their
descent from the line of Imams. This can be seen most clearly in practices
concerning the graves (astanas) of the aghas' lineage members. These are
revered and visited by faction members and the names of the dead are
remembered in a way that is no longer done for ordinary ancestors. For example,
Agha Jaffar's death day is observed by a matam ceremony in Taisuru and the
yokma-pa also visit his astana on that day. Similarly, the history of the line of
Imams and their sufferings has become the history of faction members and of Suru
to some extent.
So a sense of history seems to have been relocated from the pa to the faction and
consequently the pa has ceased to be of any importance. In fact the faction now
encompasses the various local level official kinship groups. As it subsumes both
the p'ha -spun and the village into its organisation. The leading agha is now the
main (although not ultimate) authority for faction members in respect of landholding
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and inheritance, dispute settlement and household life-cycle events, particularly
marriage and funerals.
Notions of citizenship that are connected to the land have also been subsumed into
the faction to some extent. Possession of land gives rights for male household
heads to take part in decision-making within the p'ha -spun and the village.
However, as I have shown, the degree of authority that they exercise is relatively
weak and shared between groups of men and women as well, in marked contrast to
that of the leading agha who has a considerable amount of personal authority over
his following.
Within the faction, there is a well-defined hierarchy at the head of which is the
rehbar, Agha Miggi Ort. However, his power is partially based on the belief in his
spiritual powers, so his authority is tempered by the need for him to appear
impartial and detached. His authority can only really be challenged by his agnates,
the other aghas from the core lineage. As I showed, Agha Baqir, did appear to be
trying to enhance his own power base in Suru Block in 1993/4. However, his
propensity for open dispute was a disadvantage in that respect and seemed to
undermine his standing within the core of the faction.
Around the leading aghas there is an inner circle which consists of their close
relatives - both agnatic and affinal, other learned clerics and men from the richer
families in the faction - many of whom are hajjis. These men take some part in the
decision-making of the faction such as in the management committee meetings of
the school. In these gatherings clerics are considered to have the right to speak
because they have above average merit and understanding through their
possession of religious knowledge; and the hajji-pa have gained merit mainly
through donation. This is achieved both by giving money to the aghas beyond the
normal donations made by ordinary followers and through going on ziarat, which
involves considerable financial sacrifice and is considered to accrue large amounts
of merit. Thus status in the faction is understood to come from the possession of
religious merit and power.
Ordinary male faction members do not participate in decision-making and even if
they are present, they will normally remain silent. When they want to approach the
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agha for a favour they may ask some of the men at the core of the faction to
intercede for them. Women, however, more frequently take on the role of putting
requests to the agha. Although they are largely excluded from the official politics of
the faction and notions of citizenship and status, in practice they and their relations
to the leading aghas are crucial to the organisation of the faction. Equally, for
women, the faction is the most enduring kinship group.
One of the reasons for this is that their location in the official kinship groups is very
tenuous as they have few rights in the land of their natal home and often change
their marital household (and village) several times in their lives, due to divorce or
the death of a spouse. Women's ties of kinship are partially created through
weeping, particularly, but not exclusively, over graves in which case their tears can
be understood as watering the land which is the substance of male kinship.
Weeping also occurs in many other contexts and creates relationships where no
official ones exist through the medium of land. For instance, when a young woman
leaves her natal home at the time of marriage she weeps over her living parents
and if they are dead over their graves.
Within the faction women's tears are shed to gain merit and the intercession of
Husain. Significantly, women tend to weep more copiously and extravagantly than
men, with the exception of the agha who also sheds many tears in his seat on the
minbar. Women from the faction, particularly those from the richer families often
have kinship links with the agha created through permanent and temporary
marriages and relationships of moharam. These links enable women to approach
the agha in order to make requests and present disputes and petitions and
therefore gives them a role in the politics of the p'ha-spun and land that is denied
them by the official kinship.
Hence the faction is a kinship group with the aghas' lineage at its core. As I have
shown it acts as the main political organisation for its members, as well as being a
religious and kinship group. In fact these three fields cannot be understood as
separate as aspects of all three of them are present in most relationships within the
faction and they share some of the same idioms.
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(iii) The Yokma-pa as a Faction
By the 1 990s the yokma-pa had taken on the role of acting as an interest group for
its members in the electoral and administrative politics of the area. Although their
engagement with secular education, in particular, did represent a major shift from
their previous stance, this had not required any great change in the organisation of,
or relationships within, the faction. The Noon Public School is regarded by most
members as an extension of the faction and therefore their donations (both of
money and children) are partly understood as good works that gain merit for the
donors. Similarly, one reason why yokma-pa members will vote according to the
aghas' wishes is because to follow his guidance is considered a meretricious act.
Equally, to disobey the agha is to run the risk of being a sinner. However, at the
same time, people do not do things just because the agha tells them to, as
witnessed by the difficulty of recruiting many yokma-pa children for the Noon Public
School.
Nevertheless, the faction has been able to adjust to the changing context and there
is no necessary contradiction between its constitution as a religious and kinship
group and its engagement in 'modern' electoral politics. So it clearly calls into
question the distinction between vertical kinship-based organisations and 'rational'
politics that some authors have made (see Chapter 1). Similarly, there are
continuities in the ideological differences between the yokma and goma factions
and their outside links both in the Shi'ite world and in party politics. Within Suru
Block, the three factions form distinct kinship groups between which there is now
virtually no intermarriage or changing of sides. Nevertheless, the apparent
solidarity and endurance of the factions does not preclude other cross-cutting ties.
In particular those of village and locality that I demonstrated in Chapter 5.
In addition, the fact that it is a vertical organisation does not prevent the yokma-pa
from acting as an interest group for its members and to some extent as a regional
organisation that represents the people of Sum and Sankhoo Blocks in the wider
politics of the area. In this respect it is similar to other interest groups based on
ties of religion, region, class, caste or gender that are currently found all over the
world and have a particular importance in the political economy of the nation state
in India (Jalal 1995:336, Mitra 1994:68, KohIl 1990:385).
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Membership of the factions in Suru Block seems to have remained very steady in
the last two decades at least. This is not surprising as their boundaries are now
very sharp and defined by endogamy, so leaving a faction requires joining another
one or looking for marriage partners elsewhere. As I have shown, the only person
in Suru Block who seems to have ceased to be a yokma-pa in recent years is Hajji
Mirza, who has formed alliances with the Sunnis and the administrative elite in
Kargil. His move is still unique in Suru but may be an indicator of wider changes
some of which I described in Chapters 6 and 7, of which, possibly the most
significant is the emergence of an administrative elite which is largely Kargil-based
but also involves people from Suru.
(iv) The Emergence of an Administrative Elite
The fact that the major political groups in the area are vertical organisations, does
not preclude the existence of horizontal organisations. Moreover, the
administrative elite is partly emerging through alliances between people from
different factions. Carter observed a similar phenomenon in South India, where he
says that despite the existence of vertical factions, power was most often brokered
in alliances between faction leaders and hence there was an elite that cross-cut the
factions (Carter 1974:7ff).
The emergence of this elite in Kargil tehsil seems to be largely linked to the large
scale introduction of the government economy in the last three decades. As I
demonstrated, in Suru, the Sunnis entered into secular education and government
employment much earlier than the Shi'ahs, for a number of reasons. In the 1 970s
and 1 980s, their possession of white-collar government jobs provided a platform for
them to greatly increase their status in Suru and to carve out a position for
themselves as the educated and 'modem' people in the Block. Nevertheless, it is
doubtful whether in Suru itself the conditions or political will exist for them to create
a separate class, particularly since the Suru Sunnis are all still engaged in
agriculture and are a small minority in Suru. Hence in 1993/4, the yokma-pa
appeared to be able to successfully challenge a notion of Sunni dominance in the
field of education. Nevertheless, processes of class formation do seem to be
occurring in the wider tehsi! in which both Sunnis and Shi'ahs are participating.
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This emerging elite, just like the factions is constituted as a kinship organisation.
However, it appears to be a horizontal or a vertical organisation. At the core are
the Munshi Habibullah clan and a few other powerful Kargil families, surrounded by
a network of marriage ties that link them to other families with jobs in the
administration. These families only marry within the group, or with other people
who are also involved in the administration and they do not intermarry with the
Shi'ite religious elite, although they are predominantly Shi'ah themselves. I have
suggested that the administrative jobs themselves that facilitate the creation of a
class as these provide bureaucrats with an automatic constituency in the orm of
their public so, in effect, they have a following without having to create it through
kinship strategies as the aghas do.
This administrative class partly constitutes itself as being more 'modern' and
educated than ordinary Shi'ahs in the area. Ills also largely urban and its members
are increasingly withdrawing from agriculture. The effect in Suru is that aspirants
to the administrative elite are moving to Kargil and even Srinagar and abandoning
agriculture. Therefore, there seems to be a growing economic and social divide
developing between the urban administrative elite and the majority of (rnanly
Shi'ite) peasants in the area. One problem this creates is that a largely urban
administration is charged with 'developing' the rural areas, often without reference
to the opinion of the peasants themselves. This particularly affects peasant women
most of whom lack secular education and are largely confined to the rural areas.
Even in the yokma-pa itself, which to some extent represents the rural area, politics
is increasingly conducted in spaces to which women do not have access. This was
true of the Noon Public School as I was the only woman present in all the
management committee meetings and ceremonies during my fieldwork. A feature
of the school which contrasts with women's importance to other political debates
and rituals within the faction.
Another consequence of the changes taking place is that some men who are
aspirants to the administrative elite or who are more involved in the governmental
economy, seem to be redefining their masculinity. One aspect of this is the attempt
to increase their authority within the household through greater control over women,
children and servants. Another related one is the privatising of religion through
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increasing emphasis on household-based prayers. These tendencies may
ultimately lead to an undermining of some of the authority of the aghas because of
the increasing authority of male household heads and the relocating of religious
observance into the household. However, at the moment, most of their more
successful followers continue to support the agha and the power of the faction is
being enhanced by their increased ability to donate money. At the moment the
faction seems to be holding together in the face of these processes and it remains
to be seen whether its own elite will increasingly be drawn into the administrative
elite partially through the long-term effects of the Noon Public School.
For educated and employed women, such as the women teachers, the situation is
also ambivalent as they are both gaining some degree of independence through
their salaries while at the same time under increasing surveillance by male relatives
as the control of women has become an important issue in inter-faction politics.
This phenomenon seems to be connected to the increasing communalisation of
politics that has taken place both in Ladakh and Kashmir in the last few decades.
(v) Communalism and Kinship
In recent decades in Ladakh, religious difference has become less flexible and
inter-religious marriage and conversion are now both rare and less publicly
acceptable. For example, one of the main measures of the Buddhist boycott of
Muslims in 1989-1992, was a ban on intermarriage which still continues. That
particular period was also marked by some incidences of communal violence, such
as the burning of Muslims' homes and forced conversions to Buddhism that
occurred in at least one village near Leh. Partially as a consequence of this, in
Kargil town, the small Buddhist monastery (gonpa) is under 24 hour police guard to
prevent it being destroyed by some Muslims.
The yokma-pa and goma-pa also refuse to intermarry and are in a state of conflict.
However, I have been at pains to show that they have been pathologised by
derogatory discourse on Shi'ism in the area. In his book TMThe Construction of
Communalism in Colonial North India" (1 990), Pandey suggests that the British
exaggerated reports of inter-religious violence at Muharram and used these
invented episodes in the construction of discourses that both pathologised Indian
religion and legitimated the British as rational and impartial rulers. As I have shown
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in the example of the yokma goma dispute, they do fight over merit which is an
ordinary part of Shi'ah kinship therefore, the violence itself can be understood as an
aspect of kinship relations.
This is also true of the more violent outbreaks that have occurred in Ladakh in the
last decade. For example, one of the key ways in which difference was constructed
between the religious groups in both Leh and Suru was by the refusal to give
women to the other group. In Leh, it was common in the past for Buddhist women
to marry Muslim men, often in what in Leh are called 'marriage by capture'
(skuste). This form of marriage covered a multitude of circumstances from outright
abduction (albeit one that was often then regularised), to elopement and a
convenient fiction for an arranged inter-religious marriage. However, from the late
1 970s, when these marriages took place between Muslim men and Buddhist
women, they were increasingly treated as being an assault on Buddhist manhood
and by the early 1 980s onwards, they were often forcibly prevented. Thus the
control of women became key elements in the construction of a more aggressive
and clearly defined Buddhist identity.
In Suru the control of women has also been an important element in the Sunni-
yokma-pa split. Relations between the two groups had become more hostile after
Sunnis had refused to give brides to Shi'ahs. However, they came to a head when
a yokma-pa woman was allegedly raped by Sunni young men after which Sunnis
were apparently discouraged from attending Shi'ah ceremonies. Similarly, in the
summer of 1994. Gender was also an issue in the Kargee school students
demonstration, a protest which was partly directed against Sunni women teachers
(see Chapter 5).
Hence in both Leh and Suru the control of and, sometimes, attacks on, women do
seem to be a common theme in the hardening of religious identities. Incidents of
violence in both Suru and Leh are relatively rare. However, in Kashmir, there are
many reports of incidences of rape of Kashmiri women by the army. Gender and
rape are key themes in more violent incidents of dominance generally in the region
and elsewhere (Jayawardena & de Alwis 1996).
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As I showed in my analysis of the politics of Suru in Chapter 5, during the period
when democratic politics were withdrawn in Jammu and Kashmir, there was a
tendency for disputes to be framed along religious divisions Sunnis and Shi'ahs. At
that time Kashmir was under Governor's Rule and anti-Sunni discourses in the
whole area made them an easy butt for Shi'ah claims of unfair treatment. Van
Beek and Brix Bertelson make the same claim concerning the politics of Leh tehsil,
suggesting that the Buddhists voiced their demands for regional autonomy in anti-
Muslim terms, as religious difference is intrinsic to the ideology and structures of
the Indian state and hence demands using communal idioms would be better
acknowledged (van Beek and Brix Bertelson 1995). The period of Governor's Rule
also meant that there were no democratic politics in the state and the virtual
absence of political parties seems to have left a vacuum for more communalised
forms of identification. However, in Suru, as noted, the sense of local community
was also strong, and frequently worked to mediate these disputes. Similarly, with
the restoration of democratic politics in 1996, the previously existing factional
politics returned and religion ceased to be so central to their positions.
The communalism that occurred in Ladakh in the 1 980s and 1 990s was partly
caused by central government interference in the 1 980s, which had raised tensions
in the state (Jalal 1995:1 79, Singh 1996). Therefore Jalal's conclusion that a
greater degree of federalisation and regional autonomy would allow people to find
compromises in their own area seems correct, in Suru at least (Jalal 1995:257).
Some writers are optimistic that factions or interest groups will also provide a
solution to the political crisis (Mitra 1994, Khilnani 1998); however, they seem to
ignore some of the more major structural problems in India which are to some
extent implicated in the existence of those very political groups.
(vi) The Yokma-pa, the Noon Public School
My long-term engagement with Ladakh has given me a perspective on what might
be termed the private school movement there, as I taught in one of the first private
schools in Leh in the early 1 980s. Since then, there has been such an expansion of
private schooling in the Leh town area that there are only a handful of children -
nearly all non-Ladakhi labourers - who attend government primary schools. Many
villages also have a private primary school today. A number, including the one
where I taught, are run by the Buddhist Lamdon Society and other such religious
276
social-welfare organisations. In Kargit tehsil, a similar expansion of private schools
started in the 1 980s, so there are now a dozen or so throughout the tehsil of which
several are in Kargil town and Baroo. Apparently a similar rapid expansion in
private schooling is occurring all over India and it is so common for caste and
religious groups to set up primary schools that Drury has talked about an explosion
of private education in the country in the last decade (1993:vii).
The opening of the Noon Public School, despite its remote position, therefore,
reflects political currents in India more generally. Clearly I do not know what the
motivation is behind the expansion of private schooling in other parts of India. But,
in Suru, and Ladakh generally, the main impetus for parents comes from the desire
to have some political and cultural control over schools and for their children to
obtain white-collar employment, through the possession of educational
qualifications. However, as I suggested in the last chapter, there are inherent
contradictions in such an approach. Firstly, the pre-existing structures and attitudes
in education make it very difficult to enter the system without to some extent being
changed by it. Therefore, the yokma-pa aghas who allow their children to attend
the Noon Public School merely to gain educational qualifications in a purely
instrumental way may be ultimately less realistic than the haul-pa's view that their
children will be changed by the school.
The rapid growth in private schools is also partially a product of interest group
politics, another side of which is the expectation of obtaining jobs which the state
clearly can never provide. In Kargil, the situation has been exacerbated by the
political treatment of Kashmir by the centre, which has used a disastrous mixture of
the carrot in terms of promises (usually unfulfilled) of government funding and the
stick, in the form of authoritarian rule. This has created a situation in which rising
demands for education and jobs are countered by violent responses by the
authorities.
During the election campaign of 1996, I witnessed such an occasion in Kargil town,
when young men from students' organisations were demonstrating about the lack of
government jobs. While marching, they were met by baton (lath!) wielding police
firing, I heard, the occasional bullet. Two days later, I witnessed a demonstration in
Leh, by mainly female school students, protesting against the abduction and rape of
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a young Buddhist woman by a soldier. That demonstration was allowed to pass
peaceably and representatives met with a senior officer who took swift action and
arrested the man allegedly responsible for the attack.
Most important for my theme about the marginality of the yokma-pa in Ladakh and
the region, the election of 1996 also saw Qamer Au being given the important
position of Minister of Public Works in the Jammu and Kashmir state government.
At the same time, the National Front government raised a brief glimmer of hope that
they would try to solve the Kashmir problem. So it looked as if the pokma-pa's and
Suru's fortunes had changed. However, by 1998, the creation of the Hindu
nationalist BJP government, the failure to create any settlement of the Kashmir
problem in India and the shelling of Kargil by Pakistan in the autumn of 1997, make
the prospects for Suru seem worse than they did in 1996.
This thesis has demonstrated that possibilities for the yokma-pa are framed by their
structural position within Ladakh and India. Nevertheless, they are not mere
objects of exogenous forces, which they can either accommodate or resist. Despite
their apparently peripheral position in India, they are playing a part in creating
'modern' India and an examination of their politics has revealed valuable insights
into more general political processes in India.
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Glossary
Term In text
alam
am-pa
agha
akhun
api
apo
archo
astana
azhang
bag-mo
bag-pho
bag-ston
baraka
batin
behosh
bekar
bomo
cho-cho
daftar
dahon
dasteh
dawat
duksmi
fatiha
Arabic, Farsi or
Urdu
transliteration
'alam
m-pa
ghã
khün
ästãna
barka
btin
behis
bëkar
dattar
dasteh
däwat
fãtiha
Meaning
banner for Muharram processions (Farsi)
ordinary people - as opposed to sayyids (am
is Urdu for ordinary)
male sayyid
village-level cleric
grandmother
grandfather
female sayyid
tomb of a saint (Urdu)
mother's brother
bride
groom
wedding
blessing bestowed by an agha or other
religious leader
that which is hidden, in reference to
knowledge
unconcious (Urdu)
unemployed (Urdu)
girl
honorific title given to am-pa wives of aghas
the aghas area of administration and records
women's head shawl
procession (Farsi)
dinner (Urdu)
household servant
verses from the Koran read for the dead
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hãjji
ijtihad
imm-bgrah
jultrs
khasida
khums
madrasa
al-Mandi
mahr
majlis
marsiyeh
masjid
matn
ma'tam-i-sarai
minbar
mohram
Muharram
mujtahid
murid
mut'a
nauroz
nikh
namz
goma
gron
hajji
holto
ijtihad
imam-barah
juloos
khasidas
khums
laktsiks
Iamstan
madrasa
Mandi
mahr
majlis
mars iya
masjid
matam
matam-i-sarai
milaks
minbar
mirabs
moharam
Muharram
mujtahid
murid
mut'a
nauroz
nene
nikah
nimaz
upper
dinner
person who has been to Mecca or to Shi'ite
holy places
grief or remembrance
judgement (Farsi)
an Urdu name for a matam-i-sarai
procession (Urdu)
hymns of rejoicing
Shi'ite taxes
reciprocal free labour
shower of the way' - used for the rehbar
religious school
the Tweith or "Hidden" Imam
payment made to a woman on divorce
religious gathering (Farsi)
mourning dirge (Farsi)
mosque
speech of stories from the Hadiths and
advice
building for above
free labourers
the agha's stepped seat in the masjid or
matam-i-sarai
ancestors
members of the opposite sex with whom you
may shake hands etc.
the first month in the Islamic calendar
important Shi'ite guide
followers
temporary marriage
New Year
father's sister
ordinary marriage contract
prayers (Farsi)
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noha
nyespa
nyo-pa
orche
pa
p'ha-spun
qabr
qabristan
qatl
rehbar
rgyud
rintho
rus
sagyat
sangma
sigheh
sithu
snyen
tawiz
tazia
phyak
pir
p00 ba
savab
sawab
sayyid
shaikh
sherpa
nauha	 mourning chants for Muharram (Farsi)
sin
bride groom's companions
a local term for matam
patrilineal clan that shared the land
sub-clan that shares the land and life-cycle
ceremonies
prayers
pir	 Sunni preacher
healing given by saying prayers and blowing
on affected person
qabr	 grave
qabristan	 graveyard
qatl	 killing - as in Qati Gah - killing ground
rehbar	 guide (Farsi)
descent
brideprice
bone - meaning descent
land
food touched by the agha, which is then
blessed
savb	 merit (Farsi)
sawb	 good works - leading to merit (Farsi)
descendent of the Prophet Mohammed's
family
shãykh	 highly educated religious officiant
'wet' - also refers to the Kargili Muslim
prohibition
sigheh	 another name for muta'a (Farsi)
another name for sherpa
relatives
tawTz	 protective charm given by clerics
ta'ziyah	 model of tomb carried during Muharram
processions
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tobarok
	
tabgrak
yokma
zahir	 zhfr
zat	 zt
ziarat	 ziyãrat
zizi
food or other goods which are given by an
agha or after a religious ceremony and confer
blessing
upper
revealed knowledge
the Sunni name for a clan
pilgrimage to Shi'ite holy sites in the middle
east (Farsi)
honorific word for mother mainly used for
archos
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